Ukraine, Trump and the Middle East

March 17, 2025

Donald Trump’s jarring Oval Office confrontation with Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelensky symbolizes what is wrong with Trump’s dysfunctional approach to foreign policy. In what seemed like a television comedy show, Trump accused Zelensky of everything from risking World War III to having no cards to play in defending his homeland from Russia’s unprovoked aggression. Trump then kicked Zelensky out of the West Wing without even providing lunch.

Most American children are raised to be more polite to their guests. The real meaning of the Oval Office debacle, however, does not turn on who committed the worst breaches of etiquette. Instead, Trump’s evident hostility toward Zelensky reflected the reversal of America’s position in the Russo-Ukrainian war, from supporting Ukraine to effectively supporting Russia. Recent US history provides nothing remotely comparable to Trump’s about-face.

Trump, of course, contends he is merely seeking peace to stop what he called in his State of the Union address the “senseless” war in Europe’s center. Of course, neither Russia nor Ukraine consider the war “senseless,” albeit for very different reasons. The Kremlin is fighting to recreate the Russian empire, a goal Putin announced as far back as 2005, whereas Ukraine is defending its freedom and independence. Americans once fought for freedom and independence, and certainly didn’t consider it “senseless.”

What explains Trump’s emphasis on rapidly ending the conflict, and his sympathy for Moscow? He has frequently said that if he has good personal relations with a foreign head of state, then America has good relations with that leader’s country. Conversely, if his personal relations with a foreign leader are bad, then US relations with his country are bad. Personal relations have a place in international affairs, as in all things, but they are not decisive factors in national-security decision-making, especially for the world’s hard men like Putin, China’s Xi Jinping, or North Korea’s Kim Jung Un. These authoritarians are cold-blooded and clear-eyed in knowing what their national interest are, and they pursue those interests unhesitatingly.

Trump, by contrast, pursues his personal interest. He thinks Putin, Xi, and Kim are his friends, even saying(https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/we-fell-in-love-trump-and-kim-shower-praise-stroke-egos-on-path-to-nuclear-negotiations/2019/02/24/46875188-3777-11e9-854a-7a14d7fec96a_story.html) he and Kim “fell in love.” In the case of Ukraine, that explains Trump’s tilt toward Putin and against Zelensky: Trump wants the war, which he considers Biden’s responsibility, behind him so that Moscow-Washington relations will improve. During the 2024 campaign, Trump said repeatedly that the war would never have begun had he been President.

Based on my own observations, Putin, reflecting his KGB training and skills, does not think he and Trump are friends. Rather, Trump is an easy mark, to be manipulated to achieve Moscow’s objectives. In short, the Kremlin sees Trump as what Vladimir Lenin once called a “useful idiot,” meaning he can be made to serve Russian purposes without realizing what he is doing. As part of his ongoing manipulation, Putin recently agreed the war in Ukraine would not have occurred under a Trump presidency(https://www.cnn.com/2025/01/24/world/putin-trump-ukraine-crisis-talks-intl/index.html).

Putin continued the manipulation by releasing Marc Foley, an American hostage held in Moscow, followed by Belarus releasing another US hostage, and much more. The game continues, as reflected by Putin’s conditional acceptance of the Saudi-brokered cease-fire between Washington and Kyiv. Putin doesn’t want to endanger the concessions Trump has already made to him, so he carefully accepted the cease-fire in principle, only to obscure it with conditions and modifications. Despite this carefully muddled answer, Trump was enthusiastic, saying it was “very good and productive(https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-calls-for-trump-putin-talks-on-ukraine-war-4dd35ede).” The Kremlin must have celebrated its success.

What does Trump himself want? He wants the Nobel Peace Prize. After all, Barack Obama won the 2009 Nobel for no particular reason, just months after assuming office. Under Nobel’s prize rules, nominations for a given year must be submitted by January 31 of that year(https://www.nobelpeaceprize.org/nobel-peace-prize/nomination/), meaning Obama’s nominations had to be received eleven days after his Inauguration, making the award laughable. Trump may not realize it is already too late for him to win this year, but he still craves the faded glory of a Nobel prize.

The likely next step on Ukraine is direct Trump-Putin talks, which Trump clearly wants as soon as possible. Putin also wants direct negotiations because it provides an opportunity to manipulate Trump directly, rather than through intermediaries. Moreover, by definition, their conversation would exclude Ukraine and the Europeans from the real dealmaking, which won’t bother Trump as all. While there is no certainty to the outcome of this coming conversation, all signs point to a result heavily skewed in Moscow’s favor.

The lesson for the Middle East goes straight to the question, how to deal with Trump? He is not pursuing some American grand strategy or playing sophisticated three-dimensional chess. He is pursuing a Trump-centric strategy in two dimensions, one move at a time. Keep that in mind, pile on some personal flattery of Trump, add pomp and circumstance, and who knows what Trump will be prepared to give away?

This article was first published in Independent Arabia on March 17, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

