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How Biden Can Turn the Tables on Putin

May 13, 2021
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He aggresses in a gray zone between NATO and Russia, so let’s remove it

This article appeared in The National Review on May 13, 2021. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
May 13, 2021

The Biden administration billed Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s May 6 visit to Kyiv as showing support for Ukraine’s struggle against Russian aggression. Instead, Blinken served up only rhetorical pablum, retreating from what senior Trump officials (although not Trump himself) did to back Ukraine and re­turning to Obama-era blandishments. Vladimir Putin must be delighted.

Inexplicably, moreover, Blinken equated Russia’s belligerence with Ukraine’s admittedly substantial corruption problems, stating that there is “aggression from outside . . . and, in effect, aggression from within.” This moral equivalence is nonsensical. For both Washington and Kyiv, corruption is hardly as strategically important as Moscow’s threat. Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky won election by campaigning against corruption, and while he is struggling to prevail, lecturing him publicly will not improve his performance.

More fundamentally, President Biden still has no policy to deal with Russia (or China) in Europe. During his April 13 telephone call with Putin, for example, Biden raised a long list of issues and ended by inviting Putin to a bilateral summit. Strategic coherence, however, requires allocating priorities and resources among national-security problems, not just listing them. Absent substantive policy direction, process steps such as summits are theater at best and often counter­productive, highlighting the vacuum that lies beneath public rhetoric.

Biden’s inherited problems, complicated by the passage of time, nonetheless increasingly require urgent solutions. After the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact collapsed, NATO’s eastward expansion never reached a decisive conclusion. Six Eastern European and Caucasus countries were left in a gray zone between Russia and NATO’s new borders, thereby remaining vulnerable to Moscow’s desire to reestablish hegemony within the former USSR. (The five Central Asian states, having their own complicated relationships with Russia, deserve separate analysis.)

Following the USSR’s disintegration, Moscow vigorously sought to contest the gray zone: creating “frozen conflicts” in Moldova and Georgia through direct Russian military involvement, and manipulating Azerbaijani–Armenian hostilities over Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia kept Belarus politically and economically close, still its strategy today but an increasingly difficult one after 2020’s popular opposition to the Minsk regime.

The Kremlin tried to mirror its Belarus policy in Ukraine, because both are central to its vision of “Russia.” Moscow initially succeeded in Kyiv, but the 2004 Orange Revolution brought such dramatic changes that, in April 2008, George W. Bush proposed putting Ukraine and Georgia on a sure path to NATO membership. Germany and France rejected Bush’s proposal, and four months later Russia invaded Georgia. Russia subsequently subverted the Orange Revolution through fraud and skullduggery but was in turn reversed by another popular uprising in 2014. In retaliation, Putin seized Crimea outright and created a new frozen conflict in eastern Ukraine.

However messy the history, Russian aggressiveness within the former USSR harms U.S. interests by destabilizing the region and, left unchecked, threatens instability across Europe. Virtually all the states of “new Europe” — the post–Cold War generation of NATO members — believe, with good reason, that blocking Moscow’s interference is critical to their growth and stability. Old Europe, especially Germany and France, is still somewhat tone-deaf here, so the diplomatic heavy lifting ahead for Washington should not be underestimated — par for the course even at the Cold War’s height.

Russia’s belligerence in Europe also shows its increasing, disturbing closeness to China, a relationship reflecting Moscow’s importance to Beijing for supplying hydrocarbons and high-tech weapons and the regimes’ perception of common interests in shielding the likes of Iran and North Korea from U.S. pressure. Breaking this emerging axis should be a high U.S. priority and is entirely consistent with thwarting Russian interference across its European borders.

China’s effort to purchase Ukraine’s major aerospace firm Motor Sich, successfully blocked by Kyiv after considerable American effort, exemplifies this point. Standing up to China’s existential challenge to the West as a whole will also require diplomatic heavy lifting in Europe.

As long as a gray zone remains be­tween NATO and Russia, instability will persist. Shrinking this inherently dangerous geographic space reduces potential Russian mischief, and ultimately confronts Moscow again with the question whether to join the West or oppose it.

Ultimately, inclusion in NATO is the only way for the endangered countries to minimize the inevitable uncertainty and instability between the alliance and Russia. Previously, NATO has rightly shied from adding new members with foreign combatants on their soil, seeing that as inheriting a war and thereby triggering Article Five of the Washington Treaty. Reducing the gray zone does not immediately require any new NATO memberships, but the alliance can surely devise an appropriate status to handle today’s European problem.

To get there, our primary focus should be to substantially augment Zelensky’s diplomatic and military efforts to expel Russia from eastern Ukraine, and then to impose steeply increasing costs on Russia if it fails to respond diplomatically. Succeeding will not solve Crimea, but it will clear the decks to do so. Critically, we must keep Europe focused on rolling back Moscow’s blatant cross-border military action.

Moldova, tucked between Ukraine and Romania, is a frozen conflict ready for melting. Purportedly independent Transnistria, a Russian invention, exists separately from Moldova only through Moscow’s continued military presence. Simply raising international attention to this post–Cold War anomaly would startle the Kremlin, and a determined new government in Chisinau now provides the opportunity for Washington to step up.

Similarly, in Georgia, it is time to push back against Russia’s presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with the aim of re-creating the April 2008 situation in which NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia was serious and feasible. Ukraine and Georgia remain the two most strategically important gray-zone countries. In turn, taken more seriously after Biden’s acknowledgement of Turkey’s genocidal campaign during World War I, Washington can then address the Azerbaijan–Armenian conflict. Real progress, however, will likely have to abide Turkey’s 2023 elections. If incumbent president Recep Tayyip Erdogan loses, much will be possible. But if he wins, Turkey will be dangerously close to removing itself from NATO by spurning Mustafa Kemal’s post-Ottoman vision, and thereby badly undermining NATO’s position in the Caucasus.

Belarus is the hardest challenge of all, with alliance membership inconceivable for quite some time. Yet however difficult it may be, the U.S. cannot leave Belarus to Moscow uncontested. The map alone shows how geopolitically critical Belarus is for Poland, Ukraine, and the Baltic republics, and how grave a threat an offensive Russian military presence would be. Ironically, rising pro-democracy sentiment increases the risk of Russian military intervention, and perhaps an outright Anschluss, even as the popular discontent demonstrates that moving Belarus westward may be more feasible than previously thought. NATO needs more outreach into Belarus, and its Eastern European members should play a major role. Belarus also implicates the related question whether Sweden and Finland will finally accept the inevitable and join NATO, thereby bolstering the Baltic republics and others.

Russia’s promises not to intervene in its former republics — and its protestations that its intentions are benign — carry no weight. Russia will stop meddling when it knows that it cannot succeed and that crossing a NATO boundary (of some sort) will bring inevitable and highly damaging consequences. The sooner we make that clear, the better.

June’s back-to-back G-7 and NATO summits in London and Brussels, respectively, afford President Biden an opportunity to prove he has more to offer than recycled rhetoric. If he fails to deliver next month, there is trouble ahead for Ukraine, America, and Europe.

Posted in By John Bolton, JRB_Europe, News, Uncategorized

Anatomy of an intentional escalation: Israel’s Approaching Hot Summer

May 12, 2021
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By Dr. David Wurmser
May 12, 2021

Sadly, there seems to be an escalatory effort underway within Israel, in the administered territories in Judea and Samaria, along Israel’s northern and Gaza borders, and even globally which could lead to great tension, even war, in the coming months. This is not a mutually reinforcing cycle of violence between two sides, but a concerted offensive serving strategic aims of a number of Israel’s enemies.

There is no one cause for this escalation. Rather it results from a collection of forces and strategic interests converging. Like the epic art of Middle Eastern story-telling, the singular “umbrella” theme of escalation is actually the product of many separate sub-tales woven into other tales, which align into a shell or framework story. In this case, that unifying shell tying these separate tales together represents a very real moment of danger.

The signs of escalation were building for weeks. In early April, there was a sudden escalation of attacks on Jews, many of which were serious and violent enough to result in hospitalization. As the Palestinian Media Watch, and FLAME – an organization dedicated to accuracy in media – note, the Palestinian official media organs started to broadcast highly inflammatory and bloody rhetoric starting on April 2. Two particularly disturbing attacks, one a beating by three Arab youths of a Rabbi in Jaffa, the southern part of Tel Aviv, and another wherein an Arab spilled boiling liquid on a Jew entering the Old City of Jerusalem, were followed by violent Arab demonstrations when police attempted to arrest the perpetrators.

Palestinians conducting these attacks in early April filmed their exploits and posted them to TikTok to compete over the amount of “likes” and “approvals” they can draw. So prevalent was this wave of Palestinian attacks on unsuspecting Jews who were minding their business in normal daily circumstances that the whole escalation was dubbed the “TikTok Intifadah.”

After two weeks of these violent attacks, a small group of extremist Jews marched in the streets of Jerusalem calling for the harming of Arabs, and a small demonstration was organized in Jaffa on April 20, near the area of the Rabbi’s attack. There were no acts of Jewish demonstrations prior to that. There were also one or two localized acts of anonymous Jewish graffiti-spraying with hateful slogans, and even the destruction of a few trees. But these incidents were isolated, limited and Israeli authorities investigated and will prosecute them. Moreover, subsequent investigations, even by leftist human rights organizations like BeTzelem, have even much to their chagrin later been forced to admit they had been misled and thus must retract some of their accusations of Jewish violence, particularly arson, which turned out, in fact, to be acts of Palestinian arson. Actual Jewish demonstrations and disturbances were quickly suppressed by Israeli police and have largely disappeared.

In contrast, Arab demonstrations have accelerated, expanded, broadened geographically and become increasingly violent. And the leadership of the Palestinian Authority (PA) continues to use its media outlets not to calm the flames, but to pour high-octane fuel on them. Incitement includes songs and chanting of slogans calling for martyrdom and blood in their children’s programs across all age groups, even toddlers.

Another series of attacks focused on the Damascus Gate into the Old City. This campaign of violence, especially a series of beatings of Jews and riots in Jerusalem, Jaffa and at the Damascus Gate on April 12, led Israel to set up barriers on April 13, to control flow, keep potentially violent Jewish and Arab extremists separated and maintain pedestrian traffic control to segment and respond quickly to rioting attempts by either. When a large number of Arab agitators quickly surged toward the area that evening, the barriers proved inadequate, and several days of escalating nightly Arab riots against Israeli police ensued, which eventually provoked a smaller Jewish demonstration and unrest on April 20, after a week of Arab riots and numerous beatings of Jews.

