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What Next After Rome?

April 22, 2025
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No one was more surprised than Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu when he learned of Donald Trump’s intention to reopen negotiations with Iran over its nuclear-weapons program.  At an April 7 meeting in Washington, Netanyahu almost certainly expected to move forward on plans for a potential Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs, perhaps together with the United States.  There were, of course, other issues on the agenda, particularly Trump’s tariff war with friends and foes alike, but Iran’s existential nuclear threat to Israel was the most pressing.

Trump rebuffed Netanyahu (https://apnews.com/article/trump-netanyahu-tariffs-iran-gaza-9aaf17d50beb5a5891895a702a1bac5d) according to multiple press accounts.  Neither the first nor the second negotiations, on April 12 and 19, produced any visible progress, although the sides agreed to reconvene on April 26, preceded by “technical-level” talks.  Trump would do well to remember one of baseball’s most important rules:  three strikes and you’re out.

Iran’s unrelenting efforts to acquire deliverable nuclear weapons, and the extraordinary threat posed thereby, make the logic of preventative destruction of its capabilities unarguable to Netanyahu and many others, Israeli and American alike.  With good reason, therefore, Israel believed that Trump would agree that destroying Iran’s nuclear program was entirely justifiable. 

No one could say Israel was acting hastily or rashly.  For three decades, Iran has pursued deliverable nuclear weapons, and the threat has grown with time.  Nothing has changed the mullahs’ strategic decision to achieve that goal, not diplomacy, not economic sanctions, and not mere threats of using force.  Iran’s progress on both the nuclear and missile fronts has been clear and dangerous, and the need to decide whether to use military force, already long overdue, is increasingly apparent.

What the outside world knows about Iran’s capabilities, frightening though it is, must also be weighed against what we do not know because of inadequate intelligence and international oversight.  Tehran has consistently obstructed the International Atomic Energy Agency, barring its inspectors from key military facilities undertaking the critical weaponization work on nuclear arms.  Moreover, Iran could be even closer to achieving nuclear weapons than suspected because of its cooperation with North Korea. exemplified by the North’s construction of Iran’s Dair Alzour reactor in Syria, destroyed by Israel in 2007.  Pakistani nuclear proliferator A.Q. Khan supplied both Tehran and Pyongyang their initial uranium-enrichment and weapons-design plans.  Thus, what we detect in Iran could be merely a part of its nuclear program, with subcontracted facilities buried undetected in North Korea. 

Accordingly, for Israel, the key question is not if it should strike Iran’s nuclear program, but when, and whether it would strike alone or with the United States.  Viewed strategically, Washington has every justification to take military action against Tehran’s proliferation efforts.  Iran’s nuclear threat is not a problem merely for Israel, but for the entire world.  For thirty years, the ayatollahs have sought to become a nuclear power, to the detriment of everyone else.  America has the wherewithal to eliminate this proliferation threat, and would be politically and morally justified in doing so.  Helping Israel de-fang Iran follows quite logically.

Trump may not have the resolve or character required to make this difficult decision.  Reports indicate deep splits(https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/16/us/politics/trump-israel-iran-nuclear.html?searchResultPosition=1) within his administration over using force against Iran, with several of its least competent senior officials arguing against doing so.  Fortunately, however, while a combined US-Israeli strike would be more likely to achieve total success, Washington’s participation is not a necessity.  Israel’s own forces can destroy or at least substantially cripple Iran’s program far into the future, albeit with some subsequent maintenance work from time to time.  Moreover, if Israel is prepared to act, it should not seek merely a partial destruction of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, but its entirety.  There may not be a better time than now.

What the ayatollahs will really fear after Israeli strikes, with or without US participation, is the reaction of Iran’s people.  Tehran’s ayatollahs have lost enormous power in the Middle East and are urgently trying to rebuild their network of terrorist proxies even while trying to shore up the regime domestically.  Assad’s fall in Syria, added to the defeats Israel has inflicted on Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis since October 7, has produced significant finger-pointing and recrimination inside Iran(https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/13/world/middleeast/iran-syria-assad.html).  

The very foundations of the 1979 revolution are now severely weakened.  Losing the nuclear program could be the spark that ignites Iran’s people, at long last, to rise against the regime and fragment its top leadership.  The ayatollahs desperately need relief from Israel’s punishing military assaults and from international economic sanctions.  Entering lengthy negotiations with Washington would give them a lifeline.

For those who oppose the world’s most dangerous nations possessing the world’s most destructive weapons, this is not a time, as Lady Thatcher once advised, to go wobbly.  End the fruitless discussions with Tehran, and do what is necessary to safeguard the world from a nuclear Iran.

This article was first published in the Independent Arabia on April 22, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Posted in By John Bolton, Essential, Featured, JRB_Europe, JRB_MiddleEast/NAfrica, News

Trump’s foolish Iran diplomacy

April 14, 2025

Saturday’s US-Iran proximity negotiations highlighted the choice between two very divergent futures for Tehran’s nuclear-weapons program.  One path would have Washington re-enter witless negotiations with the ayatollahs, with no evidence they have made a strategic decision to abandon their decades-long quest for weapons of mass destruction.  The alternative is military action against Tehran’s nuclear facilities, or the regime itself, to eliminate any chance of Iran becoming a nuclear-weapons power.

By agreeing to further negotiations next week, President Trump’s delegation took at least one step down the first path.  This will prove to be a serious, perhaps deadly, mistake.

The Obama and Biden administrations also followed the first path, leading to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, perhaps the most flawed international agreement in American history.  The deal’s central error was allowing Iran to continue enriching uranium, with an illusory commitment not to advance to weapons-building.  Iran’s conduct since 2015, particularly extensive weaponization activities, is graphic proof that its strategic objective was and remains achieving nuclear-weapons production capabilities.  

The first Trump presidency withdrew from Obama’s deal in 2018, but failed to take the next critical steps.  Although declaring a campaign of maximum economic pressure against Iran, the pressure was obviously inadequate.  Trump himself never embraced the only sure way to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons, namely overthrowing the ayatollahs or destroying their program by kinetic action.  Even today, we do not know what Trump has the resolve to do.