The Only Question Trump Asks Himself

March 11, 2025

Ukraine’s Volodomyr Zelensky is “a dictator without elections,” with only a four percent
approval rating( https://www.newsweek.com/what-trump-has-said-about-zelensky-since-2022-
2039000 ). The war in Ukraine( https://apnews.com/article/trump-speech-congress-transcript-
751b5891a3265ff1e5c1409c391fef7c ) is “madness” and “senseless.” While it is true Russia is
currently “pounding” Ukraine, “probably anyone in that position would be doing that right
now( https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crknjxj3n4zo ).” Kyiv is “more difficult, frankly, to deal
with” than Moscow.
This Russian propaganda could be easily dismissed, were it not being verbalized by
Donald Trump. He has turned US policy on the Russo-Ukraine war 180 degrees. Instead of
aiding a victimized country with enormous agricultural, mineral, and industrial resources in the
heart of Europe, bordering on key NATO allies, a region whose stability and prosperity have
been vital to American national security for eight decades, we now sides with the invader.
Ukrainians are fighting and dying for their freedom and independence, as near neighbors like
Lech Walesa fully appreciate(( https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/03/polish-ex-
president-lech-walesa-expresses-orror-and-distaste-at-donald-trump-volodymyr-zelenskyy-jd-
vance-spat?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email ). For most Americans, “freedom” and
“independence” resonate, but not for Trump.
He has gone well beyond rhetoric. In an unprecedented nationally televised display, he
clashed with Zelensky face-to-face in the Oval Office, ironically a very Wilsonian act: open
covenants openly destroyed. Trump suspended US military aid to Ukraine, including vital
intelligence, to make the obdurate Zelensky bend his knee. Even when Trump “threatened”
Russia with sanctions and tariffs, the threat was hollow. Russia is already evading a broad array
of poorly enforced sanctions, and could evade more. On tariffs, US imports from Russia in 2024
were a mere $3 billion( https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4621.html ), down ninety
percent from 2021’s level, before Russia’s invasion, and trivial compared to $4.1 trillion in total
2024 imports( https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/05/business/economy/us-trade-deficit-2024-
record.html ).
The Kremlin is delighted. Former President Dmitri Medvedev wrote on X: “If you’d
told me just three months ago that these were the words of the US president, I would have
laughed out loud( https://tass.com/politics/1916157) .” Unfortunately, none of this is new for
Trump. His view on Putin has remained constant for years. Saying recently that dealing with
Putin was easier than with Zelensky and that Putin would be “more generous than he has to
be( https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/mar/07/trump-says-it-is-easier-to-deal-with-
russia-and-putin-wants-to-end-the-war )” simply reprises Trump’s first term. Leaving the White
House in July, 2018, for a NATO summit (where he almost withdrew America from the
alliance), and later meetings with Prime Minister Theresa May in England and Putin in Finland
(where he seemed to back Putin over US intelligence), Trump said meeting Putin “may be the
easiest of them all. Who would think( https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/10politics/trump-putin-
meeting/index.html )?” Obviously, only Trump.
This is serious, and may be fatal both for Kyiv and NATO. Trump has sought for years
to debilitate or destroy the alliance. He doesn’t like it; he doesn’t understand it; he frowns on
its Brussels headquarters building; and, worst of all, it was deeply involved not only in Ukraine,
but Afghanistan, which he didn’t like either. Trump wants to withdraw from NATO, but, near
term, he can do serious-enough damage simply to render the alliance unworkable. Recent
reports that Trump is considering defending only those NATO allies meeting the agreed defense-
spending targets( https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/trump-considering-major-
nato-policy-shift-rcna195089 ) mirrors prior suggestions from his aides. This approach is not
merely unworkable, but devastating for the alliance( https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-should-
lay-off-nato-target-the-u-n-7e02e960 ).
What explains Trump’s about-face on Ukraine and disdain for NATO? Many find it
impossible to grasp how aberrational Trump is: he does not have a philosophy or a national-
security grand strategy. He does not do “policy” as Washington understands that term. His
approach is personal, transactional, ad hoc, episodic, centering on one question: what benefits
Donald Trump? In international affairs, Trump has said repeatedly that if he has good personal
relations with a foreign head of state, then America has good relations with that country. While
personal relations have their place, the hard men like Putin, Xi Jinping, and Kim Jung Un are not
distracted by emotions. Trump thinks Putin is his friend. Putin sees Trump as an easy mark,
pliable and manipulable, demonstrated by his approach post-November 5.
Trump says he trusts that Putin wants peace and will honor his commitments, despite
massive contrary evidence. Notwithstanding considerable efforts. Zelensky has never escaped
the “perfect” phone call precipitating Trump’s first impeachment. Of course, that call turned on
Trump’s now-familiar extortionist threat to withhold security assistance to Ukraine if Zelensky
did not produce Hilary Clinton’s server and investigate other supposed anti-Trump activity in
Ukraine aimed at thwarting his 2016 and 2020 presidential campaigns. The entirely personal
nature of Trump’s approach also manifests itself domestically. Trump is now reversing what
Biden did in Ukraine, just as, in his first term, he reflexively reversed Obama. Trump derided
Obama for not providing lethal military assistance to Ukraine, so he did just that, sending
Tomahawk cruise missiles and more.
Ronald Reagan knew what to do about nations that might commit unprovoked aggression
against US interests. Trump clearly does not. This does not reflect differences in strategy,
which Trump lacks. Instead, it’s another Trump reversal, this time of The Godfather’s famous
line, “it’s not business, it’s strictly personal.”

This article was first published in The Atlantic on March 11, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Review of Kaplan, Waste Land: A World in Permanent Crisis

March 04, 2025

T.S Eliot would not have minded Robert Kaplan expropriating the title of his most
famous poem for his latest book, Waste Land. Kaplan’s focus on the decline of the West and the
birth of modernism were among the poem’s themes(175), and his latest tour de force on the
unhappy state of the world is decidedly pessimistic on many fronts, even while dwelling only
occasionally on Donald Trump.

In this extended essay, Kaplan makes three broad points. First, he analogizes the current
world, all of it, to Germany’s inter-war Weimar Republic. He argues that, as Weimar was in
permanent crisis, so, analogously, the entire planet is now “an interconnected system of states in
which no one really rules(14).” Of course, that has long been true, but extraordinarily dense and
rapid communications capabilities now make “closeness(34)” inevitable in a way that prior
history did not experience. And since “complexity leads to fragility(42),” instability and conflict
are riskier and more pervasive than in bygone days when the earth’s enormous size prevented
diverse conflicts from becoming global.

Second, Kaplan argues that America, China and Russia, the three great powers, are all in
decline, although at varying rates and for widely different reasons. The United States, he writes,
suffers from “decay in the culture of public life, especially the media…[A]s the media has
become less serious, so have our leaders(93).” The most graphic contrast between recent
Presidents, for example, is Dwight Eisenhower, general and war hero, compared to Trump, who
represents “the epitome of self-centered, emotional impulses(49).”