It was not long before the border with Gaza heated up as well, and rockets began being launched from Gaza into Israel, with one night in late April registering nearly three dozen rocket attacks onto Israeli towns and cities near Gaza. The northern border heated up as well, with an increased pace of activity by Iran’s IRGC to establish its ability to attack Israel, followed by a series of Israeli strikes in Syria to diminish that capability. After one Israeli strike, a stray Syrian SA-5 missile flew nearly 200 km across Israel and landed near Israel’s nuclear reactor in Dimona.

In the first week of May, the escalation continued. The Palestinian Authority then formally cancelled its planned elections and blamed Israel for the cancellation, after which the long silent head of the Hamas military structure, Muhammad Deif, suddenly resurfaced to call for violent attacks on Israelis, to also include “hit and run” attempts to run over Israelis. On May 2, live fire weaponry was re-introduced when a Palestinian terrorist, Muntazir Shalabi and a driver, machine-gunned three Israelis waiting at a bus stop at Kfar Tapuah Junction in Samaria in the territories. One Israeli teenager, Yehuda Guetta, died and another is in serious condition. A third escaped with moderate injuries. Yehuda Guetta was the first Israeli to die as a result of live fire in a terror attack in months, even years.

Moreover, violent demonstrations also erupted against a cluster of Jewish houses in the southeast Jerusalem neighborhood of Shaykh Jarrah near the US embassy. The Jewish presence in this cluster of houses was not a new Israeli move; the claim was based on an old Jewish-held land-deed from early in the 20th century. But this Jewish presence in the heart of an otherwise Arab neighborhood in Jerusalem was quickly attacked as a target of opportunity in early May – a propaganda point which was quickly and unquestioningly adopted by some in the US on the left, as several major Democratic leaders, including Elizabeth Warren called the Israeli presence an “abhorrent” and “illegal” settlement.

These demonstrations in Shaykh Jarrah became more violent every day, with Arab arson attacks and the hurling of thousand of projectiles (chairs, bricks, rocks, etc.), which was met by the reinforced presence of armed Jews and police in the house cluster. Hamas warned that if the Israelis do not yield and leave the housing cluster, the violence will escalate.

Hamas delivered on its threats very quickly on another front. On May 5, Hamas from Gaza resumed their incendiary balloon attacks, which included this time not only incendiary devices attached to set fires in Israeli fields, but small bombs as well which could have caused considerable personal injury or death had any one of them had landed close to Israelis.

On Friday May 7, Israeli forces stopped a heavily armed squad originating in Tulkarem which was attempting to enter central Israel. Israeli forces identified the terrorists although they were driven in a minibus with stolen Israeli tags to facilitate entry into central Israel. When stopped, the three terrorists exited the minibus and initiated firing near the Salem military base checkpoint but failed to injure a single Israeli while two of the three terrorists were killed.

Finally, by nightfall on May 7, riots had erupted on the Temple Mount, with hundreds injured, including many police. Rioters retreated into the mosques on the Temple Mount, and police were forced to take positions up near them. This promises to put Israel in the difficult position of being accused of “aggressions” against the Temple Mount and threatening the “status quo.” Indeed, there is every indication already that this will soon cause a crisis in Israeli-Jordanian relations. In fact, the concept of status quo is odd to begin with since over the last two decades the status quo has been fluid rather than static. But the flow has always been in one direction alone. As any visitor to the Temple Mount over the last four decades can attest, the idea of a rigid “status quo” on the Temple Mount has proven to be an illusory concept masking the constantly expanding challenge to Israeli sovereignty, let alone Jewish and Christian access to the Temple Mount, at the hands of the increasingly restricting Muslim Waqf.

Finally, despite serious concerns over a complete loss of control Israeli police allowed Muslims to ascend the Temple Mount on Saturday night, May 8, to mark Laylat al-Qadr – one of the holiest days in the Muslim calendar, but one which is often marked by violence and emotion. With great effort and caution, the night passed without a serious eruption and loss of control, despite the fact that nearly 100,000 Muslims came to the limited space of the Temple Mount complex.

Indeed, despite all this escalation and violence over six weeks, not one Arab rioter has suffered serious injury, let alone be killed, although there are dead and critically wounded Israelis.

In short, Israel faces a concerted escalatory campaign which promises to deliver a hot summer. But why?

The context of this escalation is a willful policy of seeking to provoke a climate of tension which was first started by Muhammad Abbas (Abu Mazen), the head of the PLO and Palestinian Authority, but expanded to other players who had equal strategic reasons to seek upheaval.

Early this year, against the advice of most of his closest aides, Abu Mazen called for the first Palestinian elections in well over a decade for the end of May. Whatever Abu Mazen’s calculations were, it appears to have been a horrible miscalculation. By the end of March, it was painfully clear to him, his aides, his allies, his enemies, and to most international observers that not only will he not win the upcoming elections, but that he will be trounced with both Hamas’ and Marwan Barghouti’s faction of the PLO defeating him.

To avoid such a devastating humiliation, it was clear by very early April that Abu Mazen would have to cancel those elections, which he in fact eventually did the first week of May. And yet, cancelling the elections was not so simple, since both Abu Mazen’s aides and Hamas leaders made it clear that the latter would take to the streets in a violent upheaval against the PA and Abu Mazen were he to proceed to cancel the elections. Abu Mazen had no way out of this dilemma other than to proceed in cancelling the elections, but at the same time blame Israel and provoke a series of escalations that would externalize the anticipated violence and deflect it onto Israel.

A broader context also has intruded, about which there is building evidence. Several actors, both Palestinian factions as well as external actors such as Iran and Turkey, see a need and opportunity to incite escalation against Israel on many fronts, of which popular unrest was the first phase. In terms of need, the escalatory interests of the Palestinian Authority, Erdogan’s government in Turkey, the revolutionary regime in Iran — emanate from a sense of threat to their regimes from a fear of public rejection and internal unrest. All face grave crises internally that rattle their regimes in dangerous ways. On the other side, in terms of opportunity, the escalatory aspirations of all these actors emanate from the growing confidence that any increase in violence surrounding Israel will cause tension under the new Biden administration between Jerusalem and Washington, thus providing a strategic incentive to engage in just such an escalation. Other than the previous administration, and to some extent the Bush 43 administration, such a reflexive reaction to reign Israel in, and the resulting frustration of Israeli power and initiative, was a safe bet. As such, this sort of escalation, in the form of a test as well, has been a consistent theme greeting every new administration in which there was hope that they may be less pro-Israeli.

Finally, there is an internal Israeli dimension too. There is great shock and discomfort in traditional Israeli-Arab parties and elites in Israel. In the recent elections, an Arab party, the United Arab List (Ra’am) under Mansour Abbas, gained almost as many seats in the Israeli parliament (Knesset) as the traditional leadership represented by the Joint Arab List party led by Ayman Odeh. Mansour Abbas’ party gained this traction because the Israeli Arab population is facing a series of grave crises in such areas as crime, education, economy and so forth. There is popular erosion of support for the traditional leadership since it fails to deliver on such personally important issues. And patience is stretched for continued sacrifice for the elites’ obsessive, theoretical support for unattainable nationalist aspirations.

In a stark departure from the practice of reigning Arab-Israeli elites, Mansour Abbas’ party promised to work within the framework of any Israeli government as a normal parliamentary party to secure the interests of its constituents. Rather than respond competitively, however, the “establishment” Joint Arab List continued peddling an entirely disruptive, anti-Zionist pan-Arab nationalist agenda, which sacrificed its ability to enter the parliamentary power structure to leverage and barter for constituent interests, and instead continued to opt for international applause for its rhetorical, but entirely disenfranchising, nationalist behavior. As such, this internal Israeli Arab traditional leadership anchored to the Joint Arab List also instigated some violence in recent months in order to embarrass and undermine the rising support for the Ra’am (the United Arab List) party. The Joint Arab List under Odeh even provoked direct violent attacks on Mansour Abbas and some in his party in Umm al-Fahm last month. One of the aims of this tension then is to shame Ra’am’s leadership enough to force it into expressing support for the unrest, which would sabotage the party’s ability to deliver on its promise and enter an Israeli government.

As such, the interests of a panoply of actors now dovetail into a dangerously escalatory and mutually-resonating climate enflamed by the United Arab List, the PA, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Turkey and Iran. Each player has contributed a sub-tale to this story, but the shell, or “umbrella” story is the larger and unifying tale of escalation.

Thus, the unprovoked Arab rioting, the climate of tension created by the impressive performance of the United Arab List in the Israeli elections, followed by the violence instigated at the behest of Abu Mazen and then Hamas and Islamic Jihad, are not the whole story. Given the interests that seem to be in play, it is likely that they are a prelude to attempts to lay the groundwork for a more dangerous escalation in the coming days and weeks, serving not only the interests of diversion noted regarding Abu Mazen, but foreign actors who seek to drive a wedge between Israel and the United States.

A final, disturbing and novel dimension of this current escalatory cycle is that it is attended by a considerable footprint from US territory. First is the advance propaganda campaign, clearly coordinated, to provide a proper background to set a narrative in the United States favorable to this escalation and multiply the tensions it will cause in US-Israeli relations. With blazing speed after the PA and Hamas had signaled there will be an escalatory cycle, pro-Palestinian voices in the United States mobilized to secure this narrative. The Middle East Institute’s Khaled Elgindy, publishing in Foreign Policy, is for example a revealing example of the effort, when he wrote:

“The unrest began on April 13—around the start of Ramadan—when Israeli authorities blocked off the steps to the Old City’s iconic Damascus Gate in Palestinian East Jerusalem. The seemingly arbitrary move sparked several days of clashes between Palestinian protesters and Israeli security forces.”

Of course, there was nothing arbitrary about Israel’s moves at the Damascus gate on April 13, since for weeks before the restriction, accelerating numbers of unprovoked attacks, as incited by Palestinian leaders, occurred on Jews in both Jerusalem and in Jaffa. A focal point of many of these attacks not only in recent weeks, but months and over the last year, which also included several incidents against police, was at the Damascus Gate. So the restrictive barriers set up at the Damascus Gate on April 13, are the inevitable consequence of the escalatory ramp the Palestinian leadership itself had ascended.

So why did the author set the date as April 13, to use his term an arbitrary mile-marker midstream in a series of escalating activities? Because it is the start of Ramadan. The implication is insidious: the Israelis chose to, out of the blue, attack Muslims in Jerusalem on that day of all days since it marked the beginning of the most holy month. In other words, Israel is subtly accused of launching a grave religious attack on Islam itself – a highly incendiary implication.