We do know Tehran is reeling, and thus delighted to start endless negotiations to buy time to save its nuclear program.  Israel is decimating Iran’s terrorist proxies. Syria’s Assad regime has fallen.  Last October, Israel crippled Iran’s ballistic-missile manufacturing facilities and destroyed its Russian-supplied S-300 air defenses, and later, after Assad’s fall, the S-300’s in Syria.  Of course the ayatollahs want a break, which is why they have offered an “interim” nuclear agreement(https://www.axios.com/2025/04/10/iran-nuclear-deal-us-interim-agreement) and asked for sanctions relief during negotiations(https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-iran-begin-high-stakes-nuclear-talks-in-oman-fc07cdce?mod=hp_lead_pos5), both ploys to create even more delay.

Special Envoy Steven Witkoff, leading America’s delegation to Oman, said beforehand that Saturday’s meeting was “about trust building(https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/steve-witkoff-interview-iran-nuclear-talks-e41e0114?mod=hp_lead_pos11).”  But there is no trust to be built with the ayatollahs.  They have consistently sought the best of both worlds, committing to abandon their quest for nuclear weapons in exchange for tangible benefits like relief from sanctions, but never actually doing so.  Iran has followed North Korea’s playbook, which has certainly worked well for Pyongyang.  It is nothing less than madness for the US to repeat that mistake.

Witkoff says that “our position begins with dismantlement….That is our position today…,” but there might be “other ways to find compromise.”   Earlier, he said “We should create a verification program, so that nobody worries about [Iranian] weaponization….”  These positions are all flatly wrong.  There is, or should be, no compromise on denuclearization.  It is not just Washington’s beginning position, but the middle and ending position as well.  The 2015 deal’s verification terms were utterly inadequate, as Tehran’s continuing progress in weaponization, among other things, proves.  More Iranian progress will come while the talks continue.  The only acceptable verification program would necessarily be so intrusive and transparent it would threaten the very viability of the ayatollahs’ regime.  If Iran isn’t prepared strategically to denuclearize, and to prove it palpably, not just verbally, then destroying the nuclear program or the regime itself are the only alternatives. 

To be clear, what Witkoff is describing is the Obama-Biden policy.  If that is what he signaled in Oman on Saturday, then Trump has done a U-turn even more dramatic than last week’s about-face on tariffs.  To be clearer still, the result of such a contemporary Obama-Biden-Trump policy will be at least as harmful to America and its Middle East allies as the original model.  

Israel and the Gulf Arab states have known this for years.  They need no education on the threats Iran poses.  Instead, they are quietly taking military steps to prepare their defenses.  In a little-noticed but potentially significant military exercise(https://www.newsweek.com/arabs-israel-trump-uae-qatar-iran-aircraft-2053399) recently hosted by Greece, Israeli aircraft participated for the first time ever with Qatari and UAE air-force planes.  Carrying potential political perils for all three nations, the foundational, if unspoken, reason for joint exercises was their common adversary, Iran.  

Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu argues correctly that the only acceptable deal is “one modeled after Libya’s, where the U.S. goes in, dismantles the facilities, and destroys the equipment under its own supervision.” Otherwise, “the alternative is military action, and everyone knows it(https://thehill.com/policy/international/5238270-netanyahu-iran-nuclear-facilities/).”  Trump should trust America’s friends, not its enemies.

This article was first published in the Washington Examiner on April 14, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Posted in By John Bolton, Essential, JRB_MiddleEast/NAfrica, News

Ukraine, Trump and the Middle East

March 17, 2025

Donald Trump’s jarring Oval Office confrontation with Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelensky symbolizes what is wrong with Trump’s dysfunctional approach to foreign policy.  In what seemed like a television comedy show, Trump accused Zelensky of everything from risking World War III to having no cards to play in defending his homeland from Russia’s unprovoked aggression.  Trump then kicked Zelensky out of the West Wing without even providing lunch.

Most American children are raised to be more polite to their guests.  The real meaning of the Oval Office debacle, however, does not turn on who committed the worst breaches of etiquette.  Instead, Trump’s evident hostility toward Zelensky reflected the reversal of America’s position in the Russo-Ukrainian war, from supporting Ukraine to effectively supporting Russia.  Recent US history provides nothing remotely comparable to Trump’s about-face.

Trump, of course, contends he is merely seeking peace to stop what he called in his State of the Union address the “senseless” war in Europe’s center.  Of course, neither Russia nor Ukraine consider the war “senseless,” albeit for very different reasons. The Kremlin is fighting to recreate the Russian empire, a goal Putin announced as far back as 2005, whereas Ukraine is defending its freedom and independence.  Americans once fought for freedom and independence, and certainly didn’t consider it “senseless.”

What explains Trump’s emphasis on rapidly ending the conflict, and his sympathy for Moscow?  He has frequently said that if he has good personal relations with a foreign head of state, then America has good relations with that leader’s country.  Conversely, if his personal relations with a foreign leader are bad, then US relations with his country are bad.  Personal relations have a place in international affairs, as in all things, but they are not decisive factors in national-security decision-making, especially for the world’s hard men like Putin, China’s Xi Jinping, or North Korea’s Kim Jung Un.  These authoritarians are cold-blooded and clear-eyed in knowing what their national interest are, and they pursue those interests unhesitatingly.

Trump, by contrast, pursues his personal interest.  He thinks Putin, Xi, and Kim are his friends, even saying(https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/we-fell-in-love-trump-and-kim-shower-praise-stroke-egos-on-path-to-nuclear-negotiations/2019/02/24/46875188-3777-11e9-854a-7a14d7fec96a_story.html) he and Kim “fell in love.”  In the case of Ukraine, that explains Trump’s tilt toward Putin and against Zelensky:  Trump wants the war, which he considers Biden’s responsibility, behind him so that Moscow-Washington relations will improve.  During the 2024 campaign,  Trump said repeatedly that the war would never have begun had he been President.

Based on my own observations, Putin, reflecting his KGB training and skills, does not think he and Trump are friends.  Rather, Trump is an easy mark, to be manipulated to achieve Moscow’s objectives.  In short, the Kremlin sees Trump as what Vladimir Lenin once called a “useful idiot,” meaning he can be made to serve Russian purposes without realizing what he is doing.  As part of his ongoing manipulation, Putin recently agreed the war in Ukraine would not have occurred under a Trump presidency(https://www.cnn.com/2025/01/24/world/putin-trump-ukraine-crisis-talks-intl/index.html).   