Analogizing to the late Ottoman Empire, Kaplan calls contemporary Russia Europe’s sick
man(81). He stresses that Russia’s decline “is of a different scale entirely(96),” and “on a far
more advanced state of rot(101)” than the US, although both had their own “disastrous wars of
choice(90)” in Ukraine and Iraq respectively. The good news for us is that Iraq was not nearly
so important to America as Ukraine was to Russia. US decline is “subtle and qualitative,” while
Russia’s civilizational slide is “fundamental(107).” Tracking America’s worsening political
leadership, Kaplan contrasts China’s Deng Xiaoping, whose record remains underrated, with his
successor Xi Jinping: “nothing if not a Leninist ideologue(113)” who has “returned China to the
die-hard authoritarianism, bordering on totalitarianism,” of Mao Tse-tung(115).

This competition among great powers, even receding ones, may sound like most of pre-
20 th century history, but it sets the stage for Kaplan’s third point: his lengthy diagnosis of the
West’s decline, starting with the originator of that phrase, Oswald Spengler. Kaplan sees global
urbanization as “the primary change in geopolitics(129),” with cities as “the conservative’s worst
nightmare(134).” Although we shouldn’t need a reminder, Kaplan provides it: technology and
civilization are not the same thing(170).

Through both physical and communications proximity, crowd psychologies and
“excitable public opinion(136),” create a kind of “mob(139),” that accelerates especially
America’s decline: “It is the masses speaking through one voice that are the danger(138).” In
the US, Kaplan distinguishes between the conflicting views of those living in cities versus those
dwelling in what F. Scott Fitzgerald called “that vast obscurity…where the dark fields of the
republic rolled on under the night(149).” All of this is compounded, as George Orwell
depressingly writes in Nineteen Eighty-Four, because “History has stopped. Nothing exists
except an endless present(169).”

Enormous consequences flow from Kaplan’s take, perhaps none more important for the
United States than its place in the wider world. For someone who earlier wrote a book called
The Revenge of Geography, it is telling that Kaplan’s thinking today concludes that “the finite
earth is gradually losing the race against technology and population growth(89).” This ever-
increasing “closeness” increases the importance of what once seemed distant: “Every place,
every river and mountain range, will be strategic(34).” The cyber age means “the enemy is now
only one click away rather than thousands of miles away(117).”

With so many in the United States now seeking escape from both history and geography,
these should be chilling words, but probably are not. The isolationist impulse currently at full
flood in political debate is increasingly less and less intelligible. Policies sensible in a world
where enormous distances meant conflicts could be contained are today not merely outdated but
dangerous. This shift has been underway for some time, of course. Neville Chamberlain was
wrong for many reasons to describe Germany’s 1938 lust for Czechoslovakia as a “quarrel in a
far-away country,” when it was already in Great Britain’s backyard. Vice President Vance’s
recent condescending lecture( https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/14/world/europe/vance-europe-
immigration-ukraine.html ) to Europeans in Munich referred to election controversies in what he
labelled “remote Romania,” reprising Chamberlain’s glib, arrogant and ultimately debilitating
lack of situational and strategic awareness.

Faced with major, nuclear-armed adversary powers, and numerous lesser threats along a
broad spectrum, America’s grievances against its own allies must be taken in perspective against
the broader menaces we face together. Complaints that allies are not carrying their fair share of
the common-defense burden are accurate and have domestic political appeal, but mere
complaining is not strategic thinking. The answer, in Kaplan’s “close” world is not that allies do
more and we do less, which is Trump’s hazy view, but that everyone on “our side” does more,
because the global threat level is high and rising.

Contemporary policy prescriptions are not Kaplan’s immediate objective, but his broader
analysis inevitably provokes them. His seemingly inexhaustible capacity to analogize and
extrapolate is compelling and helpful, even if some, like the Weimar analogy, don’t bear the load
Kaplan imposes on them. A closer fit to today’s “closeness” might well be Europe’s post-
Reformation religious conflicts, or Archduke Ferdinand’s 1914 assassination by a rabid Serbian
nationalist that ignited a continent-wide conflagration, thereby literally laying the groundwork
for Eliot’s poem.

Indeed, despite Waste Land’s pessimism, Kaplan’s conclusion is the only correct one:
“we have no choice but to fight on, as the outcome is not given to any of us in advance(186).”
And this is where Eliot’s enduring conservative line, “[t]hese fragments I have shored against my
ruins(159),” remains inspiring.

This article was first published in the Wall Street Journal on March 4, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

How to Protect NATO and Other Alliances From Trump

March 04, 2025

Responsible advisers and GOP lawmakers should redirect his focus to other targets, especially the EU.

Last week’s Trump-Vance-Zelensky train wreck proved that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is on increasingly shaky ground. Starting with Donald Trump’s Feb. 12 phone call with Vladimir Putin about the Ukraine war, things got worse when Mr. Trump called Volodymyr Zelensky a “dictator” and the war’s instigator. Vice President JD Vance’s neocon-like complaints that Western Europeans were insufficiently democratic, without comparable analysis of Russia, eased Mr. Putin away from diplomatic purdah. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s plan to consider massive cuts in defense spending foreshadows even worse consequences. The Oval Office grudge match finished the picture, and all now points to trashing history’s most successful politico-military alliance. Mr. Trump hasn’t formally withdrawn from NATO, but he is so gravely weakening it that leaving would simply be the final insult.

NATO isn’t America’s only alliance in jeopardy. In his first term, Mr. Trump’s assault on NATO arrived alongside his criticism of other allies, albeit not as publicly as today. The Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network, the Australia-U.K.-U.S. consortium to build nuclear-powered submarines for Australia, and the export-control rules designed to keep rogue states from acquiring weapons of mass destruction—are all at risk. Even bilateral ties with Japan and South Korea are in question. Taiwan should be very worried.

Israel may escape for now, but Israelis should recall Martin Niemöller’s poem, which concludes: “Then they came for me—and there was no one left to speak for me.”

Two complementary political counterattacks are needed—to save Ukraine from Russia and to salvage NATO. Although the evidence is tenuous, there may still be enough alliance supporters among Mr. Trump’s advisers to change course. If so, they must advise the president on what he should be doing, not just responding “yes, sir” to his ill-informed statements.