As such, Khaled Elgindy’s article must be characterized not as an attempt to illuminate, but much more as an attempt to serve as a calculated propaganda offensive coordinated with the determined effort of escalation started by Abu Mazen but now joined by Hamas and Islamic Jihad as well as Iran and Turkey. The use of the word “arbitrary” to characterize Israeli actions — a clever propaganda device used not only to obscure, but entirely erase all context and preceding causes to an action — betray this as an attempt at propaganda rather than effort to bring understanding.

A second, disturbing U.S. aspect of the current escalation is the role – the money to which must be followed –a village in the northern territories in Samaria played from which the terrorist that killed the Israeli citizen, Yehuda Guetta, early this week is from. Not only is the terrorist himself (Muntazir Shalabi) a US citizen, but 80% of the village (Turmus Ayyeh) from which he originated his action is inhabited by U.S. citizens, many of whom are generally absentee, coming only during the summer months. This village has also become a Mecca of sorts for Western pro-Palestinian activists and radicals. An effort to follow the money behind this is warranted.

The Shaykh Jarrah neighborhood issue has tremendous implications and any ruling or Israeli concession could have far-reaching and highly destabilizing repercussions. The issue of the Shaykh Jarrah neighborhood is complex. It is the site of the holy graves of a 12th century Muslim Shaykh who was Salahdin’s doctor, from which the area derives its modern name, and the 5th century BC grave of Simon the Just – the last of the original clerics who returned with the Jewish people from Babylon and started the interpretation structures that make up today’s Jewish liturgy called the Mishna. The sub-neighborhood, Shimon HaTzadik is named after him. There is historical importance, but indeed, there is even more legal and strategic importance to the area.

The neighborhood’s three sections housed about 125 Arab families in 1948, most of whom had moved there in the 1930s and 1940s — some of those families only used the houses as retreats such as the Husseini and Nashashibi families — and about 80 Jewish families who had lived there year-round since the Ottoman era. In early 1948, the area was successfully secured by the Harel brigade of the Haganah as part of the Jewish-Arab-skirmishing in advance of the declaration of the State, but British soldiers, not Arabs, attacked and removed the area from Israeli control, forcing the Jewish families to leave, and turned it over to Arab forces. Shortly afterwards, on April 13, 1948, a British “protected” Jewish resupply convoy to the Israeli enclave on Mount Scopus was attacked by Arab soldiers. The British remained neutral, despite their obligation to protect the convoy, and observed the resulting massacre of 78 Jewish doctors, nurses and civilians. This effectively left Mount Scopus and the Hebrew University cut off from the remainder of Israel. A few years later, when the area was under Jordanian control, UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) and the Jordanian government transferred several Arab families into the vacant Jewish houses.

When Israel reoccupied the area in 1967, which is in the strategic triangle between the green line, the French Hill, and GIvat Hamiftar connecting Israel to Mount Scopus, the Jewish families who had been expelled two decades earlier asserted their land deeds. A decision by Israel’s Supreme Court in 1972 ruled the Jewish claims were valid, and thus ownership was theirs, but also ruled that for practical reasons, any Arab family that occupies a house will be protected from eviction if they agree to pay rent to the Jewish owners. Recently, Arabs have come forward with counterclaims, all of which are proving to be forgeries – which is not surprising since the land claims from the Ottoman era are in Ottoman archives in Istanbul, and the Turkish government under Erdogan several years ago launched an effort to cull all the land deeds in Israel from the Ottoman era, and are strongly suspected of systematically destroying original Jewish deeds and creating new forgeries.

At any rate, in 1972, a number of families did accept the Israeli Supreme Court formula and paid rent, but a much larger number of families simply ignored the rule of law and refused to pay. The current issue of eviction is about some of those families who have refused to pay rent since 1972 in houses whose Jewish title was incontrovertibly established.

The Shaykh Jarrah issue is strategic for two reasons. First the area connects the Jewish areas of Jerusalem to the Hebrew University, Mount Scopus and several large Jewish neighborhoods to the north. Second, and perhaps much more ominously, if the Jewish claims were annulled, then this would encourage a massive effort to challenge all Jewish claims to any property in Jerusalem, such as the Jewish Quarter of the Old City, and perhaps throughout Israel.

Equally disturbing are the highly incendiary and destabilizing claims of US Democratic politicians, such as Elizabeth Warren, that the Jewish land ownership deeds constitute an “abhorrent” and “illegal” act of occupation and settlement. Such statements either display such insensitivity to, or ignorance of, the history of the neighborhood that it effectively should annul the validity of their participation in discussions, or worse, an anti-Semitic outlook that holds that Jewish titles and land deeds simply do not count and are less valid than anyone else’s anywhere else in the world. One can only hope the motivation is ignorance. Nonetheless, the statements have encouraged the violence and greatly inflamed the situation as it encourages Arab rioters to believe their violence is gaining traction. The statements by the US government, while less flagrantly ignorant or prejudicial, have been weak and disturbingly neutral as well, which also enflames the situation.

The Israeli Supreme Court on May 9, decided to postpone the issue, clearly to buy time to avoid playing into the highly escalatory climate encouraged by Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, but this issue will rear again soon, if not immediately since postponing may not buy calm at any rate and the Arab rioters enjoy international support.

The coming months, thus, will be tense for Israel, and quite possibly very violent. The failure of the United States to preemptively and strongly signal that it will not allow a wedge to be driven between Washington and Jerusalem, and indeed the strong expectation that the opposite will occur, only further encourages the eruption of violence, which aligns with the underlying interests of the various Palestinian factions and surrounding ambitious Turkish and Persian neighbors.

Posted in By David Wurmser, JRB_MiddleEast/NAfrica, News, Uncategorized

The Zarif tape shows why Biden should abandon reviving the Iran nuclear deal

May 04, 2021
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This article appeared in The Washington Post on May 3, 2021. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
May 3, 2021

A recording of Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif that leaked last week remains unverified, but his apology on Sunday and a key Iranian official’s dismissal provide confidence in its accuracy. Considerable ink has been spilled over whether former secretary of state John F. Kerry at some point leaked classified U.S. information (he denies it) to Zarif about Israeli strikes in Syria.

Far more significant, however, is Zarif’s assertion that he learned sensitive Iranian information from Kerry. This from the Iranian diplomat who would be Tehran’s chief negotiator as the Biden administration ill-advisedly moves to revive the Obama-era nuclear deal with Iran.

Remarkably, Zarif claims he was unaware of substantial increases in Iranian military activity in Syria that prompted the Israeli strikes in question. According to the Financial Times, after listening to three hours of the seven-hour recording that had been intended for an oral history project, “Kerry told Zarif that Iran Air flights to Syria had increased sixfold, a clear indication they were being used by the military to support Damascus in its conflict with the opponents of the Assad regime.”

When Zarif asked Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani about the flights, Soleimani blew him off, saying, “if Iran Air is 2 per cent more secure than [another airline], Iran Air must be used even if this inflicts 200 per cent costs on diplomacy.”

Beyond Syria, Zarif had a long list of complaints about his irrelevance to fundamental national-security decisions made without his involvement or even his knowledge. He provided several examples of efforts by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, to sabotage the 2015 nuclear deal with the Obama administration, such as by seizing two U.S. Navy patrol boats in 2016, and by Soleimani’s direct intervention with Moscow in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade Russia to reject the agreement.

Zarif says he was not aware that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad visited Tehran in February 2019, until he saw Assad on television. This devastating exclusion from a head-of-state visit prompted his (temporary) resignation; he fretted that otherwise, “nobody in the world” would even “give me broad beans to carry, let alone negotiate with me.” Zarif also says the IRGC initially denied shooting down a Ukrainian passenger jet in 2020, although it later had to admit the truth. No one should be surprised if more emerges to this effect.

Summarizing his discontents, Zarif said, “in the Islamic Republic, the [military] field rules. I have sacrificed diplomacy for the military field rather than the field servicing diplomacy.”

Zarif’s confessions show why President Biden should abandon his dream of returning to the 2015 nuclear deal, which the United States exited during the Trump administration. In Iran, it is not the negotiators who matter, nor what they say. It’s increasingly the IRGC, which controls the nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs, commands conventional military activities externally, and supports terrorists worldwide.

If Israel is pounding Iranian and allied units in Syria, it is hardly a secret to the Quds Force. The real news is that it was a secret to Iran’s foreign minister, and likely therefore his subordinates responsible for nuclear diplomacy. The killing of Soleimani with a U.S. drone strike in Baghdad in January 2020, while an enormous blow to Iran, does not change the picture. If anything, Soleimani’s demise simply reinforced the IRGC ethos that it alone can protect the 1979 revolution.

The extent of internal deception in Iran shows that its “commitments” on nuclear issues are inherently unbelievable and untrustworthy. It is easier to disseminate diplomatic untruths when an envoy believes that what he is saying is true. Flat-out lying is harder to mask. The ready solution for authoritarians is simply to conceal key facts from diplomats doing the negotiations. No one should find this surprising. Even in Washington, there is hardly seamless cooperation between the Defense and State departments.

With Tehran, we do not face a government where “trust, but verify” makes sense. We have no basis for “trust” in the first place, let alone confidence that verification measures can detect active Iranian violation and concealment.

Advocates of the 2015 nuclear deal tout its “enhanced” verification mechanisms used by the International Atomic Energy Agency, but these are grossly ineffectual. Iran has long stonewalled IAEA inspections and declared key facilities off limits, which alone makes a mockery of reliance on its efforts.

The United States’ real insurance is not international monitoring, but its own intelligence capabilities. IAEA’s total operational budget in this area is roughly 0.6 percent of current U.S. intelligence spending of approximately $85 billion. If our intelligence is inadequate, it is hardly credible to think that the IAEA will safeguard us from Iranian nuclear violations.

The Zarif tape tells us much about Tehran’s diplomatic mendacity. Unfortunately, however, the Biden administration is still incomprehensibly piling up broad beans for Zarif and his nuclear negotiators.

Posted in By John Bolton, JRB_MiddleEast/NAfrica, News, Uncategorized

What does Biden’s Armenia statement mean for the region?

April 27, 2021
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This article appeared in The Washington Examiner on April 26, 2021. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
April 26, 2021

Despite the headlines, President Joe Biden is not the first United States president to declare that the Ottoman Empire’s mass killings of Armenians, beginning on April 24, 1915, constitute genocide. President Ronald Reagan did so in his April 22, 1981, proclamation of “days of remembrance” for the Nazi Holocaust.

He emphasized that “like the genocide of the Armenians before it and the genocide of the Cambodians which followed it, and like too many other such persecutions of too many other peoples, the lessons of the Holocaust must never be forgotten.” Whether Biden’s announcement marks a significant departure from the reticence of other presidents remains to be seen. Although the gruesome historical reality is undisputed, even Reagan’s administration was reluctant to highlight his statement, fearing disruption of relations with Turkey, a key NATO ally.

