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The Conservative Future Requires Optimism and Confidence

November 30, 2020
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How the GOP can regain the voters Trump alienated, but also keep those whom he attracted.

This article appeared in The Dispatch on November 30, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
November 30, 2020

Donald Trump’s post-November 3 conduct has been consistent with his entire presidency: wholly centered on Donald Trump. One of the worst consequences of this self-indulgence for conservatives is the treacherous fixation on whether one agrees or disagrees with Trump. Even when he embraces some element of conservative truth, he typically so exaggerates or distorts it that one can barely discern the underlying principle.

Or worse. Remember, for example, his diktat at an April 13 coronavirus briefing: “When somebody’s the president of the United States, the authority is total, and that’s the way it’s got to be.” An unvarnished Trumpism, made in Trumpian style, and utterly contradictory to American conservative thinking.

Rather than aligning with principle (which Trump lacks), long-standing conservatives torqued themselves uncomfortably to support his positions. This is unnatural and unwise, and we must stop it. Politics based on personality rather than philosophy is not conservatism’s credo. When politicians go astray, we judge their failures against our principles. We do not readjust our principles to suit their personal interests, as the paradigm case of Richard Nixon demonstrates. James Buckley, New York’s Conservative Party senator, was the first Republican to call for Nixon’s resignation. In the congressional delegation to the Oval Office that told Nixon he had to go, Barry Goldwater had the most impact.

Liberal pundits complain ceaselessly that today’s Republicans do not demonstrate sufficient courage against Trump. This is surely what liberals want to believe, but they misread conservatives as badly as Trump’s misreading that he owns the party.

Consider Michigan, where Trump’s post-election conspiracy theories met their Waterloo. Defeated by more than 150,000 votes, he authorized litigation asserting massive fraud and electoral malfeasance, as he did nationwide. Not one of his cases produced facts changing even a single vote. This conspiracy must be so vast and so successful that it left no evidence behind, making it modern history’s pre-eminent covert operation.

Rebuffed in state and federal courts, Trump abandoned legal reasoning for pure political force, attempting to rewrite the constitutional role of state legislators to generate slates of pro-Trump electors. He summoned Mike Shirkey and Lee Chatfield, the top Republicans in Michigan’s Senate and House, to Washington, hoping to intimidate them into overturning their state’s counting and certification process. They refused.

The pressure shifted to Michigan’s State Board of Canvassers. The Republican national and Michigan state chairs urged the board to postpone certification for two weeks, thereby enabling more mischief. Republican board member Aaron Van Langevelde disagreed, in plainly conservative terms: “We have a clear legal duty to certify the results of the election, as shown by the returns that were given to us. … We cannot and should not go beyond that. As John Adams once said, ‘We are a government of laws, not men.’”

Shirkey, Chatfield and Van Langevelde are heroes, and far from alone. National GOP leaders can profit from their example. If these three Michiganders can do it, so can the rest of us.

With Trump’s efforts now defeated in fact, if not yet in his imagination, what comes next? One immediate project is producing documentation analogous to the Black Book of Communism, to serve as a definitive refutation of Trump’s extravagant, unsubstantiated claims of “stealing the election.” Such a work will not convince all conspiracy theorists, but we need an authoritative, even encyclopedic, recital of the truth for future use.

Longer term, there must be a broad “conversation” about the direction of the conservative movement and the Republican party. Much of the havoc Trump wreaked is uniquely due to his ego, his public style, and his distortion of basic conservative philosophy. We should have no illusions that excising Trump’s lesions from the body politic will be easy. Many conservatives invested themselves in his success and have not yet receded. Still, there is no point in demanding that they confess error as an auto da fe. We need instead a “malice toward none, charity toward all” approach, which is fully justified by the Democratic left’s larger threat, whether from Biden or his successors.

Our objective should be restoring to conservatism an unmistakably Reaganite optimism and confidence: the “morning in America” crowd defending our “shining city on a hill,” not Trump’s dystopian “American carnage” approach. We can thereby regain the voters Trump alienated, but also keep those whom he attracted. Blue-collar families who left the Democratic party in 1980 were called “Reagan Democrats,” and those who have voted for Trump are essentially their contemporary counterparts. The proposed “conversation” may be lengthy, but there is every reason to believe it will succeed with enough work.

We need to start now, in time for Georgia’s critical January 5 runoffs. Victory for incumbents David Perdue and Kelly Loeffler will produce a 52-vote Republican Senate majority, a major check against Biden administration excesses. Placating desolate Trump supporters is purportedly the rationale for not speaking truthfully about Trump’s defeat, but hard political logic points in exactly the opposite direction. By pursuing his personal interests, Trump has vastly complicated the prospects for winning both runoffs. For no reason other than ego, he induced Perdue and Loeffler to demand the resignation of Brad Raffensperger, Georgia’s Republican secretary of state. Now, some Trump supporters argue for boycotting Perdue and Loeffler because they are insufficiently pro-Trump, perhaps writing in Trump’s own name to show their dissatisfaction.

