Russia’s recent breach of Polish airspace may be Donald Trump’s last chance to show resolute opposition to Moscow’s assaults against Ukraine. But the stakes aren’t limited to the European battlefront. America must also make clear to China and others that unprovoked aggression against U.S. friends and allies beyond Europe is equally unacceptable. For peace and security in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, Washington must repair U.S.-India relations damaged by imposing 25% tariffs on India for importing Russian oil and gas.
This is a pivotal moment. White House equivocation on Poland will undercut support for Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and will encourage potential aggressors in Asia and the Middle East. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made his displeasure with Washington clear through his recent Beijing meetings with Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un. Despite social-media efforts to revive Trump-Modi personal relations, India remains seared by the Russia-related tariffs and doubts about Mr. Trump’s good faith in trade negotiations, which he abruptly terminated in August before imposing the tariffs.
Mr. Trump’s earlier claims of resolving Indo-Pakistani conflict over terrorist attacks in Kashmir violated longstanding Indian insistence, embodied in the 1972 Simla Agreement, that such disputes be resolved only between the parties. India is also smarting from the Trump administration’s welcome to Field Marshal Asim Munir, chief of staff of Pakistan’s army, in June. He was the first Pakistani military leader hosted at the White House with no civilian leaders present, and the first world leader to nominate Mr. Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize.
All this outrages India, harking back to the era of a “hyphenated” U.S. policy toward New Delhi and Islamabad. Under that approach, Washington tilted toward one or the other—usually Pakistan during the Cold War. Neither India nor Pakistan liked being hyphenated. Each wanted to be treated on its own merits, which George W. Bush’s administration succeeded in doing.
No serious observer believes Russia’s contention that its drone strikes in Poland weren’t intentional. Moscow was likely testing NATO in two ways, first by assessing its capabilities against drones. On this score, the results were unfortunate. Neither NATO nor U.S. alliances generally have cost-effective defenses against drone capabilities evolving daily in the Ukraine conflict. This deficiency isn’t surprising, but now there is proof.
Second, Moscow wanted to test whether crossing a NATO border is really the red line we have long declared. The early signs aren’t encouraging. Mr. Trump’s reaction was to dismiss Russia’s drone attack, saying “it could have been a mistake.”
He later urged Europeans to impose tariffs of as much as 100% on India and China for buying Russian hydrocarbons. Mr. Trump then demanded that NATO members cease buying Russian oil before Washington imposes further sanctions on Moscow. This ploy could simply excuse him, yet again, from taking meaningful action against Russia. Most likely, it means the Ukraine war continues, and India remains singled out as collateral damage.
China’s purchases of Russian oil and gas are part of the problem, as is the two countries’ growing axis. By contrast, India’s purchases, and most others, while undesirable, are symptoms of the problem. One major reason existing anti-Russia sanctions are ineffective is that they embody two inconsistent objectives. They were intended to reduce Russian revenue for funding the Ukraine war, but also, through a price-cap mechanism, to maintain flows of Russian oil into global markets, thereby avoiding increased European and American retail gasoline prices and the inevitable negative political consequences.
These conflicting objectives persist, but one must give way. Targeting China, the largest buyer of Russian oil and gas, and a predator on Pakistan, makes sense. Leaving India hanging is a mistake. America and Gulf oil producers should help India make the transition away from reliance on Russian hydrocarbons, just as major buyers of Iranian commodities shifted to new suppliers after 2018 when Mr. Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal and reimposed U.S. sanctions. Curtailing the international availability of Russian oil opens opportunities for other producers, not least the U.S., to expand sales to India and others. Our goal should be to constrain Russia and China, while rebuilding relations with India.
Showing political resolve in Europe and Asia requires White House leadership. If that is forthcoming, Russia will have to rethink its views of American resolve. If not, the future could be grim, both on NATO’s eastern flank and along China’s vast Indo-Pacific periphery.
This article was originally published in the Wall Street Journal, on September 19, 2025. Click here to read the original article.