The pundits immediately characterized Biden’s remarks as merely symbolic, which may prove to be correct. Biden supporters contend that he was underlining the importance of human rights in his foreign policy, but that misses the critical point: ignoring the imperative need, and opportunity, we now have for strategic realignment in the Caucasus. Rewriting history, even to correct it, is too transient an exercise of governmental authority unless more substance follows. International political logic explains Washington’s past hesitations. Turkey’s Cold War role in NATO was critical for immutable geographic reasons, such as anchoring NATO’s line in Europe against the Warsaw Pact and controlling the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. Thereafter, of course, the Soviet Union broke apart, almost all for the better, radical Islamist terrorism arose, and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan took power in Turkey, almost all for the worse.

In the Caucasus, three small states, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, are sandwiched between three large, incompatible ones, Russia, Turkey, and Iran, whose interests quite often run counter to the U.S. We cannot unpack the region’s political complexity here, but the key point about Armenia since independence from the Soviet Union is its too-tenacious loyalty to Russia. Locked in a desperate territorial, ethnoreligious struggle with Azerbaijan, deeply fearful of conflict with Turkey, and justifiably wary of Iran, Yerevan looked to Moscow for support. Doing so resulted in an Armenian foreign policy that is otherwise totally inexplicable. For example, on April 21, at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Armenia, along with the likes of Russia, China, and Iran, voted unsuccessfully against a resolution stripping Syria of its vote in the organization for using chemical weapons against its own people. Three decades of pro-Moscow policy has been wholly misguided.

Armenia’s highest international priority, the conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, is an outgrowth of Moscow’s Soviet-era internal boundary drawing, yet another failed effort to answer what Marxists called “the nationalities question.” When its most threatening recent crisis arose, the 2020 flare-up with Azerbaijan, which was aided by Turkey, Armenia’s dependence on Russia proved almost entirely worthless. Armenia suffered significant military reversals, but contrary to Yerevan’s expectations, Moscow essentially imposed a cease-fire that nearly collapsed Armenia’s government and acknowledged its territorial losses. With friends like that…

Armenia’s attachment to Russia has been tragic, especially given the large number of Armenian Americans who could have focused Washington’s attention on the plight of their ancestral homeland. During a 2018 visit to Yerevan, I asked Armenian analysts why this had not happened. Several pointed to the Armenian American focus on getting U.S. recognition of the genocide rather than on contemporary realities. Whether right or wrong, Biden nonetheless has an opportunity to place a higher U.S. priority on Armenia’s plight. The Armenian American community should now focus on the negative consequences of Yerevan relying on Moscow, and Washington should worry more about bringing peace and stability to all three Caucasus countries. We have no interest in any of them aligning with, or being exploited by, the regimes in Iran, Russia, and Turkey.

Certainly, Erdogan’s Turkey is dangerous for Armenia, but grounds for hope exist. Dissatisfaction with Erdogan is rising, reflected in his party’s defeat in key 2019 local elections, such as Istanbul and Ankara, making Turkey’s looming 2023 presidential race critical for its future direction. It is premature to dismiss Turkey as a NATO ally, at least until we see if Erdogan permits free and fair national elections, which will happen only under Western pressure and scrutiny. Turkey itself should long ago have recognized the Armenian tragedy, but its internal politics have made that impossible. Washington should not underestimate the difficulties of change even now, but Erdogan’s departure opens many possibilities for Turkey to rehabilitate itself.

No one seriously believes that Caucasus politics is anything but complex. Inadequate U.S. attention for three decades after the Soviet Union’s dissolution, however, has not made it any easier. If Biden’s genocide statement is more than domestic U.S. politics, an increase in awareness can only bolster Washington’s position in the region.

Posted in By John Bolton, JRB_Asia, News, Uncategorized

‘Bring the Troops Home’ Is a Dream, Not a Strategy

April 27, 2021
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A full withdrawal from Afghanistan is a costly blunder and failure of leadership.

This article appeared in Foreign Policy on April 19, 2021. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
April 19, 2021

U.S. President Joe Biden’s decision to withdraw the United States’ remaining military forces from Afghanistan rests far more on domestic politics than on national security strategy. In 2020, he campaigned on the issue. He said last week, “It’s time to end the forever war.” We should “be focused on the reason we went in the first place: to ensure Afghanistan would not be used as a base from which to attack our homeland again. We did that. We accomplished that objective.”

Biden sounds like his predecessor, Donald Trump, whom I served as national security advisor. That’s no surprise, as Biden is carrying out Trump’s policy with only slight modifications. Media coverage of Biden’s April 14 announcement has noted widespread public support for bringing the troops home. The American people are tired of foreign military engagements, or so the pundits tell us; they’re tired of Afghanistan, tired of Iraq, tired of Syria, tired of terrorism, tired of the Middle East—just plain tired. The chattering classes agree, academics agree, Democrats almost unanimously agree, and even some Republicans agree.

They are all wrong.

The basic national security goal that all U.S. leaders must pursue is to define their country’s strategic interests and how to protect them. Politicians must then justify how they propose to defend the country against external threats and to muster the necessary resources. When leaders do not explain hard realities, the public’s resolve flags, which politicians then use to justify their own hesitancy to make hard decisions. In effect, weak politicians switch cause for effect, levying responsibility on the people instead of themselves. Under Trump and former President Barack Obama, and now perhaps Biden, it wasn’t the public that was weak but its leaders, who were unwilling or unable to do their job.

Afghanistan proves the point. If the Taliban return to power in all or most of the country, the almost universal view in Washington today is the near certainty that al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and others will resume using Afghanistan as a base of operations. On April 14, Biden said that terrorism had evolved since the 2001 assault on the Taliban and that “the threat has become more dispersed, metastasizing around the globe.” Of course it has. That’s because the United States and its NATO allies have substantially denied al Qaeda its preferred safe haven for 20 years. Terrorists had to go elsewhere, seeking Middle Eastern or African zones of anarchy, because they had no choice. But make no mistake: Afghanistan, more remote particularly from the United States, is their preferred staging ground.

Washington didn’t create the threats, and the withdrawal won’t make them disappear.

In Biden’s own words, the United States obviously cannot “ensure” that terrorists will not again use a Taliban-dominated Afghanistan as a base to strike the U.S. homeland. Biden recognizes this danger by saying the United States will maintain “our counterterrorism capabilities and the substantial assets in the region” to guard against a future strike. Blunt geography, however, shows Biden is wrong to think that the United States can have comparably effective counterterrorism and intelligence-gathering assets after departing Afghanistan. After all, Osama bin Laden settled there after being expelled from other countries precisely because its remoteness made it attractive. The map hasn’t changed.

And what exactly is the United States doing today in Afghanistan? To the proponents of withdrawal, it has been 20 years of endless, daily, bloody combat. But this narrative is false, especially during the last seven years following the transition of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force into Operation Resolute Support. Afghanistan remains extraordinarily dangerous, and there have been casualties, but the last U.S. combat death occurred in February 2020. Moreover, there is no proof of real financial savings from withdrawing the approximately 3,500 remaining U.S. military personnel; the costs for Washington may well increase after the withdrawal because of the greater distances that must be overcome for any future operations.

Moreover, U.S. allies are performing a key mission in Afghanistan: training, advising, and assisting the Afghan National Army and other security forces. This is not combat. The roughly 10,000 troops from NATO members and nonmembers deployed as part of Resolute Support are a much-reduced presence from the International Security Assistance Force’s peak of 130,000. Their departure alongside that of U.S. troops is a severe blow to a free Afghanistan.

Concededly, the United States has spent enormous sums on so-called nation-building activities in Afghanistan, with precious little to show for it. It never should have been the United States’ objective to create a Central Asian Switzerland, even if it had the ability to do so, which it does not. But it is an even graver mistake to conclude that because Washington wasted resources on the wrong objective before, withdrawal is now justified. The United States hasn’t engaged in nation-building for many years and has long moved beyond these costly mistakes.

Supporters of withdrawal assert that the United States has tried long enough to enable the Afghans to defend themselves and that U.S. responsibilities are over. Those making this argument miss the key point that it is U.S. security that is at stake, not Afghan military competence. Washington and its allies are not there to protect Afghans against Taliban solely for their sake but to protect against the terrorist threat to Western nations that has previously emanated from the petri dish of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, and would do so again.

To that end, the United States concentrates on gathering information on possible terrorist threats through a variety of mechanisms, not just the military. It is, however, the military presence and a considerable logistical base that enable much of this critical work. And it is in-country U.S. armed forces, which can scale up rapidly, that provide confidence that no sustained terrorist threat can reemerge while the United States remains. Removing the troops removes a key predicate.

Biden, having in effect tacitly admitted that the United States has not achieved its basic objective of safeguarding the homeland, then complains that new objectives have been established. That is true; reality has changed since the initial victory over the Taliban and al Qaeda. But it is hardly a radical departure for the United States to remain overseas for long periods when it has substantial interests there, even if those interests change dramatically. Biden is quick to say he is restoring U.S. leadership in NATO—yet there have been no complaints that the United States has had troops garrisoned in Germany for over 75 years since destroying the Third Reich. The same goes for Japan and South Korea. With U.S. troops remaining in those places, Trump could say that Biden is not following their shared rhetoric to end “forever wars.”

Long-term deployments in dangerous places can be required by long-term threats to the United States. Washington didn’t create the threats, and the withdrawal won’t make them disappear. The war against terrorism is unlike 19th-century conventional warfare not because the United States made it so but because the terrorists did. Even conventional warfare is changing, as we are seeing in cyberspace and the varieties of asymmetric and hybrid warfare being developed and deployed by adversaries hoping to leverage their smaller strengths against Western weaknesses. The war against terrorism is open-ended in the same way the struggle against international communism was open-ended. Many of the same people who disliked having to defend the United States in the Cold War—and their ideological successors—dislike having to defend the country against terrorism. Too bad the United States’ enemies won’t give it a break.

Among other reasons to stay in Afghanistan is keeping watch on the risks emanating from Iran and Pakistan. These are clear cases where geographic proximity has no substitute. Iran’s continuing nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs; its unwavering support for terrorist groups such as the Houthis, Hamas, and Hezbollah; and its belligerent conventional military activity around the Middle East all mark it as an aspiring regional hegemon whose near neighbors have become increasingly anxious. Afghanistan is an excellent, proximate location to keep an eye on things inside Iran. Moreover, a Taliban takeover, which could lead to a distinctly fragmented pattern of Afghan government, would undoubtedly increase Iran’s influence in western Afghanistan as before, to the United States’ distinct disadvantage.