Putin continued the manipulation by releasing Marc Foley, an American hostage held in Moscow, followed by Belarus releasing another US hostage, and much more.  The game continues, as reflected by Putin’s conditional acceptance of the Saudi-brokered cease-fire between Washington and Kyiv.  Putin doesn’t want to endanger the concessions Trump has already made to him, so he carefully accepted the cease-fire in principle, only to obscure it with conditions and modifications.  Despite this carefully muddled answer, Trump was enthusiastic, saying it was “very good and productive(https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-calls-for-trump-putin-talks-on-ukraine-war-4dd35ede).”  The Kremlin must have celebrated its success.

What does Trump himself want?  He wants the Nobel Peace Prize.  After all, Barack Obama won the 2009 Nobel for no particular reason, just months after assuming office.  Under Nobel’s prize rules, nominations for a given year must be submitted by January 31 of that year(https://www.nobelpeaceprize.org/nobel-peace-prize/nomination/), meaning Obama’s nominations had to be received eleven days after his Inauguration, making the award laughable.  Trump may not realize it is already too late for him to win this year, but he still craves the faded glory of a Nobel prize.

The likely next step on Ukraine is direct Trump-Putin talks, which Trump clearly wants as soon as possible.  Putin also wants direct negotiations because it provides an opportunity to manipulate Trump directly, rather than through intermediaries.  Moreover, by definition, their conversation would exclude Ukraine and the Europeans from the real dealmaking, which won’t bother Trump as all.  While there is no certainty to the outcome of this coming conversation, all signs point to a result heavily skewed in Moscow’s favor.  

The lesson for the Middle East goes straight to the question, how to deal with Trump?  He is not pursuing some American grand strategy or playing sophisticated three-dimensional chess.  He is pursuing a Trump-centric strategy in two dimensions, one move at a time.  Keep that in mind, pile on some personal flattery of Trump, add pomp and circumstance, and who knows what Trump will be prepared to give away?

This article was first published in Independent Arabia on March 17, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Posted in By John Bolton, Essential, Featured, JRB_MiddleEast/NAfrica, News

Trump’s Gaza Dreaming

February 10, 2025
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Donald Trump’s remarks on the Gaza Strip after his February 4 meeting with Israeli Prime Minster Bibi Netanyahu precipitated enormous controversy and confusion.  They were not idle musings, but written in advance.  Typically, Trump wandered off-script, speculating about using US military force in Gaza, which White House handlers walked back the next day.  Trump himself then promptly walked back the walk-back, insisting he was serious about American control of Gaza, although without force.  (For the record, I have never advocated deploying the US military in Gaza.)

The ensuing furor has obscured the reality that Trump addressed two vastly different issues.  First, and most bizarrely, he asserted that Israel would hand control of Gaza to the US, which would “own” it, and make it “the Riviera of the Middle East.”  Second, and far more important, was Trump’s contention that resettling Gaza’s population in the Strip was the wrong way forward, at least near-term.  This distinction is critical to evaluating Trump’s statements, until changes positions again, perhaps while you read this article.

Trump’s first idea is not going to happen.  It springs from no underlying philosophy, national-security grand strategy, or consistent forward-looking policy.  It derives instead from his first-term pitch to North Korean leader Kim Jung Un that his country’s untouched beaches could become major resort areas.  That did not materialize, but the dream never died.

Wild as it was for North Korea, it is even more so in Gaza.  The aphorism “capital is a coward” is directly applicable.  Because of the ongoing cease-fire/hostage exchange, Hamas is reasserting control in Gaza, suggesting it may not be as debilitated by Israeli military action as initially thought.  In turn, that means Israel will likely resume hostilities, rightly so, when the exchanges end.  Until Gaza is fully secure, capital and labor necessary to build the Middle East’s Riviera, will be few and far between.  “Gaza” itself is an historical accident, reflecting military reality at the end of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, simply a part of the ancient Mediterranean path leading to Egypt.  Standing alone, it is not economically viable as far as the eye can see. 

Trump’s second suggestion about Gaza’s future is not new, having emanated from multiple sources long before his February 4 comments.  If adopted, it would fundamentally, permanently alter the Middle East.  Among other things, it would be the final death knell for the “two-state” solution.  Well before Hamas’s barbaric October 7 attack, the two-state solution had become simply an incantation.  Afterwards, in Israel, it all but disappeared as a serious proposition.  Nonetheless, absent any serious effort to create an alternative, the mantra has remained the default position. 

Those days are over.  The fundamental problem with the putative Palestinian “state” was its artificiality, a legacy of radical Arab leaders like Egypt’s Gamal Abdul Nassar;  its lack of any economic basis;  and its susceptibility to terrorist control.  Nonetheless, if the two-state concept is dead, we must find an alternative.  I once proposed a “three-state” solution:  returning Gaza to Egypt, with Israel and Jordan dividing sovereignty over the West Bank.  This approach would safeguard Israeli security while also settling Palestinians in viable economies, with real futures.  

Palestinians, however, have for decades been so abused by the region’s radical, post-colonial ideologies that neither Cairo nor Amman welcomed having potentially subversive populations come under their jurisdictions.  But the palpable difficulty of resolving the Palestinian issue should not lead regional states and concerned outside powers to fall back to reconstructing high-rise refugee camps in Gaza.  So doing, involving enormous costs in clearing the rubble and unexploded ordnance, not to mention eliminating the Hamas tunnel network, and then reconstruction itself, would inevitably lead to another October 7.  That is obviously unacceptable.

There is an alternative, however, namely changing the way Palestinians have been treated for over seven decades.  UNRWA, the UN’s Palestine relief agency, which is functionally an arm of Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, should be abolished, and responsibility for Palestinian refugees transferred to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.  In turn, UNHCR should follow its basic humanitarian doctrine, under which refugees are either repatriated to their country of origin, or, if that is not possible, resettled in other countries.  There is nothing forcible about UNHCR resettlement, since both refugees and recipient countries must agree.  But it is also true that, unlike UNRWA, UNHCR refugee camps do not last forever.

This is not to the detriment of Palestinians.  Exactly the opposite.  It means they will receive the same humanitarian treatment as every other refugee population since World War II.  As difficult as switching to the UNHCR model may be, Trump’s comments, the first such by a major world leader, may finally ignite the debate that must occur to find a lasting home for the Gaza Palestinians.