I’ve been through this myself, as have others, and can attest it will be unpleasant for those showing loyalty to our country and its Constitution. But at some point, principles must rise above job security and ambition. Resignation becomes the only honorable course. Each adviser will have to make his own decision. But they need to start making them.

House and Senate Republicans must also stand up against dismantling our alliances and gutting the defense budget. Some lawmakers are asserting themselves on Ukraine and NATO, and more must follow. They will find allies among Democrats, and together they could constitute majorities in both chambers. Vocal congressional support for bolstering our alliances and substantially increasing defense spending is important in its own right—and for the reassurance it will give like-minded Trump administration officials. There is no argument more powerful to Mr. Trump than his own political well-being.

Alliance supporters should also persuade Mr. Trump to focus on his well-known disdain for the European Union, thereby easing the assault on NATO. Mr. Trump’s distaste for the EU reflects European weakness and inadequate defense spending, as well as his criticism of trade terms negotiated by previous U.S. administrations. Some of that dissatisfaction is justified but not enough to dismantle broader American security interests.

Here, Europeans must reject EU dogmatism, especially espoused by France, which insisted, even before the EU’s creation, on Europe’s separateness from America. Long reflected in calls for a “European pillar” within NATO, this groupthink has corroded the alliance’s cohesion. Ironically, and potentially fatally, if France’s EU ideology prevails and the EU tries to substitute itself for NATO, that would provide support for Mr. Trump’s view that America should withdraw. Not all of Europe suffers from this kind of thinking. Much of Donald Rumsfeld’s “new Europe” in the east and some “old Europeans,” like the U.K. and Nordic NATO members, have always emphasized Atlanticism. It is “old Europeans” such as France and Germany that are the main problem.

Europe’s first reaction to Mr. Trump’s fusillade, predictably led by French President Emmanuel Macron, was to assume Washington was irretrievably departing. Instead, to protect the West’s overall security and shared concerns about rising global threats, NATO advocates on both sides of the Atlantic must resist the misimpression that Mr. Trump’s position is enduring. Whether Europeans can stand alone against the China-Russia axis, the real overarching menace, is doubtful. Europeans should prize being part of the West more highly than being part of the EU, and act on that basis. Unfortunately, incoming German Chancellor Friedrich Merz moved immediately in the wrong direction, saying he would seek “independence” from the U.S. Saying that “the free world needs a new leader,” as EU official Kaja Kallas did, also doesn’t help.

Mr. Trump never appreciated Winston Churchill’s insight that “there is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.” Accordingly, advancing U.S. national-security interests under Mr. Trump, and saving our admittedly imperfect alliances, requires enduring before prevailing. One answer is to outlast him, distract him and find him other targets. But the most important course is to tell the truth to the American people, starting now.

This article was first published in the Wall Street Journal on March 3, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

After the Oval Office Debacle

March 03, 2025

Vladimir Putin was the only winner in last week’s Oval Office grudge match between Donald Trump and Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky. Trump harmed US national security by ignoring our profound, long-standing interest in European stability, which we learned through the 20th Century’s two hot world wars and one Cold War. Ensuring our enemies do not control the European landmass, and having extensive trans-Atlantic economic, political, cultural and familial relations are palpably important to our way of life. All this is at risk. Trump has not merely gone neutral in the Russo-Ukraine war, he is objectively on Moscow’s side.

Likely now to be abandoned by Washington, its largest single source of military and economic aid, Kyiv’s problems are even worse. Ukraine still faces the implacable Russian enemy, whose leadership is determined to recreate the Czars’ empire, especially by absorbing “little Russia” as they patronizingly call it. The Europeans, for all their bluster, are woefully inadequate substitutes, especially if Washington moves even further into Russia’s camp, perhaps lifting economic sanctions and seeking investments in Russian mineral resources.

The instant analysis of Friday’s debacle, pitting Trump supporters against Zelensky supporters, largely turned on questions of etiquette. This is seriously wrong. What is at stake is not an Emily Post-style assessment of who blew up the meeting, who was rude or disrespectful, or judging “where the meeting went wrong.” Almost certainly, everything the three principals said with the press watching, they would have said while meeting privately after the Oval Office photo opportunity. The issue is US national security, not whose behavior was more juvenile.

Trump argued that Zelensky was not serious about peace, and that his comments made it harder to persuade Putin to come to the negotiating table. But Putin is hardly a snowflake, wounded by unkind Zelensky remarks. In fact, Putin is one of the most cold-blooded leaders in today’s world. He knows exactly what he wants. Even though his logic, especially regarding the value of human life, does not correspond to ours, he has relentlessly pursued his objective of restoring “greater Russia.” Ukrainians object to this outcome not because they have bad manners but because they insist on freedom and independence (should be familiar words for Americans) from foreign oppressors.

Indeed, it is precisely Washington’s massive shift toward Moscow that moving legitimate discussions between Kyiv and Moscow into the future. As Trump hands the Kremlin one concession after another, Russia’s incentive to negotiate diminishes. Why seek compromise through negotiations when obtaining precisely what they want by direct US intervention?

Former Russian President Dmitri Medvedev wrote prior to the Oval Office disaster, “if you’d told me just three months ago that these were the words of the U.S. president, I would have laughed out loud(https://nypost.com/2025/02/20/world-news/russia-praises-trump-after-he-ripped-ukraines-zelensky/).” He was referring not just to Trump calling Zelensky a “dictator” but to abandoning US and NATO positions that Ukraine must reobtain full sovereignty and territorial integrity; that Ukraine could ultimately join NATO; and that America or NATO itself would give Kyiv security guarantees under a comprehensive peace deal. Such retreats clearly evidence that Trump is now siding with Moscow rather than Kyiv and America’s own security.

Trump’s insistence that he wants “peace,” while carefully phrased for its political benefits, is in fact the most dangerous outcome of the Oval Office meeting. Peace can always be obtained by surrender. “Peace at any price” is always on offer. Russia’s unprovoked aggression put Ukraine at risk, not its desire to join NATO. That has been America’s official position since at least 2008 under George W. Bush. Russia did not strike against Ukraine until 2014, and then waited eight years to attack again in 2022. By adopting the Kremlin’s view that Ukraine and NATO precipitated the war, Trump is repeating Russian propaganda. Former UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson called this notion “Orwellian”: “you might as well say that the swimmers were responsible for attacking the shark in Jaws or the United States were responsible for attacking Japan at Pearl Harbor( https://www.lbc.co.uk/politics/uk-politics/boris-johnson-on-trumps-ukraine-comments/).”