Perhaps Biden is turning into a modern-day George McGovern, the Vietnam-era Democratic presidential nominee who made “come home, America” his mantra.

A U.S. withdrawal may be even riskier with respect to Pakistan. If the Taliban resume control in Kabul, this can only encourage the Pakistani Taliban and other Islamist radicals, including within the Pakistani intelligence services. Since Partition in 1947, Pakistan has never had a reliably stable government. Instead, to paraphrase the famous jibe against Prussia: Where some states have an army, the Pakistan Army has a state. If Islamabad’s government fell to the radicals, terrorists would possess a significant number of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, not only threatening India and others but also risking the proliferation of nuclear weapons to terrorists worldwide. For Washington, this is perhaps the most dangerous consequence of the Taliban retaking power in Afghanistan, yet it rarely receives significant attention.

Moreover, ignoring the follow-on effects of a U.S. Afghanistan withdrawal on Iran and Pakistan does not augur well for Biden administration’s national security policies globally. The United States’ continuing and probably growing strategic struggle with China and Russia, the critical need to prevent the further accumulation of weapons of mass destruction by North Korea and Iran, and the threat of proliferation more broadly should be matters of enormous concern. Weakness and self-congratulation are often contagious.

Recently, media commentators have breathlessly proclaimed that Biden is governing much further to the left in domestic affairs than most people predicted. Perhaps the same is coming true in the international arena—and Biden is turning into a modern-day George McGovern, the Vietnam-era Democratic presidential nominee who made “come home, America” his mantra. Unfortunately, that call is a dream, not a strategy. It is not a dream that ends well.

Posted in By John Bolton, JRB_Asia, News, Uncategorized

Shehrazad’s Twilight

April 23, 2021
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By Dr. David Wurmser
April 26, 2021

It has been a month since Nowruz, the Persian holiday marking the beginning of Farvardin and turn of the new year, which this year is 1400. This was a welcome turnover for the Iranian regime. 1399 was a miserable year. Iran suffered not only a divinely inflicted plague in COVID-19, but also a manmade exacerbation by breakdown and extreme governmental mismanagement of the epidemic. Iran’s external adventures proved no quarter for diversion or respite either. Its proxy, Hizballah, suffered a devasting blow politically when one of its storage depots in Lebanon accidentally exploded and destroyed the center of Beirut on August 4, killing hundreds. The regime started 1399 reeling from the humiliating demise of the RGC al-Qods Corps commander, Ghassan Soleimani, at the hands of a US drone. Later in the year, Brigadier General Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who led the IRGC’s nuclear program, was also assassinated by unknown assailants. Both deaths of these high-profile humiliations remain glaringly unavenged, despite shrill rhetoric by Iran’s leaders promising to visit the gates of hell on the perpetrators. Instead of inflicting revenge, Iran found itself even further humiliated when its strategic programs suffered a long series of incidents, accidents and unrest in the summer and fall that damaged many Iranian facilities suspected of being involved in some way with its nuclear or ballistic programs.

Along the way, Iran’s economy continued its collapse and its currency continues to plunge at faster rates than gravity can pull it. And the inevitable constant underlying din of riots and demonstrations persisted. Iran’s regime indeed faced a miserable year, perhaps the most miserable since its inception in 1979.

Now that Iran is about a month into 1400, it is apparent this year has thus far failed to turn around last year’s misery. COVID-19 rages at astronomical rates, vaccinations having barely started, the economy continues to sink, and the mysterious accidents and incidents at key strategic facilities carry on. On the high seas, after having attempted to environmentally destroy Israel’s Mediterranean coast, Iran’s floating IRGC ships conducting strategic activities in critical sea lanes have now too begin suffering such incidents and sit still now dead in the water.

In short, while the Biden administration seems determined to restore the JCPOA lift sanctions on Iran, and halt the clandestine activities – whom leaking US officials attribute to Israel – thus far the economy continues to sink, the mysterious actions against strategic targets continue and the Israelis openly vow to continue to do whatever they need to do to stop Iran’s regional, nuclear and ballistic ambitions. And whether by the hand of God or man, top IRGC officials continue to die under obscure circumstances, the latest being Mohammed Hejazi, the head of the IRGC ballistic programs and liaison with Lebanese Hizballah and the Yemeni Houthis. The regime – including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei himself — at first said he “died suddenly after a long illness” – itself a rather curious phrase. But by the next day, many Iranian senior officials, not just bloggers, openly questioned the honesty of the reports, and instead said he was martyred. One senior official, Amir Moghadam, said his death was connected to the attack attributed to Israel by US officials on the Iranian IRGC operations ship last month in the Red Sea. Others now say that he was killed in the Marib Governate in Yemen in an attack, while some papers in Kuwait, citing Iranian sources, believe he had been murdered by poison in his last trip to Iraq or Syria. What really happened with General Hejazi will remain a mystery, but the bottom line is that the Iranian regime ends the year with its own senior officials unwilling to buy anything as truthful said by any other official of the regime. Everyone is scrambling into the safety of his own self-serving conspiracy theory du jour to cope with the undigestible reality that the enemies of Iran’s regime, likely Israel, operate devastatingly at will within Iran’s most sensitive facilities and most important people.

In the end, Iran is facing five extremely dangerous but inescapable realities with which it must cope:

• Iran’s economy is in freefall;
• Its strategic programs (nuclear, missiles, regional proxy warfare) are constantly and apparently largely successfully battered by Israeli actions;
• It has faced a years-long diet of serial humiliations at the hands of the Israelis and US under the previous administration that created a climate of malaise, penetration and impotence – all fatal reputations for a regime that survives trafficking in their brutality and internal terror to cower the domestic population;
• All of its attempts at revenge or escalation have met with further high-profile, humiliating setbacks, having fizzled, been preempted, or answered; and
• The fundamental dishonesty of the regime, which was necessary to avoid admitting failure and projecting weakness, has become so pervasive that it has led to a widespread expectation of dishonesty, both in the population and even among elites. This has created an ironic, but very dangerous, condition where even when the regime tells the truth, it is not believed and instead everyone descends into conspiratorial speculations about the “real” story. These developments lead to the fundamental breakdown of the very stability and public stature that the regime hoped to solidify by employing dishonesty to begin with. For example, the deputy head of the IRGC may indeed have died of a heart attack on April 18, but nobody believes it. Instead, Iranian elites are descending into wild speculations that this was yet another assassination – thus further destabilizing the regime and deepening its reputation of impotence.

These conditions have led to several realizations in Tehran:

• Despite relentless effort, Iran’s regional strategy is thus far still frustrated.
• While Iran does have escalatory actions against Israel it can take, some of which can be painful, it also realizes it will pay an even heavier, perhaps fatal, price for any escalation against Israel.
• While the leadership externally evinces bluster, the economic pressures and constant frustration and assault from outside has internally led various leadership cliques to descend into internecine bickering against each other, which could even lead to internal violence and collapse.

So where does the Iranian government go forward from here?

The current crop of Iranian leaders are if nothing else excellent students of manipulation. They are the modern inheritors of Shehrazad, the doomed woman who used her storytelling acumen to transform her position of absolute weakness and imminent execution ultimately into a position of unfettered control of the soul of her would be executioner and the man who became her husband, the ruler Shariyar. She transformed her reality of passive weakness into absolute power.

The strategy of the modern Sherazads in Tehran is already coming into focus. There is nothing the regime wants and needs more than:

• Have sanctions lifted and cash flowing into their coffers
• Have the Israelis stymied or tethered in pursuing their relentless shadow war against Iran’s nuclear and ballistic programs, against Iran’s regional attempts at strategic advance, and against Iran’s international structure of land and maritime terrorism.

To these ends, the Iranian government is painfully aware that China can deliver nothing. Russia is both unwilling and unable to stop the Israelis, and it may in fact be increasingly suspicious of Iran for its own reasons. Europe is altogether of marginal relevance. Only the United States can deliver the coin and calm that the regime needs to regain its footing and strategic initiative., or so Tehran believes.

As such, Iran’s strategy ultimately boils down to manipulating Washington into opening the spigot of funds to Tehran and into leaning so heavily on its ally, Israel, that the latter retreats into acquiescence and strategic passivity. In other words, Iran’s strategy is to get money and to cause so deep a rift between Jerusalem and Washington that it leaves Jerusalem paralyzed.

In this context, Iran is once again employing its apologists overtime in an effort to pray on the fears so often raised in Western capitals of some sort of apocalyptic upheaval were to ensue were Israel to seriously wound Iran. Added to this is the strategy – a modification of the “good vs bad” cop interrogation model to diplomacy — first employed by the Nazi propagandist, the Harvard-educated Ernst “Putzi” Hanfstaengl, perfected by the Soviets during the arms control talks by Andrei Gromyko, and embraced finally wholeheartedly by Palestinian negotiators in the seasonal assortments of Arab-Israeli peace processes: namely, that the West must concede to validate and empower the other side’s moderates while tethering its own hawks in order to discredit the other side’s eternally looming threating hardliners. It was a strategy which has worked far too often to manipulate Western leaders and their diplomats into preemptive concessions.

The current urgency in Washington to reach a new JCPOA, at all costs it appears, is a framed into this context. Iran has national elections in June. Tehran is happily encouraging its apologists in the West to emphasize that a tough Western negotiating position would not only render a deal impossible – and the much-threatened quasi-apocalyptical escalation ensue – but would lead to the election of hardliners and the defeat of ostensible moderates, such as Rouhani.
As such, Iran is holding the upcoming June elections as a convenient venue to hold fire to the heels of Western diplomats’ feet. A deal must be reached in weeks, or the “window of opportunity” supposedly closes and the region will descend into an unimaginably horrific convulsion.

In-the-know senior Iranian officials in their energy and nuclear bureaucracies have emphasized in unguarded moments that the incident at Natanz in early April destroyed thousands of centrifuges and was a blow around which Iran cannot easily work for quite some time – having essentially shut down large-scale enrichment. Incidents last summer similarly hampered their strategic programs. And yet, because of its strategy, Tehran must downplay the setbacks it so often suffered, and instead needs at all costs to put on a Potemkin-like display of its strength, prowess, and escalatory capabilities by enriching a small amount of uranium apparently to 60% and firing a missile large enough to be nuclear-capable. Like one of the last Qajar Shahs who upon death (by assassination) was paraded around the capital for days with a mechanical waiving arm to show the realm that he was not dead, when in fact he was, Iran needs to project an invincible capability to threaten.