This article was first published in the Daily Telegraph on February 10, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Posted in By John Bolton, Essential, Featured, JRB_FP/Terrorism, JRB_MiddleEast/NAfrica, News, Uncategorized

Ignore Trump’s Gaza distraction. Focus on Iran

February 05, 2025

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s meeting with President Donald Trump, the first post-inaugural White House visit by a foreign leader, could shape the Middle East for generations. Pre-meeting speculation centered on how the leaders would handle the Hamas-Israel war.

Stunningly, Trump’s comments just before and then after his meeting with Netanyahu focused on the U.S. taking control of the Gaza Strip while Gaza’s residents are resettled elsewhere in the Middle East.  There is little point in commenting seriously on this “idea,” which appears to be entirely Trump’s own.

The most important strategic issue in the real Middle East remains Iran’s existential threat to Israel.  Tehran’s ayatollahs can only be delighted if the Trump administration expends any time and effort at all on the Gaza idea rather than addressing their nuclear weapons program. Restoring the “maximum pressure” campaign from Trump’s first term is a sound decision, but still only the beginning of an effective strategy.

Since Hamas’s barbaric Oct. 7, 2023, attack, Israel, with U.S. assistance, has dealt Iran and its “ring of fire” strategy major blows. Hamas and Hezbollah have been decimated but not destroyed. Iran’s ballistic missile production facilities and its sophisticated, Russian-supplied, S-300 air-defense systems have been all but eliminated. Syria’s Iran-friendly Assad regime has fallen, and its S-300 systems and other military assets have been destroyed. Unfortunately, the Houthis in Yemen, West Bank terrorists, and Iranian-controlled Shia militias in Iraq are only wounded, and not severely.

The job is unfinished, but enormous progress has been made to diminish Iran’s overall threat, especially its terrorist surrogates. The existential danger remains: Its nuclear program is essentially intact, with only one location, the Parchin weaponization facility, attacked. Looking ahead, the central issue remains how to destroy Tehran’s nuclear weapons efforts, which threaten not only Israel but also constitute a major proliferation threat to America and the world.  

Eliminating this menace is Netanyahu’s real top priority, but it should not be solely Jerusalem’s responsibility. The United States is the only country that can stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (chemical and biological as well as nuclear). For America and Israel, there has never been a better time to do just that, using carefully targeted force against Iran’s nuclear arms facilities.

Accordingly, Israeli-American objectives should be victory against both Iran’s nuclear and terrorist threats. In World War II, Prime Minister Winston Churchill explained to his countrymen why this was the only acceptable outcome: “victory; victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival.”

The real debate is between those advocating victory and those advocating the Obama-Biden approach:  endless negotiations on an elusive deal to return Iran’s government to civilized behavior. There are certainly legitimate questions about the timing of striking Tehran’s nuclear facilities. Most important is reducing Iran’s capacity to retaliate against Israel, friendly Gulf Arab states, and deployed U.S. forces in the region. In Lebanon, Hezbollah likely retains tens of thousands of Iranian-supplied missiles, and Iran itself still has significant numbers of missiles and drones. The clock is running. Tehran is racing to repair the production facilities Israel leveled in October 2024 to replenish its missile stockpiles.

Another mutual priority is achieving Israel’s objective of eliminating the political and military capabilities of Hamas and Hezbollah, as Netanyahu stressed yesterday. Although Israel has enjoyed remarkable success in Gaza and Lebanon, the recent Gaza hostage releases were staged to portray Hamas as a viable fighting force, with considerable support among Gaza’s civilians. Yet under former President Joe Biden’s ceasefire deal, which Trump’s pre-inaugural pressure on Netanyahu ironically brought to fruition, Israeli negotiations with Hamas over Gaza’s future are due to start. Yet this is precisely what Netanyahu wanted to avoid and why Biden failed for seven months to close the deal. Just because it is now Trump’s deal does not improve it substantively.

Hamas can have no part in any future Gaza, whatever it looks like, nor can Hezbollah have any future in Lebanon. Only by removing these cancers can Gazans and Lebanese have any prospect of normality.  And so long as the ayatollahs rule in Tehran, they will do their best to rearm their terrorist proxies, even under “maximum pressure” against Iran.

Following their summit, Netanyahu and Trump must demonstrate the resolve to persevere, as Churchill said, however long and hard the road may be. Watch what happens on Iran.

This article was first published in the Washington Examiner on February 5, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Posted in By John Bolton, Essential, Featured, JRB_MiddleEast/NAfrica, News

Trump and the Middle East

January 28, 2025
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History in the Middle East is moving very fast these days.  The long-overdue fall of Syria’s Assad regime is only the latest evidence, and Donald Trump’s January 20 inauguration will accelerate the pace.  The central question is whether the principal players seize opportunities now open for lasting regional peace and security before they quickly close.  Of course, there are massive, daunting uncertainties, but leaders should remember the Roman saying, “fortune favors the bold.”

Surprisingly, one of the major uncertainties could be Trump.  In his first term, he was viewed as automatically pro-Israel, moving the US embassy to Jerusalem and recognizing Israeli sovereignty over disputed territory in the Golan Heights.  It would be wrong for several reasons, however, to assume reflexively that this pattern will recur during his second term.

For example, Trump’s private view of Netanyahu is far more negative than generally perceived, exemplified by Trump’s anger when Netanyahu congratulated Biden on winning the 2020 presidential election(https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-jerusalem-israel-middle-east-iran-nuclear-d141ca03a5e38bfb60b37f94a38ecda8).  To most of the world, this was hardly noteworthy, but Trump’s fixation never to be perceived as a loser forced him to argue that the Democrats stole the election, which mythology Netanyahu violated.  Even before that, Trump said in an interview that he thought the Palestinian Authority’s Mahmoud Abbas wanted peace more than Netanyahu(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lq1seiWI8ro), which hardly expresses confidence in the Israeli leader.  Moreover, Netanyahu is an expert politician, far more astute than Trump, which undoubtedly also inflames Trump’s vanity.

Moreover, Trump’s obsession to seek a deal on anything and everything, even with Iran’s ayatollahs, may come to dominate his Middle East actions.  As I previously recounted in The Room Where It Happened, Trump came remarkably close to meeting Iran’s then-Foreign Minister, Javid Zarif, at the August, 2019, G-7 summit in Biarritz, France.  French President Emmanuel Macron suggested such an encounter to Trump immediately upon his arrival in Biarritz, and he was initially inclined to agree.  Conferring in Trump’s hotel room with Jared Kushner and White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvanery, I urged against meeting with Zarif.  Trump ultimately did not see Zarif, but, as the Duke of Wellington said of Napolean’s defeat at Waterloo, it was “the nearest run thing you ever saw.”