Whether Ukraine and America can find a way back from the precipice remains to be seen. The real threat for the United States, however, is that we now have a President who can’t tell our friends from our enemies.

This article was first published in the Washington Examiner on March 3, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Trump’s Gaza Dreaming

February 10, 2025

Donald Trump’s remarks on the Gaza Strip after his February 4 meeting with Israeli Prime Minster Bibi Netanyahu precipitated enormous controversy and confusion. They were not idle musings, but written in advance. Typically, Trump wandered off-script, speculating about using US military force in Gaza, which White House handlers walked back the next day. Trump himself then promptly walked back the walk-back, insisting he was serious about American control of Gaza, although without force. (For the record, I have never advocated deploying the US military in Gaza.)

The ensuing furor has obscured the reality that Trump addressed two vastly different issues. First, and most bizarrely, he asserted that Israel would hand control of Gaza to the US, which would “own” it, and make it “the Riviera of the Middle East.” Second, and far more important, was Trump’s contention that resettling Gaza’s population in the Strip was the wrong way forward, at least near-term. This distinction is critical to evaluating Trump’s statements, until changes positions again, perhaps while you read this article.

Trump’s first idea is not going to happen. It springs from no underlying philosophy, national-security grand strategy, or consistent forward-looking policy. It derives instead from his first-term pitch to North Korean leader Kim Jung Un that his country’s untouched beaches could become major resort areas. That did not materialize, but the dream never died.

Wild as it was for North Korea, it is even more so in Gaza. The aphorism “capital is a coward” is directly applicable. Because of the ongoing cease-fire/hostage exchange, Hamas is reasserting control in Gaza, suggesting it may not be as debilitated by Israeli military action as initially thought. In turn, that means Israel will likely resume hostilities, rightly so, when the exchanges end. Until Gaza is fully secure, capital and labor necessary to build the Middle East’s Riviera, will be few and far between. “Gaza” itself is an historical accident, reflecting military reality at the end of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, simply a part of the ancient Mediterranean path leading to Egypt. Standing alone, it is not economically viable as far as the eye can see.

Trump’s second suggestion about Gaza’s future is not new, having emanated from multiple sources long before his February 4 comments. If adopted, it would fundamentally, permanently alter the Middle East. Among other things, it would be the final death knell for the “two-state” solution. Well before Hamas’s barbaric October 7 attack, the two-state solution had become simply an incantation. Afterwards, in Israel, it all but disappeared as a serious proposition. Nonetheless, absent any serious effort to create an alternative, the mantra has remained the default position.

Those days are over. The fundamental problem with the putative Palestinian “state” was its artificiality, a legacy of radical Arab leaders like Egypt’s Gamal Abdul Nassar; its lack of any economic basis; and its susceptibility to terrorist control. Nonetheless, if the two-state concept is dead, we must find an alternative. I once proposed a “three-state” solution: returning Gaza to Egypt, with Israel and Jordan dividing sovereignty over the West Bank. This approach would safeguard Israeli security while also settling Palestinians in viable economies, with real futures.

Palestinians, however, have for decades been so abused by the region’s radical, post-colonial ideologies that neither Cairo nor Amman welcomed having potentially subversive populations come under their jurisdictions. But the palpable difficulty of resolving the Palestinian issue should not lead regional states and concerned outside powers to fall back to reconstructing high-rise refugee camps in Gaza. So doing, involving enormous costs in clearing the rubble and unexploded ordnance, not to mention eliminating the Hamas tunnel network, and then reconstruction itself, would inevitably lead to another October 7. That is obviously unacceptable.

There is an alternative, however, namely changing the way Palestinians have been treated for over seven decades. UNRWA, the UN’s Palestine relief agency, which is functionally an arm of Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, should be abolished, and responsibility for Palestinian refugees transferred to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. In turn, UNHCR should follow its basic humanitarian doctrine, under which refugees are either repatriated to their country of origin, or, if that is not possible, resettled in other countries. There is nothing forcible about UNHCR resettlement, since both refugees and recipient countries must agree. But it is also true that, unlike UNRWA, UNHCR refugee camps do not last forever.

This is not to the detriment of Palestinians. Exactly the opposite. It means they will receive the same humanitarian treatment as every other refugee population since World War II. As difficult as switching to the UNHCR model may be, Trump’s comments, the first such by a major world leader, may finally ignite the debate that must occur to find a lasting home for the Gaza Palestinians.

This article was first published in the Daily Telegraph on February 10, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Ignore Trump’s Gaza distraction. Focus on Iran

February 05, 2025

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s meeting with President Donald Trump, the first post-inaugural White House visit by a foreign leader, could shape the Middle East for generations. Pre-meeting speculation centered on how the leaders would handle the Hamas-Israel war.

Stunningly, Trump’s comments just before and then after his meeting with Netanyahu focused on the U.S. taking control of the Gaza Strip while Gaza’s residents are resettled elsewhere in the Middle East. There is little point in commenting seriously on this “idea,” which appears to be entirely Trump’s own.

The most important strategic issue in the real Middle East remains Iran’s existential threat to Israel. Tehran’s ayatollahs can only be delighted if the Trump administration expends any time and effort at all on the Gaza idea rather than addressing their nuclear weapons program. Restoring the “maximum pressure” campaign from Trump’s first term is a sound decision, but still only the beginning of an effective strategy.

Since Hamas’s barbaric Oct. 7, 2023, attack, Israel, with U.S. assistance, has dealt Iran and its “ring of fire” strategy major blows. Hamas and Hezbollah have been decimated but not destroyed. Iran’s ballistic missile production facilities and its sophisticated, Russian-supplied, S-300 air-defense systems have been all but eliminated. Syria’s Iran-friendly Assad regime has fallen, and its S-300 systems and other military assets have been destroyed. Unfortunately, the Houthis in Yemen, West Bank terrorists, and Iranian-controlled Shia militias in Iraq are only wounded, and not severely.