This is all a charade to create an international climate of acute crisis and extreme danger of escalation as part of its strategy to press the West into making the necessary concessions to return to a weakened JCPOA, which in turn would unlock finds and cause serious tensions between Washington and Jerusalem. Sadly, it appears likely that Washington will plunge headlong into this trap.

However, Iran will find that the last four years have changed much. Four years ago, the Israelis suspected that the constant threat of escalation to apocalyptic levels from Tehran was overblown. Iran clearly has means to inflict great pain on Israel – hundreds of thousands of missiles in Lebanon – but when Israeli strategists gamed out the scenarios in exercise after exercise, it was consistently Iran, not Israel, that came up with the short straw in the escalatory cycle. But even then, these were theories of how Iran would and could respond; there was not hard evidence.

But the last four years have shown us that when challenged and resolutely confronted, Iran’s options are indeed far more limited than Tehran projects. It has tried for years to escalate in Syria, but both its senior officers and its forces lay dead on Syrian soil and its assets smoldering. It is no closer to consolidating its grip on Syria than it was several years ago. Moreover, since last summer, its grip on Lebanon was rattled. Neither could it deliver its Houthi allies to victory in Saudi Arabia, nor even bring down one of its main targets in the Gulf: Bahrain. And every time it attempted to launch a retaliation against Israel, it only wound up facing an even more deeply embarrassing failure.

To be sure, Iran is a threat, and a very dangerous one. If its ambitions are realized, it would be catastrophic. Even in its still weakened state, it has killed thousands of Americans and Israelis since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. It sends drones through proxies into Saudi Arabia and paralyzes parts of its oil production, and has left several nations, such as Yemen, Iraq and Lebanon crippled at will. It is currently the greatest threat the United States and its allies face in the region.

But by last summer, the costs of Iran’s regional adventures and the wages of embarrassment it accumulated caused the regime to lose the Iranian street. Demonstrators often took to the streets demanding an end to sacrifice for Gaza, for Palestine, for Lebanon, and that Iranian assets and sacrifice must instead be for Iranians. The Iranian government knows that in a confrontation with the West and Israel, the Iranian street has had enough and are no longer willing to mortgage their reputation and their future on failed adventures. The rulers of Tehran cannot count on their own street anymore. As such, their escalatory hand – already burdened by limited means – is stayed by fear of the Iranian street. While Western elites consistently assume Iranian will rally around their regime if beleaguered, the historical record of the last four years proves otherwise. In a confrontation, Iran’s regime is afraid of its street more than we should be.

As such, the real threat Israel sees is not from acting, but rather from not acting to stop Iran from advancing strategic programs and regional campaigns. A such, while Washington may gallop to a deal with Tehran, all it will likely achieve is not calm, but an escalated shadow war that leaves the United States weakened, untrusted, and looking increasingly as marginalized in real terms as its EU partners have been for quite some time in the region. And our allies – the genuine ones, like Israel, the UAE, Bahrain and others – will look stronger and at each other to carry the burden of protecting our and their interests until such time as we return to ourselves. Because while Washington may fall prey to Shehrazad’s charms, Jerusalem, Abu Dhabi, Manama and the rest will not and are no mood for further tales of 1001 nights. Eventually, the feared morning will come for the Islamic Republic.

Posted in By David Wurmser, JRB_Asia, News, Uncategorized

How to confront China on Hong Kong

April 07, 2021
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This article appeared in The Daily News on April 7, 2021. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
April 7, 2021

The recent conviction of seven prominent advocates of Hong Kong autonomy for participating in peaceful protests is yet another milestone in China’s campaign to bury freedom of speech and conscience. The authorities are suppressing not just student protesters, but the leaders of China’s most important freedom movement since Sun Yat-sen. Martin Lee, Jimmy Lai and others fought for decades to expand political freedoms, and now face lengthy jail terms.

How should the United States respond to these convictions, and the growing list of other acts of internal repression? Opening the March 18 Alaska encounter with senior Chinese diplomats, Secretary of State Antony Blinken raised Hong Kong as an issue concerning America. Shortly thereafter, the State Department’s 2020 human-rights report explicitly described extensive Chinese abuses, and the annual Hong Kong report to Congress confirmed that Beijing was systematically dismantling the territory’s separate status.

Recent administrations, including President Biden’s, have imposed economic sanctions on Chinese leaders. In retaliation, on Jan. 20, Beijing sanctioned 28 Americans (full disclosure: myself included), and later imposed travel bans on members of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom.

But is that it? Are salvos of economic sanctions effective, or are we Americans simply engaging in virtue signaling? Most importantly, how should human rights fit into U.S. national-security policy?

Despite considerable disagreement and confusion, a realistic approach is readily apparent. How China or other authoritarian states treat their own people speaks volumes about how they will treat us. Great-power authoritarians repress their citizens and threaten foreigners with hegemonic subordination. Rogue states like Iran and North Korea repress their citizens while seeking weapons of mass destruction and supporting international terrorism. None of them are trustworthy.

There are, of course, repressive regimes friendly to America. During World War II and the Cold War, we allied with such regimes, and often had their support in confrontations with regional authoritarian powers, as in the Middle East, which Jeane Kirkpatrick’s “Dictatorships and Double Standards” championed. This is neither immoral nor insincere, since Washington cannot cure all the world’s human-rights ills. Morality is boundless, whereas both state interests and material resources are finite.

The human-rights sins of friendly states have not threatened U.S. interests or values significantly, and are addressable through forceful but quiet diplomacy, not public breast-beating. Virtue signaling is for political show horses, but unbecoming for America.

As state policy, Washington’s opposition to Beijing’s repression or genocide is not abstract moralizing, but a legitimate concern for the implications of China’s domestic conduct on its behavior abroad. While not America’s job to mend the world’s ills, it is most certainly our job to protect ourselves. Thus, when China violates its 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration obligation to “a high degree of autonomy” for Hong Kong, it demonstrates graphically how it regards international treaties. It has not chosen to withdraw from the deal, but to violate it.

That demonstrates, not that we need further proof, Beijing’s true priorities. Chinese genocide against Uighurs, or repression of Falun Gong believers, Christians and Tibetan Buddhists, reveals how Beijing is prepared to resolve disputes with its near neighbors and beyond.

We should aggressively highlight China’s internal authoritarianism in our information statecraft, an aspect of U.S. diplomacy that needs enormous improvement. As during the Cold War, we need not fear a debate with China on human-rights issues. We should welcome it.

Rhetoric and individual sanctions alone, however, are not only inadequate but sometimes counterproductive, giving the appearance of “doing something,” when we are actually just being self-indulgent, not damaging our authoritarian adversaries.

Semiotic warfare should be left to academicians. The real way to make human-rights policy effective is by linking it with other bilateral priorities. How, for example, can we take trade agreements seriously when Beijing is prepared to sacrifice a choice economic asset like Hong Kong for overriding internal political considerations? Just how long will a Chinese pledge to buy more American soybeans last as compared to snuffing out internal dissent?

Economic complications were missing during the Cold War because U.S.-Soviet economic interaction was so limited. Of course, China’s massive penetration of Western economies makes it a far more dangerous adversary, but at the same time one more vulnerable to criticism and punishment for human-rights transgressions.

Washington still does not understand how to integrate human-rights issues effectively into foreign policy. Certainly, however, treating them in a silo separate from all other disputes with Beijing will only ensure their second-tier status. Advocates of an aggressive human-rights posture should recognize that trade-offs with other national-security priorities will be required. Accepting less-than-perfect outcomes means success, not defeat, because it means human rights are an integral part of U.S. policy, not an isolated, hot-house flower.

Posted in By John Bolton, JRB_Asia, News, Uncategorized

Reflections on Israel’s Recent Elections

April 06, 2021
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By Dr. David Wurmser
April 6, 2021

The value of elections is not just that they produce a winner and loser in determining who runs the nation. Elections are also diagnostic tools ascertaining societal trends and ideas. While Israel has been deadlocked in stalemate with almost no movement in terms of delivering a winner and loser in the last four elections cycles, those cycles have nevertheless with clarity and richness exposed tremendous effervescence and movement in Israeli society.

On winners and losers

In terms of deciding who will rule Israel in the coming four years, each round of elections has resulted in deadlock. However, in terms of how the two blocs are defined, and around what set of questions coalitions are to be formed, the nature of the two blocs has changed. The first campaign in 2018 was defined around traditional security, economic and social questions. The previous government had collapsed over its handling of inconclusive fighting in Gaza, and the public debate was in part dominated by this question, especially within the inter-right debates. Only two years later, in the fourth round of elections just concluded, all these questions were almost entirely absent. Blocs divided up almost to the complete exclusion of all substantive issues around the question of whether Netanyahu should, or could, be reelected. There was almost no mention of Gaza, of COVID-19, of Iran, of the new Biden administration, or any other issue of gravity. This election was almost entirely a personal verdict on Netanyahu. Even the election returns graphics on the news on election night divided the columns of parliamentary seats between the “camp against Netanyahu” or “camp to replace Netanyahu” versus the “Netanyahu camp.”

Ironically, the ones who have had the greatest confidence that Netanyahu can continue to lead the conservative camp in Israel are actually the traditional leftist leadership that started the “rak Lo Bibi” (“Anyone but Bibi” — Netanyahu’s nickname) movement. One of the central assumptions of the “Anyone but Bibi” campaign was that Netanyahu represents the center of gravity, the indispensable pillar, for the right. He was the standard bearer for slow erosion of power of the left, and thus personally represented the greatest threat to that establishment. His removal, thus, is seen by this camp on the left as a sine qua non of breaking the iron grip the right has had on Israeli national politics for most of the last three, or even five, decades.

And yet, the left simply could not muster the numbers to break that grip. The elections of 2015 involved the considerable intervention of the U.S. under the Obama administration in money and operatives. Still, it failed to tear Netanyahu down. Indeed, it was the final highwater mark of the left although it was not a high enough mark to succeed.

As such, in its attempt to tear Netanyahu down, the left realized that it would have to find allies on the right whose aspirations ran up against the ceiling of Netanyahu’s continued tenure. The maneuver for these strategists on the left is to convince those on the conservative side that Netanyahu is too politically weak or morally tainted to lead the right while at the same time to pursue a strategy which in contrast emanates from frustrating confidence the left holds in Netanyahu’s ability to lead the right. This is tension — which externally portrays Netanyahu as an albatross while internally believing he remains the irreducible pillar of the right — cannot be long maintained.