Trump’s pre-Inauguration intervention in Joe Biden’s long effort to obtain a cease-fire/hostage-release deal between Hamas and Israel is also noteworthy.  After seven months of failure, Trump’s pressure on Israel resulted in Netanyahu finally accepting Biden’s deal, or at least its first phase.  Trump wanted to take credit for the hostage releases, hearkening back to the start of Ronald Reagan’s administration, when Iran returned US embassy officials taken hostage during the 1979 Islamic Revolution.  On that level, Trump succeeded where Biden failed.  But whether Trump understands Biden’s plan has other phases is far from certain, as are the prospects that even the first phase will conclude successfully, let alone those that follow.  

Improbably, however, there have been signs, before and after Trump’s Inauguration, that he may believe that the Gaza war has actually ended.  Steve Witkoff, his family friend and now a special Middle East envoy, has stresses that “phase two” of Biden’s deal, which involves further negotiation between Israel and Hamas, should begin promptly.  This can hardly be what Israel expects.  In addition, Witkoff’s Trumpian “zeal for the deal” mentality, and his inexperience, reflected in naïve public comments(https://www.foxnews.com/media/trump-envoy-says-gaza-ceasefire-could-pave-way-mideast-normalization-deal-inflection-point), are factors that could militate against Israel in the immediate future.  Impressed by Witkoff’s performance to date, Trump may have decided to give him a role in Iran matters, although that remains unclear(https://www.axios.com/2025/01/23/trump-witkoff-iran-diplomacy-nuclear-deal).  Nonetheless, both have said they favored diplomatic options to resolve Iran’s nuclear threat.

If true, this creates a dilemma for Netanyahu.  Right now, Israel and America have the best opportunity ever to destroy Iran’s nuclear-weapons and missile programs.  Israel has already massively damaged Iran’s missile-production facilities(https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production) and at least one target involved in weaponizing highly enriched uranium(https://www.axios.com/2024/11/15/iran-israel-destroyed-active-nuclear-weapons-research-facility), not to mention flattening Iran’s sophisticated, Russia-supplied, S-300 air defense systems(https://www.voanews.com/a/israel-s-attack-on-iran-has-left-tehran-offensively-and-defensively-weaker/7848701.html).  Additional attacks in Syria after Assad’s overthrow have opened an air corridor allowing direct access from Israel to Iran.  The path is clear.  

Obstacles remain, notably Iran’s and Hezbollah’s remaining ballistic missiles, which would enable either retaliatory strikes against Israel, or even a pre-emptive strike to foreclose Netanyahu’s options.  Israel, Jordan, and nearby Arab states must also worry about the current regime in Damascus, led by the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (“HTS”) terrorist group.  Having shed his nom de guerre, and changed from combat fatigues to suits and ties, HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa is doing his best to convince outsiders that he now simply seeks responsible government in Syria.  Whether this is true remains unclear, as do Turkish aspirations in Syria and across the region.  The Biden administration(https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/01/24/us-syria-intelligence-hts-isis/) reportedly went so far as to share intelligence with HTS about ISIS, although whether Trump will continue this risky business is unknown.

What is inescapable is that while Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities have never been more vulnerable, Trump’s new administration seemed undecided on its future course.  His first term may not be an accurate prediction of his second.  There is no Trumpian grand strategy at work here since he does not do grand strategy.  Instead, he is transactional, episodic, and ad hoc, often making decisions based on whatever the last person he consults with recommends.  This may be the real future of America’s policy in the Middle East.

This article was first published in Independent Arabia on January 28, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Posted in By John Bolton, Essential, Featured, JRB_FP/Terrorism, JRB_MiddleEast/NAfrica, News

Trump can turn Syria opportunity against Iran

January 06, 2025
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Last month’s rapid collapse and fall of Syria’s Assad dynasty surprised the world, starting with Bashar Assad himself. Led by the radical Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al Sham and likely galvanized by Israel’s mauling of Hamas and Hezbollah, the rebel victory represents Iran’s third catastrophic defeat in trying to implement its anti-Israel “ring of fire” strategy.

HTS and its leader, Ahmed al Sharaa, are struggling to consolidate power within long-fractured Syria. Their main priority is convincing Arab and Western states that they are no longer terrorists, nor controlled by Turkey, which labels HTS as terrorist but has nonetheless aided it for years. Sharaa has shed his terrorist nom de guerre and even his combat fatigues, now appearing at media events in Western attire. Whether his transformation from radical terrorist is real or merely cosmetic remains to be seen.

Iranian Leader Ali Khamenei attends a program at the Imam Khomeini Hosseini meets with Iran Air Force commanders and Iran Air Defense Force officers at the Imam Khomeini Husayniyya in Tehran, Iran on February 05, 2024. (Iranian Leader Press Office / Handout/Anadolu via Getty Images)

Still, this is no time for the United States to say “hands off.” We have two critical national security interests flowing from Assad’s downfall. First, cooperating with Israel and Arab allies, we must ensure that Syria does not become another terrorist state, threatening our regional allies and possibly Europe and America. Second, Washington and Jerusalem should seize the opportunity of swiftly moving events in the Middle East to increase pressure on Iran, including destroying or substantially weakening its nuclear weapons program.

On the antiterrorism front alone, the U.S. has compelling reasons to prevent another Afghanistan. Nearly 2,000 of our troops remain in northeastern and eastern Syria, supporting primarily Kurdish forces who helped eliminate the Islamic State territorial caliphate in 2019, and who are now guarding thousands of dangerous Islamic State fighters held prisoner. The Kurds are threatened not only by HTS but by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s neo-Ottomanist aspirations, long-standing irredentist objectives in northern Syria, and his vindictive campaign against the Kurdish people. Northeastern Syria is today relatively calm. Any U.S. withdrawal or assent to Turkish demands to “relieve” us would only contribute to longer-term instability.

Inside the remainder of Syria, numerous ethnic and religious minorities, some favored under Assad, some not, worry about their fate under radical Sunni Islamist rule, as possibly dangerous as the Shia Hezbollah terrorists in next-door Lebanon. The disorder in Syria compounds the already widespread fragmentation created during the Arab Spring struggle to overthrow Assad. These anarchic conditions are conducive for existing and newly arriving foreign terrorists to establish a significant presence in Syria, as in Afghanistan, which would pose substantial dangers regionally and globally.