The job is unfinished, but enormous progress has been made to diminish Iran’s overall threat, especially its terrorist surrogates. The existential danger remains: Its nuclear program is essentially intact, with only one location, the Parchin weaponization facility, attacked. Looking ahead, the central issue remains how to destroy Tehran’s nuclear weapons efforts, which threaten not only Israel but also constitute a major proliferation threat to America and the world.

Eliminating this menace is Netanyahu’s real top priority, but it should not be solely Jerusalem’s responsibility. The United States is the only country that can stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (chemical and biological as well as nuclear). For America and Israel, there has never been a better time to do just that, using carefully targeted force against Iran’s nuclear arms facilities.

Accordingly, Israeli-American objectives should be victory against both Iran’s nuclear and terrorist threats. In World War II, Prime Minister Winston Churchill explained to his countrymen why this was the only acceptable outcome: “victory; victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival.”

The real debate is between those advocating victory and those advocating the Obama-Biden approach: endless negotiations on an elusive deal to return Iran’s government to civilized behavior. There are certainly legitimate questions about the timing of striking Tehran’s nuclear facilities. Most important is reducing Iran’s capacity to retaliate against Israel, friendly Gulf Arab states, and deployed U.S. forces in the region. In Lebanon, Hezbollah likely retains tens of thousands of Iranian-supplied missiles, and Iran itself still has significant numbers of missiles and drones. The clock is running. Tehran is racing to repair the production facilities Israel leveled in October 2024 to replenish its missile stockpiles.

Another mutual priority is achieving Israel’s objective of eliminating the political and military capabilities of Hamas and Hezbollah, as Netanyahu stressed yesterday. Although Israel has enjoyed remarkable success in Gaza and Lebanon, the recent Gaza hostage releases were staged to portray Hamas as a viable fighting force, with considerable support among Gaza’s civilians. Yet under former President Joe Biden’s ceasefire deal, which Trump’s pre-inaugural pressure on Netanyahu ironically brought to fruition, Israeli negotiations with Hamas over Gaza’s future are due to start. Yet this is precisely what Netanyahu wanted to avoid and why Biden failed for seven months to close the deal. Just because it is now Trump’s deal does not improve it substantively.

Hamas can have no part in any future Gaza, whatever it looks like, nor can Hezbollah have any future in Lebanon. Only by removing these cancers can Gazans and Lebanese have any prospect of normality. And so long as the ayatollahs rule in Tehran, they will do their best to rearm their terrorist proxies, even under “maximum pressure” against Iran.

Following their summit, Netanyahu and Trump must demonstrate the resolve to persevere, as Churchill said, however long and hard the road may be. Watch what happens on Iran.

This article was first published in the Washington Examiner on February 5, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Trump and the Middle East

January 28, 2025

History in the Middle East is moving very fast these days. The long-overdue fall of Syria’s Assad regime is only the latest evidence, and Donald Trump’s January 20 inauguration will accelerate the pace. The central question is whether the principal players seize opportunities now open for lasting regional peace and security before they quickly close. Of course, there are massive, daunting uncertainties, but leaders should remember the Roman saying, “fortune favors the bold.”

Surprisingly, one of the major uncertainties could be Trump. In his first term, he was viewed as automatically pro-Israel, moving the US embassy to Jerusalem and recognizing Israeli sovereignty over disputed territory in the Golan Heights. It would be wrong for several reasons, however, to assume reflexively that this pattern will recur during his second term.

For example, Trump’s private view of Netanyahu is far more negative than generally perceived, exemplified by Trump’s anger when Netanyahu congratulated Biden on winning the 2020 presidential election(https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-jerusalem-israel-middle-east-iran-nuclear-d141ca03a5e38bfb60b37f94a38ecda8). To most of the world, this was hardly noteworthy, but Trump’s fixation never to be perceived as a loser forced him to argue that the Democrats stole the election, which mythology Netanyahu violated. Even before that, Trump said in an interview that he thought the Palestinian Authority’s Mahmoud Abbas wanted peace more than Netanyahu(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lq1seiWI8ro), which hardly expresses confidence in the Israeli leader. Moreover, Netanyahu is an expert politician, far more astute than Trump, which undoubtedly also inflames Trump’s vanity.

Moreover, Trump’s obsession to seek a deal on anything and everything, even with Iran’s ayatollahs, may come to dominate his Middle East actions. As I previously recounted in The Room Where It Happened, Trump came remarkably close to meeting Iran’s then-Foreign Minister, Javid Zarif, at the August, 2019, G-7 summit in Biarritz, France. French President Emmanuel Macron suggested such an encounter to Trump immediately upon his arrival in Biarritz, and he was initially inclined to agree. Conferring in Trump’s hotel room with Jared Kushner and White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvanery, I urged against meeting with Zarif. Trump ultimately did not see Zarif, but, as the Duke of Wellington said of Napolean’s defeat at Waterloo, it was “the nearest run thing you ever saw.”

Trump’s pre-Inauguration intervention in Joe Biden’s long effort to obtain a cease-fire/hostage-release deal between Hamas and Israel is also noteworthy. After seven months of failure, Trump’s pressure on Israel resulted in Netanyahu finally accepting Biden’s deal, or at least its first phase. Trump wanted to take credit for the hostage releases, hearkening back to the start of Ronald Reagan’s administration, when Iran returned US embassy officials taken hostage during the 1979 Islamic Revolution. On that level, Trump succeeded where Biden failed. But whether Trump understands Biden’s plan has other phases is far from certain, as are the prospects that even the first phase will conclude successfully, let alone those that follow.