But this may be one of those times of where one must be careful of what one wishes, for it may come true. The recent additions to the “Anyone but Bibi” camp are reading the sentiments of their own more right-leaning constituents. They are not listening to arguments from the left about Bibi’s being an albatross, and they do not believe they need the left as an ally. They believe that about two years ago – around 2019 – Netanyahu reached the tipping point from being an asset for the right to being a drain. Namely that while he retains a strong following in a good section of the right side of the spectrum, he is no longer able to deliver for the right the full spectrum of votes he needs to stand up a government, and even if he does, he is increasingly embarking on policies of political survival, maneuver and navigation rather than seize the moment – especially following the 2014 war with Hamas and under the Trump administration to fundamentally alter the underlying strategic reality. In other words, while there remains deep appreciation for Netanyahu’s historical achievements in the economy, and in his tactical skill in navigating the hostile Obama administration, there is disappointment that he did not capitalize strategically more aggressively during the Trump years. Settlement was tepid, absorption under Israeli law of areas has followed America’s lead and has not been followed up with actions on the ground, Hamas remains a constant problem and sets the agenda on the border of Gaza, and Iran is obstructed but not defeated – the IDF is still defensive. As such, there is frustration on the right not only that he cannot deliver a government in the last two years but that even before that, he was operating tactically rather than strategically to change the terms of debate in favor of the right, on defense, social and foreign policy issues.

The evidence this community of right-leaning politicians highlights to support this electoral and strategic outlook is that the right side of the Israeli spectrum – defined around party positions on both security and social issues — has been inexorably growing for years. And based on examining the platforms of the left-leaning parties, some of them, as well, seem to be drifting away from many of the hard-charging leftist positions of the past. In short, not only has the right-bloc portion within the spectrum continued to grow, but the whole spectrum has shifted altogether. There is thus a growing community on the right that argues the inability of the right to translate the electoral shift to the right with a solid right-wing governing coalition is attributable personally to the lingering presence of Netanyahu as the camp’s leadership.

Beneath all the sound and fury, thus, there seems to be a consensus that the balance of the Israeli electorate is not only to the right but is moving more so in that direction. The left, however, believes that it is because Netanyahu continues to be the insurmountably capable politician whom they cannot overcome, while a community on the right believes it is despite Netanyahu’s being an albatross weighing them down both electorally and strategically.

Prime Minister Netanyahu and his supporters essentially agree with the left camp on his role. They continue to see him as the standard bearer of the right who, if toppled, will reverse the political tides and allow for a resurrection of the left. In particular, this camp sees the attack on Netanyahu to be a manifestation of the overall attack of the elites and founding “Mayflower” generation on the panoply of communities largely ignored and underrepresented since Israel’s creation by a socialist, secular European (particularly Russian and Polish) establishment. These communities – later immigrants, liberal-nationalists, settlers, religious, religious-nationalist, oriental Jews, non-socialists (including recent Russian immigrants) – found an unlikely home under the archetypical Polish Jew, Prime Minister Menahem Begin, and his Likud Party in 1977, and they have never parted ways since. Prime Minister Begin was the epitome of the anti-establishment, his identity was deeply traditionally Jewish, not secular-socialist, and he was thus their leader. So these “outsider” communities — especially those for whom traditionally respect or adherence to Judaism, or for whom a more “Jewish” rather than “Israeli” sense of identity mattered such as the religious, religious-nationalist, recently-immigrated and the Sephardi Jews — the epically Polish Begin was their salvation. These followers still clearly form the critical mass of the right. For them, the attack on Netanyahu is just the latest rendition of the establishment nemesis they had faced all along, and any surrender to the assault on him would be tantamount to surrendering their effort to demand enfranchisement and respect.

A broader community of support for Netanyahu also includes those who feel the economic, security and social stresses and challenges Israel faces going forward – especially rehabilitating the economy after COVID-19, dealing with Iran growing as an acute threat, and navigating the Biden administration as it takes office with an anticipated distancing from Israel. All these challenges demand a seasoned, proven leader. Netanyahu’s many years in office and his generally acknowledged success stand in contrast to the complete absence of executive experience of his opponents.

Important shifts underneath the deadlock

The numbers in each round of elections – which reflect impressive stability in terms of the question of anointing a new leader – also reflect that the left camp continues its slow decline. Its votes seem to be bleeding to the right-camp’s community of Netanyahu skeptics. The right camp that supports Netanyahu seems to be slightly changing its internal composition but has remained rather consistently hovering around 59 seats. A flashing warning sign for Netanyahu, is that the Likud lost a lot of ground in core communities, such as Dimona, Beer Sheva, Jerusalem and Bet Shemesh. Additionally, Naftali Bennett’s Yemina (Rightward) party – which is wavering between the pro-Netanyahu and anti-Netanyahu camp on the right – and grew considerably, signaling that the unquestioned support for Netanyahu is beginning to seriously wobble even if it still holds to some extent. Essentially, Yemina voters knew they were voting for Netanyahu as prime minister indirectly (since Bennett signaled before the voting began that he would align with Netanyahu), but had taken the first stride on the psychological bridge away from Netanyahu by voting for Bennett. This trend shows every sign of accelerating in the next months.

While still needing a magnifying glass to discern, there was a highly significant shift in the recent election in the Arab community – part of it began voting as the latest “outsider” group finding a home in Likud against the establishment they see failing them. While one should withhold long-term judgment on whether this continues, voting in the Arab sector for Likud grew between four and ten-fold (for example, from 1% to 4% in partly Christian Nazareth, and from a half percent to 6 percent in all-Muslim Rahat). The Arab community understands it is in crisis, that it needs the help of the state, and that its traditional allies in the Jewish establishment have proven useless. These establishment parties’ leaders appeared to ever more Arabs as focusing more on theoretical expressions and demonstrations of Arab rights than in pursuing practical policies which allowed them to realize their rights.

More dramatic was the transformation of one of the main Arab parties, Raam (Reshima Aravit Meuhedet – the United Arab List) under Abbas Mansour. Originally an Islamist, Mansour sensed this shift in the Arab community and campaigned on participating in Israeli government – all other Arab parties had focused on using their parliamentary power as a platform to stage a display of support for national identity and rights – and inviting the Israeli state into their community to address the rising list of severe problems afflicting it. In the course of the campaign, Mansour developed a close relationship with a key Likud strategist and Netanyahu ally, Yaron Levine, laying the groundwork for a potential earthquake: a Likud governing coalition building a majority on an Arab party. While the success of standing this coalition up may still be unlikely, it does show the Arab community is the latest “outsider” community that rejects its establishment leadership and seeks an entry ticket into the heart of Israeli politics, and sees the “outsider” Likud as the path, or ally, to get there. Social issues, and communal interests emanating from those social issues, are beginning to define coalitions and alliances. The Raam party is on the more traditional side of the Arab political spectrum, with an Islamist pedigree. And yet, it sees the threat represented by socialism and secularism to be great enough to drive them into alliance with more traditional Jewish parties.

Indeed, the low Arab voter turnout and the drift, however limited, away from the parties for which the Arab community have traditionally voted, toward the “outsider” Arab party and even the “outsider” Jewish party, such as Likud, reveals a deep frustration among Arabs with the traditional societal and political leadership. More Arabs voted for Likud (21,500) than for Meretz (15,000), which focused its campaign heavily on equal rights for Arabs, and Yesh Atid (8,000), which is that standard-bearer party for the left. Another right-leaning party, the anti-Netanyahu Avigdor Liberman’s Israel Our Home party also gain about 13,000 votes – nearly as many as Meretz. In earlier rounds, as many as 35,000 had voted for Meretz, and at one point long ago up to 150,000 for the Labor party, while Likud measured imperceptibly. As far as Arab parties go, the Joint List Party led by Ayman Oudeh – essentially the “establishment” party of the Arab community, got 207,000 votes (6 seats) as opposed to its high water mark in 2015 with two and a half times that number. The Arab establishment and the aligned Jewish left-leaning establishment are both losing the following of the Arab community.

Another relatively subtle, but potentially significant shift appearing in these elections was in the Haredi (Ultra-Orthodox Jewish) community. There has been a growing frustration with the stagnant leadership of the Haredi community, especially the European (Ashkenazi) Haredi community – in contrast to the Oriental (Sephardi) community which tends to be more flexible – among the community’s youth. Specifically, there is a palpable desire among the youth to participate in Israeli life as Israelis, rather than continue their rarified, separated life in the Haredi “ghettos” in Israel where they were strongly discouraged, and at times prevented, from serving in the Israeli army, which is generally a pathway to participation in Jewish Israeli life. A sign of the change had already come through language: Haredi youth increasingly spoke Hebrew, not Yiddish.

This trend among Haredi youth led to a shift in this election from voting for the Haredi leadership to voting for a right-wing religious-nationalist party, the Religious-Zionist party under Bezalel Smotrich, which accounts for that party’s unexpected success, let alone its survival (it had been expected to fail to cross the electoral threshold). This shift was quite evident in voting patterns in bastions of Haredi support, such as in Jerusalem, Bnei Brak and Bet Shemesh. About 25,000 votes were taken away from United Torah Judaism (UTJ), the Ashkenazi Haredi party and the larger Shas, the Sephardi Haredi party, lost 37,000 votes. The leader of the UTJ was so angry about the drift of youth from his community toward the religious-nationalist camp that he refused over the last week to commit to a government led by Likud that included the religious nationalists. He certainly will join any government under Netanyahu, and its leader, Moshe Gaffney, even says so, but his formal balking for a few days is symbolically meant as an overt demonstration of pique and protest.

Finally, the elections highlighted another trend. The path to top political leadership in the past, especially from the 1970s onward, led through being a general in the IDF earlier in one’s career. Even after the period in which the Likud started dominating the scene, the effort to reverse the tide against the left was almost always led by a general. Because of the restrictive ways in which the Labor party, which ran the state and all its affiliated institutions, monopolistically until 1977, almost all former generals were affiliated with the Labor party movement. Thus, the security elites until recently were almost entirely secular, socialist, and European Jews. Since the right campaigned on the issue of security, especially in the wake of the disastrous Oslo Accords in 1993, the left saw it as its best strategy to try to turn the tide against Likud by handing a former general their standard. In essence, by bedecking themselves with a mantle of generals, the left banked on the reputation of the IDF in Israeli society to parry Likud’s accusations of their being soft on security. Ehud Barak was the highwater mark of this effort, although he managed to become prime minister for only a short time. The final effort in this regard was the rise of the Blue-White party of the last three years, led by three generals – Benny Gantz, Gabi Ashkenazi and Moshe Yaalon. Moreover, going forward, more and more of the retiring senior officers are themselves from the “second Israel,” namely, the communities that were largely unrepresented in elite institutions prior to 1977.