For Washington, the possibility that HTS might push Russia out of its naval and air stations at Tartus and Hmeimim, respectively, is a major upside. HTS has reportedly called for all Russian forces to withdraw. Widespread reporting indicates that some removals of troops and equipment are underway, perhaps slowed by the sinking of a Russian cargo ship in the Mediterranean, which Moscow blames on terrorism. But if HTS did, in fact, expel the Russian military from Syria, that could be promising evidence that HTS wanted to foster stability and reject adventurism by unhelpful foreign assistance.

As to Iran, Assad’s overthrow substantially damaged its hegemonic ambitions, and not just in Syria. By cutting off land supply routes to Hezbollah in Lebanon, HTS severed the most efficient, economical route used by Tehran for years to supply its terrorist proxy. HTS has warned Iran against “spreading chaos in Syria,” which, typically, Iran denied doing.

Israel wasted little time after Assad fled to Moscow, attacking Syrian air, land, and naval military facilities; chemical and biological weapons targets; and temporarily occupying the entire U.N. Golan Heights demilitarized zone and some additional Syrian territory. Although criticized pro forma by Gulf Arab states, Israel’s preventive action was justified by Syria’s instability and the risk of terrorists seizing government control in Damascus. Even the Biden administration acted militarily, bombing significant Islamic State targets to prevent its resurgence, or allowing HTS to absorb Islamic State fighters and assets.

With Syrian air defenses degraded, as Iran’s have been by prior Israeli strikes, the way is now largely open from Israel to Iran should Jerusalem and Washington decide to strike the heart of Tehran’s nuclear program. There may never be a better opportunity.

The Biden administration has consistently and erroneously pressured Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not to eliminate Iran’s nuclear menace. However, core U.S. national security interests, notably our long struggles against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and global terrorism, all justify eliminating Tehran’s existing capabilities. Diplomacy has manifestly failed.

History is ready for the making in Syria and the Middle East. The incoming Trump administration should go for it.

This article was first published in the Washington Examiner on January 6, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Posted in By John Bolton, Essential, Featured, JRB_FP/Terrorism, JRB_MiddleEast/NAfrica, News

The Fall of Assad

December 17, 2024
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History is moving fast in the Middle East, raising the possibility, for well or ill, of massive changes throughout the region.  The collapse of Syria’s Assad-family dictatorship took everyone by surprise, starting with Bashar al-Assad himself, and certainly including Russia and Iran.  Arab and Western intelligence services missed the regime’s vulnerability, particularly the weakness and disloyalty of its military and security services.  

The brutal dictatorship is gone, but what comes next?  Most importantly, Assad’s removal is yet another massive defeat for Iran’s ruling mullahs.  Following Israel’s thrashing of Hezbollah and its near-total dismemberment of Hamas, this is the third major catastrophe for Tehran’s anti-Israel “ring-of-fire” strategy.  While Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu agreed to a cease fire with Hezbollah, he has made clear it lasts for only sixty days, ending just after the Joe Biden leaves office.  Hezbollah will be in further dire trouble if its overland supply route through Iraq and Syria is permanently blocked.  There is no cease fire with Hamas, meaning both terrorist proxies  could face further Israeli decimation.

As for Iran itself, the situation could hardly be worse.  With three major pillars of its regional power already fallen or on the way, the ayatollahs are now at great risk both internationally and domestically.  Recriminations and finger-pointing among top leaders of the Revolutionary Guards and regular Iranian military(https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/12/09/iran-armed-forces-at-war-with-themselves-fall-assad-syria/) has already spread widely in the general population(https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/13/world/middleeast/iran-syria-assad.html).

Disarray and fragmentation in the senior ranks of authoritarian governments are often the first signs of regime collapse.  Popular discontent in Iran was already extensive due to long-standing economic decline, the opposition of young people and women generally, ethnic discontent, and more.  If the Revolutionary Guard and regular military leaderships begin to come apart, the potential for internal armed conflict grows.  Assad’s collapse showed that a façade of strength can mask underlying weakness, with surprisingly swift collapse following.  

Externally, Iran’s regime has not been this vulnerable since the 1979 revolution.  Jerusalem has already eliminated Tehran’s Russian-supplied S-300 air-defense systems, seriously damaged its ballistic-missile capabilities, and destroyed elements of the nuclear-weapons program(https://www.axios.com/2024/11/15/iran-israel-destroyed-active-nuclear-weapons-research-facility).  Netanyahu has never had a better opportunity to obliterate all or vast swathes of the entire nuclear effort.  So doing would make Israel, neighboring states, and the entire world safe from the threat of Iran’s decades-long nuclear-proliferation threat, which has long contravened the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Israel, with US assistance if requested, should go for the win on the nuclear issue.  Not only would that eliminate Tehran’s threat of a nuclear Holocaust, it would simultaneously strike yet another domestic political blow against the mullahs.  In addition to the tens of billions of dollars wasted in supporting Iran’s now-decimated terrorist proxies, but the billions spent on nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles would also be seen as squandered.  Iran’s citizens would be perfectly entitled to conclude that the ayatollahs had never had their best interests at heart, and that their removal was now fully justified.

Russia is the next biggest loser.  Distracted and overburdened by its unprovoked aggression against Ukraine, now about to enter its third year, the Kremlin lacked the resources to save its puppet in Damascus.  Vladimir Putin’s humiliation is reverberating globally, and it will also have corrosive impact inside Russia, perhaps finally stimulating more-effective opposition to the ongoing burdens the Ukraine war imposes on Russia’s citizens and  economy.  

Even more significant losses may be coming.  The Kremlin’s main interests in Syria are its Tartus naval station and its Latakia air base.  These are Moscow’s only military facilities outside the territory of the former Soviet Union.  They are vital to Russia’s position in the eastern Mediterranean.  If forced to evacuate these bases, Moscow’s ability to project power beyond the Black Sea would be dramatically reduced, as would be the threat to NATO across the Mediterranean.  Although there were early indications Russia might to retain the bases, recent commercial overhead photography indicates it may be preparing to withdraw some or all of its forces.  The situation remains fluid(https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/12/13/world/syria-news).