Improbably, however, there have been signs, before and after Trump’s Inauguration, that he may believe that the Gaza war has actually ended. Steve Witkoff, his family friend and now a special Middle East envoy, has stresses that “phase two” of Biden’s deal, which involves further negotiation between Israel and Hamas, should begin promptly. This can hardly be what Israel expects. In addition, Witkoff’s Trumpian “zeal for the deal” mentality, and his inexperience, reflected in naïve public comments(https://www.foxnews.com/media/trump-envoy-says-gaza-ceasefire-could-pave-way-mideast-normalization-deal-inflection-point), are factors that could militate against Israel in the immediate future. Impressed by Witkoff’s performance to date, Trump may have decided to give him a role in Iran matters, although that remains unclear(https://www.axios.com/2025/01/23/trump-witkoff-iran-diplomacy-nuclear-deal). Nonetheless, both have said they favored diplomatic options to resolve Iran’s nuclear threat.

If true, this creates a dilemma for Netanyahu. Right now, Israel and America have the best opportunity ever to destroy Iran’s nuclear-weapons and missile programs. Israel has already massively damaged Iran’s missile-production facilities(https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production) and at least one target involved in weaponizing highly enriched uranium(https://www.axios.com/2024/11/15/iran-israel-destroyed-active-nuclear-weapons-research-facility), not to mention flattening Iran’s sophisticated, Russia-supplied, S-300 air defense systems(https://www.voanews.com/a/israel-s-attack-on-iran-has-left-tehran-offensively-and-defensively-weaker/7848701.html). Additional attacks in Syria after Assad’s overthrow have opened an air corridor allowing direct access from Israel to Iran. The path is clear.

Obstacles remain, notably Iran’s and Hezbollah’s remaining ballistic missiles, which would enable either retaliatory strikes against Israel, or even a pre-emptive strike to foreclose Netanyahu’s options. Israel, Jordan, and nearby Arab states must also worry about the current regime in Damascus, led by the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (“HTS”) terrorist group. Having shed his nom de guerre, and changed from combat fatigues to suits and ties, HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa is doing his best to convince outsiders that he now simply seeks responsible government in Syria. Whether this is true remains unclear, as do Turkish aspirations in Syria and across the region. The Biden administration(https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/01/24/us-syria-intelligence-hts-isis/) reportedly went so far as to share intelligence with HTS about ISIS, although whether Trump will continue this risky business is unknown.

What is inescapable is that while Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities have never been more vulnerable, Trump’s new administration seemed undecided on its future course. His first term may not be an accurate prediction of his second. There is no Trumpian grand strategy at work here since he does not do grand strategy. Instead, he is transactional, episodic, and ad hoc, often making decisions based on whatever the last person he consults with recommends. This may be the real future of America’s policy in the Middle East.

This article was first published in Independent Arabia on January 28, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Negotiating Advice for Ukraine Supporters

January 13, 2025

During the 2024 campaign, candidate Donald Trump said he could resolve the Ukraine war in twenty-four hours by getting together with Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky to thrash things out. At a January 7 press conference, President-elect Trump conceded it could take up to six months. Call that learning.

Trump fundamentally wants the war to disappear. He has said repeatedly it would never have occurred had he been President, as he has also said about the ongoing Middle East conflict. Of course, these statements are, by definition, neither provable nor disprovable, but they reflect his visceral feeling that the wars are Biden’s problem and should disappear when Biden does.

Neither war will disappear so quickly, but Trump’s comments strongly suggest that he is indifferent to the terms on which they end. That is likely bad news for Ukraine, though it could be good news for Israel in its struggle against Iran’s “ring of fire” strategy. As Inauguration Day nears, there is precious little information publicly available about what Trump will actually do. And, because he has neither a coherent philosophy nor a strategic approach to foreign affairs, what he says in the morning may not apply in the afternoon.

Accordingly, those concerned for Ukrainian and Western security should focus clearly on what is negotiable with Moscow and what is not. Early decisions on the central components of potential diplomacy can have far-reaching implications that the parties will inevitably try to turn to their benefit. Ukraine especially must make several key decisions about how to proceed. Consider the following.

Although a cease-fire linked to commencing negotiations may be inevitable because of pressure from Trump, such a cease-fire is not necessarily in Ukraine’s interest. Talking while fighting was a successful strategy for the Chinese Communist Party in its struggle against the Kuomintang during and after World War II. It could work for Ukraine today under certain conditions. Most important, of course, is the continued supply of adequate military assistance, which is questionable with Trump in office.

But a cease fire can be more perilous for Ukraine than for Russia: the longer negotiations take, the more likely it is the cease-fire lines become permanent, a new border between Ukraine and Russia far into the future. As negotiations proceed, the absence of hostilities will provide opportunities for Moscow to seek full or at least partial easing of economic sanctions, which many Europeans seem poised to concede. Moreover, once hostilities stop, they are far harder politically to resume, which is also likely to Ukraine’s disadvantage. Although Russia would probably win an indefinite war of attrition, it also needs time to rebuild its debilitated military and economy. A cease fire affords that opportunity, and thereby buys time for Russia to heal its wounds and prepare the next attack. Russia waited eight years after its 2014 offensive, and can afford to wait again until the West is distracted elsewhere.

If Trump insists on a cease-fire-in-place and contemporaneous negotiations, Ukraine must be careful to avoid having the talks aim at a permanent solution rather than a temporary accommodation. Russia will see any deal as temporary in any case, no matter what it says publicly. Vladimir Putin obsesses over reincorporating Ukraine into a new Russian empire, and each slice of territory Russia takes back brings that goal closer. Negotiating an “end” to the war plays into the Kremlin’s hands, since it provides the false impression to gullible Westerners that there is no risk of future aggression.

Both the cease-fire issue and the duration of any deal raise two other questions: should there be “peacekeepers” along the cease-fire line, and should Ukraine insist on “security guarantees” from the West (NATO or otherwise) against future Russian aggression?

Peacekeeping is operationally complex, and rarely successful in any sense other than helping prolong a military stalemate. That is nearly the uniform outcome of UN peacekeeping. Peacekeeping forces (like UNIFIL in Lebanon or UNDOF on the Golan Heights) simply become part of the landscape, in peace or war. The Security Council loses interest in resolving the sources of the underlying conflict. The peacekeepers become irrelevant, as recent developments along the cease-fire line between Israel and Syria demonstrate. In short, peacekeepers are essentially only hollow symbols.