Not only did the left finally abandon this formula in the last round of the elections and turn instead to a “split the right” strategy – since the Blue-White “generals” effort had failed to deliver – but the shift in the Knesset away from former generals toward settlers continued. This Knesset election returned fewer former generals (only six – Gantz from Blue-White, Yair Golan from Meretz, Yoav Galant and Miri Regev from Likud, and Orna Barbibai and Elazar Stern from Yesh Atid) and more “settlers” (18 from the Jerusalem area and 7 from Judean and Samarian settlements). And to note, a third of the generals in Knesset now are themselves from the right-bloc parties.

Conclusion

The recent round of national elections in Israel failed to produce a winner, and instead delivered the fourth deadlock in two years. The current prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, who fell short of a majority in terms of his natural coalition, now has a narrow, if not unlikely, path to a narrow right coalition with some untraditional allies. The left has almost no path at all since too many of the anti-Netanyahu block are themselves on the right side of the political spectrum. They agree in opposing Netanyahu, but nothing else around which an opposition-based government could be formed.

This deadlock raises the specter of a fifth election cycle two years, the third in 18 months. The gradual decline of the left, and the failure of the Netanyahu bloc to finally cross the 61-vote threshold, however, suggests pressure to avoid a fifth round. For the left, each cycle returns a slightly more right-leaning parliament. For Netanyahu, the bump he enjoyed driven by the Abraham Accords peace treaty, the masterful handling of the COVID-19 crisis, and several other substantial successes in the last months still failed to deliver victory. It would not be easier in a fifth-round, and if no new government is installed by November, opposition leader Benny Gantz would assume office and become the incumbent as a result of the rotation agreement Netanyahu and Gantz signed last year to form the caretaker national unity government currently governing Israel. In other words, time works against, not for, PM Netanyahu.

And yet, despite this deadlock, the underlying trends revealed by this round of elections suggest that Israeli politics are actually entering a period of great, if not bewildering, change.

Posted in By David Wurmser, JRB_MiddleEast/NAfrica, News

Biden must confront North Korea via Beijing

March 29, 2021
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This article appeared in The Washington Examiner on March 29, 2021. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
March 29, 2021

North Korea’s first ballistic-missiles launches during Joe Biden’s presidency triggered the usual flurry of speculation about Kim Jong Un’s intentions, Biden’s possible responses, and whether to resume Washington-Pyongyang negotiations.

But before we yet again commence a diplomatic minuet of semiotics and process, two questions demand answers. First, how close is North Korea to nuclear weapons and delivery systems that can accurately target America? Second, does Biden really intend to stop the North from achieving these objectives?

On capabilities, the Kim family dynasty has made slow but steady progress for decades. The best bet, although not certain, is that its nuclear-warhead stockpile has steadily increased. Pyongyang likely now has the ability to put a warhead over North America, and it is pursuing systems beyond land-based ballistic missiles. There is, however, no certainty among observers that the North can target accurately or that its warheads can survive the difficult atmospheric reentry process. Critically, therefore, enough time remains (albeit not much) to stop North Korea before it directly threatens the United States.

That said, important U.S. allies like Japan are already vulnerable. Accordingly, Tokyo has long pressed Washington to stand firm against both Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and missiles (whatever their range), stressing correctly that technological advances at shorter ranges also benefit longer-range missile developments.

Biden’s intentions remain unclear. The administration scoffed at North Korea’s March 21 launches of two anti-ship cruise missiles, describing them as “normal missile activity.” Whereupon Pyongyang fired two nuclear-capable ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan. On March 25, Biden said plainly that these latter launches violated U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718, thereby reversing his predecessor’s unwarranted insouciance about such activity. Biden acknowledged that North Korea was “the top foreign policy issue that he was watching” and that America’s Pyongyang diplomacy “has to be conditioned upon the end result of denuclearization.” If Biden is serious, he has rejected the idea, advocated by the international left, that we accept Kim’s regime as a nuclear power and instead try merely to constrain it. And hopefully, Biden won’t be the second president to fall in love with Kim.

These positions are necessary but hardly sufficient conditions for realistic U.S. policy. Biden said further, “we’re consulting with our allies and partners” about the launches. This is simply common sense (in all except the last administration). Biden added, “If they choose to escalate, we will respond accordingly.”

The problem: Pyongyang has already escalated, and Washington is not responding.

To the contrary, U.S. officials admit they made several unrequited efforts to open discussions with Pyongyang, thereby potentially looking desperate for a deal. Nor has Biden restored joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises to levels necessary for true readiness against North Korean conventional attacks. Doing so would be not just a “signal,” but an important, long-overdue correction in its own right. Congress should demand it. Next week, Japan’s Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga will be the first foreign leader to visit Biden’s White House. Suga has stressed his intention to “thoroughly discuss” North Korea’s threat, meaning Biden will surely hear, prior to completion of the National Security Council’s ongoing policy review, a strong, realistic message about the grave risks of conventional diplomacy with Kim.

Tokyo and Washington should both understand, however, that the real target of their efforts must be Beijing, not Pyongyang. History has proven clearly that North Korea has never made the strategic decision to give up its nuclear goals. It is always willing to trade promises of denuclearization for financial assistance and sanctions relief. That route has been tried and failed for 30-plus years. Pyongyang gets the financial benefits upfront, but mysteriously to some, never fulfills its denuclearization commitments. It is time for the U.S. to focus on China.

Over 70 years, Beijing has provided North Korea with enormous military assistance and, while denying recent support for nuclear-related programs, undoubtedly provided considerable help previously (as did Moscow). Politically, Beijing flies protective cover for Pyongyang at the United Nations Security Council. This is no casual activity: Beijing and Pyongyang’s respective communist parties once proclaimed themselves “as close as lips and teeth.” Economically, North Korea would collapse quickly if China suspended energy transfers, which constitute 90%-plus of its supplies, not to mention massive subsidies and humanitarian assistance. Indisputably, China made and sustains North Korea. Beijing must now own up to its responsibility.

Either Xi Jinping takes serious measures to help terminate Kim’s nuclear ambitions, or he risks dramatically raising the level of disagreement between China and America. Will this approach offend Xi? Possibly, but his sensitivities are hardly a useful metric of American interests. For too long, Washington has meekly accepted Beijing’s line that it too wants to “solve” the North Korea nuclear problem. That was likely never true, and it is certainly not true today. Until we accept and act on that reality, Pyongyang will only continue to progress toward deliverable nuclear weapons.

Posted in By John Bolton, JRB_Asia, News, Uncategorized

Suez Crisis Will Become Unstuck. The Real Security Crisis Will Remain.

March 29, 2021
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Countries and companies should wake up to new political risks to shipping and supply chains.

This article appeared on Bloomberg.com on March 29, 2021. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
March 29, 2021

The Suez Canal Crisis of 2021 is upon us. The canal is closed, and maritime traffic jams extend into the Mediterranean and Red Seas. The reopening date is uncertain, supply chains are stressing, and executives are nervous.

“Crisis” may strike some as the wrong word. After all, there are no Cold War tensions as there were during the 1956 Suez Crisis, which closed the canal for six months, as the USSR simultaneously crushed the Hungarian Revolution. Nor are there Arab-Israeli military hostilities as during 1967’s Six-Day War, which (along with the 1973 Yom Kippur War) closed the Suez Canal for eight years.

The current blockage apparently arose from adverse weather conditions. But no one should underestimate the geostrategic warning it sends about the potential for political sabotage. As nature inspires art, so too does it inspire malevolence. This is not merely about geography, but also about today’s broader political risks to world commerce, ranging from one errant ship at Suez to confronting China’s enormous political, military and economic challenge.

Indisputably, political risks are now rising from sources not previously perceived. The coronavirus pandemic, for one, has alerted terrorist groups, rogue states and major powers alike that biological (and chemical) weapons have far more coercive power than once recognized. Such weapons are comparatively easier to make than nuclear devices.

New political risks have come on little cat feet, almost unnoticed. For decades, foreign investment in and reliance on supply sources in China expanded as if political risk were irrelevant. No longer. Former President Donald Trump’s tussle with Beijing, hardly amounting to a “trade war,” simply underscored the emerging political risks of dealing with China. Looking to hedge their bets, some foreign companies were already shifting capital allocations and supply chains to Southeast Asian countries, India and elsewhere. That trend is accelerating.

And the aggregate China risk factor will only increase. Beijing’s crackdown in Hong Kong and the city’s melancholy demise as a “rule-of-law” international enclave in China is all but certain. Computer-driven industrial and financial espionage, outright theft of intellectual property, discrimination against foreign firms, and internal political and religious oppression all make China an increasingly risky place to be. And as political conflicts between China and the West continue to escalate, it becomes more dangerous to rely on Chinese supply sources.

Many Europeans, favored Wall Street investors and well-paid pundits argue that rising tensions are not inevitable. Perhaps. Certainly, the risks of relying on China don’t rule out having any presence whatever in the country. There are innumerable intermediate options. Yet in virtually every line of business, the intermediate options cry out for estimating a higher risk to any material supply-chain investment in China.

Moreover, China is creating its own geostrategic choke points, by building naval and air bases on islands, rocks and reefs it claims in the South China Sea, and declaring the region a Chinese province. In the East China Sea, Beijing is threatening Taiwan and challenging Japan on the sovereignty of the islands called the Senkaku in Japan and the Diaoyus in China. This menacing behavior leaves the economies of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Southeast Asian countries in danger.

Clearly, geopolitical risks are rising sharply. And to mitigate disruption, governments and businesses must diversify their supply chains and methods of shipping, and avoid geographic or political chokepoints, man-made or natural.

The United Arab Emirates has shown foresight by building an oil pipeline bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. The East-West Petroline, running from Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province to Yanbu on the Red Sea, was also designed to avoid the Strait of Hormuz. Nevertheless, shipments must traverse either the Suez Canal or the Bab el-Mandeb Strait at the Red Sea’s southern end, now threatened by Yemen’s Houthi rebels (who have also attacked the Petroline itself). Today’s Middle East might consider building pipelines and other shipment methods through Jordan to Israel’s Mediterranean coast. Iran may well have had such an alternative route in mind for its (and Iraq’s) oil in extending its military dominance through Lebanon and Syria to the Mediterranean.

By the same token, why shouldn’t American and European companies concentrate more investment and manufacturing in the Western Hemisphere (or at home) rather than in China? As long as they avoid the likes of Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, their political risk would be drastically lower, not to mention their transportation costs and possible losses during shipping. Perhaps the 2021 Suez Canal Crisis will have a silver lining after all, impelling governments and companies to come to terms with the new global security dangers they face.

Posted in By John Bolton, JRB_MiddleEast/NAfrica, News, Uncategorized

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