Without doubt, Turkey, the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) terrorists, and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army are the big winners so far.  However, Syria’s internal situation is far from settled.  American troops remain in northeastern Syria assisting the largely Kurdish Syrian Defense Forces in the anti-ISIS campaign, and at al-Tanf.  The Kurds should not be abandoned, especially to President Recep Erdogan’s neo-Ottomanist aspirations to expand Ankara’s control and influence in Arab lands  It would be a mistake, at this point, to remove HTS from Washington’s list of foreign terrorist organizations, although, unwisely, the Biden administration is reportedly considering doing so(https://www.politico.com/news/2024/12/09/us-debates-lifting-terror-designation-for-main-syrian-rebel-group-00193367).  

While eliminating Assad is a critical contribution to reducing the Iranian threat, neither Israel nor neighboring Arab governments nor the United States have any interest in seeing another terrorist state arise, and this one on the Mediterranean.  Delicate diplomacy lies ahead.  In the meantime, Biden was right to bomb ISIS weapons storage depots in eastern Syria to deny those assets to HTS, and Israel is justified in eliminating the Assad government’s military assets for the same reason.

Importantly for the region and beyond, urgent efforts are required to locate and secure all aspects of Assad’s chemical and biological weapons programs(https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/12/12/syria-chemical-weapons-search-mustard-sarin/).  Assaad used chemical weapons against his own people as recently as 2017 and 2018, so there is no question whether these capabilities exist.

Thus, while there is considerable good news surrounding Assad’s ouster and exile to Moscow, circumstances in Syria still pose serious threats to peace and security in the Middle East and globally.  This is no time to relax or turn away, especially for the incoming Trump administration.

This article was first published in Independent Arabia on December 17, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

Posted in By John Bolton, Essential, JRB_Asia, JRB_FP/Terrorism, JRB_MiddleEast/NAfrica, News

Trump and Iran

November 11, 2024
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Donald Trump’s election as President guarantees that America’s Middle East policy will change.  The real question, though, and a major early test for Trump, is whether it will change enough.  Does he understand that the region’s geopolitics differ dramatically from when he left office, and could change even more before Inauguration Day?  The early signs are not promising that Trump grasps either the new strategic opportunities or threats Washington and its allies face.

The region’s central crisis on January 20 will be Iran’s ongoing “ring of fire” strategy against Israel.  Right now, Israel is systematically dismantling Hamas’s political leadership, military capabilities, and underground Gaza fortress.  Israel is similarly dismembering Hezbollah in Lebanon:  its leadership annihilated, its enormous missile arsenal steadily decimated, and its hiding places shattered.  Israel will continue degrading Hamas, Hezbollah, and West Bank terrorists, ultimately eliminating these pillars of Iranian power.  Even President Biden’s team has already urged Qatar to expel Hamas’s leaders(https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/08/politics/qatar-hamas-doha-us-request/index.html).

Unfortunately, Yemen’s Houthis, still blocking the Suez Canal-Red Sea passage, have suffered only limited damage, as have Iran’s Shia militia proxies in Syria and Iraq.  Iran itself finally faced measurable retaliation on October 26, as Israel eliminated the Russian-supplied S-300 air defenses and inflicted substantial damage on missile-production facilities.  Nonetheless, Iran’s direct losses remain minimal.  Due to intense White House pressure and the impending US elections, Jerusalem targeted neither Tehran’s nuclear-weapons program nor its oil infrastructure.

Whether Israel takes further significant action before January 20 is the biggest unknown variable.  Israel’s October 26 air strikes have prompted unceasing boasting from Tehran that it will retaliate in turn.  These boasts remain unfulfilled.  The ayatollahs appear so fearful of Israel’s military capabilities that they hope the world’s attentions drift away as Iran backs down in the face of Israel’s threat.  If, however, Iran does summon the will to retaliate, it is nearly certain this time that Israel’s counterstrike will be devastating, especially if during the US presidential transition.  Israeli Defense Forces could lay waste to Iran’s nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs so extensively they rock the foundations of the ayatollahs’ regime.

Washington’s conventional wisdom is that Trump will return to “maximum pressure” economically against Iran through more and better-enforced sanctions, and stronger, more consistent support for Israel, as during his first term.  If so, Tehran’s mullahs can relax.  Trump’s earlier “maximum pressure” policy was nothing of the sort.  Even worse, a Trump surrogate has already announced that the incoming administration will have “no interest in regime change in Iran(https://www.timesofisrael.com/ex-envoy-says-trump-aims-to-weaken-iran-deal-of-the-century-likely-back-on-table/),” implying that the fantasy still lives that Trump could reach a comprehensive deal with Tehran in his second term.

Moreover, despite the staged good will in Bibi Netanyahu’s call to Trump last week, their personal relationship is tense.  Trump said in 2021, “the first person that congratulated [Biden] was Bibi Netanyahu, the man that I did more for than any other person I dealt with.  Bibi could have stayed quiet. He has made a terrible mistake(https://www.axios.com/2021/12/10/trump-netanyahu-disloyalty-fuck-him).”  In practice, this means that Israel should not expect the level of Trump support it received previously.  And, because Trump is constitutionally barred from seeking a third term, he need not fear negative domestic political reactions if he opposes Israel on important issues.

Much depends on the currently unclear circumstances Trump will face on January 20.  In addition to shunning regime change, Trump seems mainly interested in simply ending the conflict promptly, apparently without regard to how(https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trumps-erratic-foreign-policy-meet-a-world-fire-2024-11-06/), which has proven very effective in US politics.  This approach is consistent with his position on Ukraine.  Asserting that neither conflict would have even occurred had he remained President, which is neither provable nor disprovable, Trump sees these wars as unwanted legacies from Biden.

If Israel does not demolish Iran’s nuclear aspirations before Trump’s inauguration, those aspirations will be the first and most pressing issue he faces.  If he simply defaults back to “maximum pressure” through sanctions, he is again merely postponing an ultimate reckoning with Iran.  Even restoring the sanctions to the levels prevailing when Trump left the Oval Office will be difficult, because Biden’s flawed and ineffective sanctions-enforcement efforts have weakened compliance globally.  Trump will not likely have the attention span or the resolve to toughen sanctions back to meaningful levels.  The growing cooperation among Russia, China and Iran means Iran’s partners will do all they can to break the West’s sanctions, as they are breaking the West’s Ukraine-related sanctions against Russia.