Indeed, it is the recognition of UN ineffectiveness that has likely inspired calls for deploying NATO peacekeepers along the Ukraine-Russia line-of-control. But does anyone expect Russia to agree meekly? Will Moscow not suggest peacekeepers from Iran or North Korea along with NATO? Moreover, there has been little discussion about what a peacekeeping force’s rules of engagement would be, whether deployed by the UN or NATO. Would these rules be typical of UN operation, where the peacekeepers can only use force only in self-defense? Or would the rules be more robust, allowing force in aid of their mission? Really? In aid of their mission, NATO peacekeepers would be allowed to use force against Russian troops? Or Ukrainian troops? In such circumstances, potential troop-contributing countries would make themselves very scarce.

Future security guarantees for Ukraine, which it is insisting upon, are unfortunately likely to be blue smoke and mirrors. Russia has repeatedly said that NATO membership — the only security guarantee that really matters — is a deal-breaker. European Union security guarantees? Good luck with that. Security guarantees by individual nations? That was the approach of the Budapest agreements on returning Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia; they didn’t work out so well. In short, “security guarantees” are mellifluous words, but evanescent without US and NATO participation, which Trump seems unlikely to endorse.

Negotiations are looming primarily because Trump wants the war to go away. Europe is too tired and too incapable of charting a different course. Contemplating these depressing scenarios, therefore, Ukraine and its supporters may have little choice but to acquiesce in talks on unfavorable terms. For that very reason, Kyiv should be very cautious on what it agrees with Trump.

This article was first published in 19fortyfive on January 12, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Dark days lie ahead with Trump on the world stage once more

January 13, 2025

Soon to be cast adrift by President-elect Trump, Ukraine’s likely future is bleak. Let’s not make it worse by a feckless peace deal
Donald Trump’s looming inauguration bodes poorly for vital Western security interests, and Ukraine in particular. Trump’s hostility to NATO is palpable, and his feelings about Ukraine follow close behind. After January 20, US military and economic assistance will likely drop significantly, and negotiations with Russia begin quickly. In turn, European financial support for Ukraine will diminish, as EU members rush to revive now-defunct commercial ties with Moscow. Despite contrary press reports, Trump has not yet spoken to Vladimir Putin. When they do, Trump’s desire to put this “Biden war” behind him could, at worst, mean capitulation to maximalist Russian demands. After all, if assisting Ukraine’s defence against unprovoked aggression is unimportant to Washington, why worry about Kyiv’s terms of surrender?

In fact, core America national interests remain. Since 1945, European peace and stability have been vital to advancing US economic and political security. The ripple effects of perceived American and NATO failure in Europe’s centre will embolden Beijing to act aggressively toward Taiwan and the East China Sea; the South China Sea; and along its land borders. These aren’t abstract, diaphanous worries at the periphery of our interests, but hard threats to US physical security, trade, travel and communications globally.

Biden put these interests at risk by bungling implementation of nearly three years of aid to Kyiv. He never developed a winning strategy. His administration helped create the current battlefield gridlock, deterred by constant but idle Kremlin threats of a “wider war.” Parcelling out weapons only after long public debates prevented their most effective use. Biden failed to explain clearly Russia’s threat to key Western interests, thereby fanning the belief there are no such interests, and abetting the Trump-inspired isolationism spreading nationally.

What to do? Aiding Ukraine is in NATO’s vital interest. That interest does not diminish because of persistent Biden administration poor performance. Do we ignore the continuing reality that Russia’s aggression threatens Alliance security? Does Ukraine simply give way to Trumpian capitulationism?

Certainly not. In the coming negotiations, certain points are essential to any potential agreement. The following suggestions, which are hardly my preferred outcome, are the absolute minimum we must obtain. They are only indicative, not exhaustive, and certainly not NATO’s opening position.

Any agreement must be explicitly provisional to keep Ukraine’s future open. Moscow will treat any deal that way regardless. For the Kremlin, nothing is permanent until its empire is fully restored, by their lights. Putin needs time to restore Russia’s military capabilities, and believing any “commitment” to forswear future aggression against Ukraine is dreaming.

A ceasefire along existing military frontlines during negotiations may be inevitable. Nonetheless, we should insist that any ultimate agreement explicitly state that the lines eventually drawn have no political import whatever, but merely reflect existing military dispositions. Russia may later disregard such disclaimers, but such claims must be rendered clearly invalid in advance.

Similarly, the agreement should not create demilitarised zones between Ukrainian and Russian forces inside Ukraine, or along the two countries’ formal border elsewhere. The surest way for a ceasefire line to become a permanent border is to make it half-a-mile wide, extending endlessly through contested territory. A DMZ inures solely to Moscow’s benefit.

Deployments of UN peacekeepers have an unhappy history of freezing the status quo, not helping to resolve the underlying conflict. Consider the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) which has partitioned the island since 1964. The UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has patrolled the Golan Heights since 1974, and may last forever, but did not prevent Israel from annexing the Golan. The list goes on. In Ukraine, a disengagement force could mean permanent cession of twenty percent of Ukraine to Russia.

The problem is not mitigated if the peacekeepers are under NATO rather than UN auspices. It is not the quality of the military that makes a difference, but the intentions of the parties to the conflict. Does anyone doubt what Russia’s long-term aims are? Or Ukraine’s for that matter? My guess is that the Kremlin won’t agree to NATO peacekeepers anyway, at least not unless augmented by thousands of North Korean troops.

Finally, Ukraine should not be constrained in its future options to join or cooperate with NATO. What’s left of Ukraine will still be a sovereign country, striving for representative government, and free to pick its allies on its own. We should not acquiesce in enforced neutralisation, what in the Cold War was called “Finlandisation”. Even Finland turned out not to like it, finally joining NATO in 2023. And if some hardy nations want to provide security guarantees to Free Ukraine, they should be able to do so, not subject to Russian vetoes.

Soon to be cast adrift by President-elect Trump, Ukraine’s likely future is bleak. Let’s not make it worse by a feckless peace deal.

This article was first published in The Telegraph on November 30, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

Securing America’s Interests In a Challenging World

Posts by: FAS Freedom Staff