As they say in Texas, Trump is typically “all hat and no cattle”:  he talks tough but doesn’t follow through on his rhetoric.  Since he has never shown any inclination to move decisively against Iran’s nuclear program, that leaves the decision to Israel, which has its own complex domestic political problems to resolve.  An alternative is to assist Iran’s people to overthrow Tehran’s hated regime.  Here, too, however, Trump has shown little interest, thereby missing rare opportunities that Iran’s citizens could seize with a minimum of outside assistance.  If Tehran’s ayatollahs are smart, they will dangle endless opportunities for Trump to negotiate, hoping to distract him from more serious, permanent remedies to the threats the ayatollahs themselves are posing.

Of all the critical early tests Trump will face, the Middle East tops the list.  China, Russia, and other American adversaries will be watching just as closely as countries in the Middle East, since the ramifications of Trump’s decisions will be far-reaching.

This article was first published in The Independent Arabie on November 10, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

Posted in By John Bolton, Essential, Featured, JRB_FP/Terrorism, JRB_MiddleEast/NAfrica, News, Uncategorized

What Next in the Middle East?

October 07, 2024
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One year after Hamas launched Iran’s “Ring of Fire” strategy with a barbaric attack against Israeli civilians, the Middle East has changed significantly.  Now, the world awaits Jerusalem’s response to Tehran’s ballistic-missile attack last week, the largest such attack in history.  It was the current war’s second military assault directly from Iranian territory against Israel, the first being April’s combined drone and ballistic/cruise missile barrage.  We do not know how Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu will respond, but it is nearly certain Israel’s answer will be far stronger than in April.

Meanwhile, Iran’s Ring of Fire is clearly failing.  Israel is systematically destroying Hamas and Hezbollah, two critical foundations of Iran’s terrorist power.  Whatever now happens between Jerusalem and Tehran, Iran’s efforts to debilitate Israel —  and potentially the Gulf Arab states  —  with terrorist and conventional military assets may well suffer irreversible defeat.

According to Israel, 23 of 24 Hamas combat battalions have been destroyed, and what’s left remains under attack.  Numerous Hamas leaders have been killed, not the least being Ismael Haniyeh in a supposedly secure compound in the heart of Tehran.  Yahyah Sinwar remains at large;  Hamas still holds Israeli civilian hostages;  and Gaza’s enormous underground fortress is still partially in Hamas hands, but the ending is increasingly clear.

Hezbollah is still in the process of being destroyed.  Israel’s killing of Hassan Nasrullah is already a turning point in Middle East history, so great was the shock in Lebanon and beyond.  As effectively as against Hamas, or perhaps more, Jerusalem is relentlessly decapitating Hezbollah’s leadership, eliminating officials even as they are being promoted to the fill vacancies left by dead colleagues.  Israel also claims to have destroyed half of Hezbollah’s enormous arsenal of missiles and launchers.  That estimate seems high, and in any case leaves significant work remaining against Hezbollah’s estimated  inventory of up to 150,000 missiles.  Nonetheless, with Nasrullah’s demise and with its leadership decimated, Hezbollah is reeling.

The Gulf Arab states and others should now be considering what the future holds for the people of Lebanon and Gaza without Hezbollah and Hamas.  What has been unthinkable for decades may now be within sight.  As long as Hezbollah, the world’s largest terrorist group, controlled Lebanon and its government, there was no possibility to achieve political freedom and stability.  Given the prospect of Hezbollah’s eradication as both a political and military force, urgent attention is required to the possibility of a society without intimidation and control from Iran.  Lebanon with Hezbollah could and should be a very different place.

Gaza, although smaller, is more complicated.  Palestinians are the only major refugee population since World War II that has not benefitted from the basic humanitarian principle of either returning to their country of origin or being resettled.  Palestinians are, unfortunately for them, the exception, not the norm.  The international community needs to confront the reality that Gaza is not and never will be a viable economic entity, even if some distant day combined as a state with “islands” on the West Bank.  Far better, once Hamas is on history’s ash heap, to treat Gazans more humanely than simply being shields for their terrorist masters.  It makes no sense to rebuild Gaza as a high-rise refugee camp.  The most humane future for innocent Gazans is resettlement in functioning economies where their children have the prospect of a normal future.

Although Gaza and Lebanon have something to look forward to, the same cannot yet be said, sadly, for Yemen, Syria and Iraq.  Yemen’s Houthi terrorists and Iranian-backed Shia militias in Syria and Iraq remain largely untouched after October 7.  That should change.

Although the Houthis have launched missiles and drones against Israel, and Israel has retaliated, the Houthis main contribution to Iran’s Ring of Fire has been effectively closing the Suez Canal-Red Sea maritime passage.  This blockade has been extremely harmful to Egypt through lost Suez Canal transit fees, and has hurt the wider world by significantly increasing shipping costs.  A clear violation of the principle of freedom of the seas, the major maritime powers would be fully warranted to correct it through force, with or without UN Security Council approval.

For the United States, freedom of the seas has been a major element of national security even before the thirteen colonies became independent.  In the last two centuries, America and the United Kingdom led global efforts to defend the freedom of the seas, and should do so now, eliminating the ongoing Houthi anti-shipping aggression.  Cutting off Iran’s supply of missiles and drones is a first step, coupled with destroying existing Houthi stockpiles.  Washington’s opposition to prior efforts by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to defeat the terrorists was misguided and should be reversed.  Destroying Houthi military capabilities would afford Yemen the same opportunities now opening for Lebanon and Gaza, and should be urgently pursued.

In Iraq and Syria, as Iran’s power fades (and may well fade dramatically after Israel’s coming retaliation), action against the Iran-backed Shia militias should be the highest priority.  In such circumstances, Baghdad at least may well think twice before demanding that the few remaining US forces still in Iraq and Syria be removed.

For Iran itself, loss of its terrorist proxies, after having invested billions of dollars over decades to build the terrorist infrastructure, will be a dramatic reversal of fortune.  If Iran’s nuclear program is similarly devastated, the threat Iran has posed by seeking to achieve hegemony in the Middle East and within the Islamic world will likely be impossible for the foreseeable future.  In these circumstances, the people of Iran may finally be able to achieve the downfall of the ayatollahs and the creation of representative government.  It is far too early to be confident of such an outcome, but it is not too early to hope for it.

This article was first published in Independent Arabia on October 7, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

Posted in By John Bolton, Essential, Featured, JRB_FP/Terrorism, JRB_MiddleEast/NAfrica, News

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