Nothing like fratricide to kick off a crucial election campaign. Obviously, keeping a GOP Senate majority is the immediate electoral priority, which underscores precisely why remaining silent on Trump’s conspiracy theories is so damaging. His impending campaign visit to Georgia could well cause more harm. Republican voters will accept the truth if explained rationally by responsible party leaders. But if all they hear is Trump barking, they may well believe, and far beyond Georgia, that no one disputes his version of “the stolen elections.” That would be dangerous beyond calculation.

Looking toward 2024, the risks of silence only grow. The “Trump lane” to the party’s presidential nomination will be congested, especially if Trump is still in it. Just as Democrats almost blew their 2020 prospects by endlessly rehashing “Russian collusion,” we could do the same by relitigating “the steal” merely to gratify Trump’s fantasy. While a crowded race to be Trump’s heir would free up lanes for those who do not seek that role, such lanes might disappear if the “stolen election” becomes dogma. It is far easier to avoid this calamity by speaking now, rather than waiting until minds and memories are hardened by unrefuted Trump logorrhea.

Preparing the battlefield for 2024 will largely unfold through Republican responses to Biden’s priorities. We will see no lack of enthusiasm for the opposition party’s most important duty: opposition. The issue is whether we proceed in Trump mode, further undermining the integrity and legitimacy of our institutions, or whether we fight as true conservatives, attacking leftist policies without despoiling the foundations of America’s flourishing.

The Senate in particular will have a frontline role dealing with the Biden presidency through the “advice and consent” process for his nominees. Several Republican senators have already criticized those nominated for national-security positions, laying down markers that they might fight confirmation. I agree with their policy critiques, especially Biden’s likely fecklessness on China. What they have not addressed, however, is the Senate’s proper role in assessing executive branch nominees (life-tenured judicial nominees residing in a completely separate analytical framework). In a world truer to the intent of the Framers, the Senate would grant wide deference to a president’s choices, recognizing that his views control executive policies, not the views of his subordinates. The legitimate targets of opposition should be only those with grave personal failings or views beyond the range of reason.

I have some standing to raise this issue. Twice in George W. Bush’s presidency, Biden unjustifiably tried to block my nominations, first as an undersecretary of State, and later as U.S. ambassador to the U.N. My complaint, however, is constitutional, not personal. In recent years, increasing partisanship in advice-and-consent matters has risked transforming our system of separated powers into something quasi-parliamentary. So far, Biden’s nominees are not beyond the pale. Quite the contrary. He and his team instead embody Disraeli’s famous put-down of Gladstone’s front bench: “You behold a range of exhausted volcanoes. Not a flame flickers on a single pallid crest.”

Allow Biden these nominees; it will serve him right. Make their confirmations miserable, to be sure. Harry them with uncomfortable questions, exposing the weaknesses in Biden’s and their own stated policy positions and records. Once they take office, haul them back repeatedly for hearings. This would all serve the greater good. I am not so naïve to believe that reversion to the norm here will arise solely from constitutional arguments. Still, one can appeal to conservative Senators aspiring to the presidency to imagine their reactions when Democrats with blood in their eyes are rampaging against their nominees. Just a suggestion.

With Trump thrashing around for the next four years and Biden in the White House, conservatives face a sustained two-front struggle. Nonetheless, it is entirely winnable with persistent concentration and effort. We must remind ourselves that it was always morning in Reagan’s America, and it should be in ours as well.

Posted in By John Bolton, News, Uncategorized

How Trump is weakening America

November 17, 2020
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How Trump is weakening America: His refusal to concede defeat strengthens Russia and China

This article appeared in The New York Daily News on November 17, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
November 17, 2020

As Russia, China and other adversaries try to undermine our citizenry’s confidence in American institutions, Donald Trump has been their hopefully unwitting ally. Oblivious to anything not directly benefitting him, Trump spent much of the 2020 campaign, and has spent nearly every waking hour since Nov. 3 complaining that the outcome was rigged, and that massive conspiracies to commit fraud are overturning his re-election.

Trump’s unprecedented insistence that the core machinery of U.S. elections (voter identification and vote casting, counting and certification) is being manipulated is obviously wrong. Significant protections and safeguards are built into the electoral process in every state and county because we know that the possibilities for fraud and stolen elections are ever-present, notwithstanding the dewy-eyed view of some commentators. If Trump had evidence of election-rigging or fraud, he should have produced it by now. He has not; lawsuits have flamed out or been radically pared back.

But his continued aspersions on the 2020 election buttress the case our enemies make against us. Now, they can quote an American president for their own ends.

Without a doubt, Russian and Chinese efforts in the 2016 and 2020 elections have been devoted to undermining America’s confidence in its own institutions, increasing mistrust among our fellow citizens, and confusing the public discourse with false and misleading information. They have most certainly used cyberwarfare against the integrity of our elections, and China’s subversive efforts especially have ranged far more broadly, as Vice President Mike Pence has previously made clear.

We, and Trump in particular, do Moscow’s and Beijing’s work for them when we argue whether they favor Trump or favor Biden. Russia and China favor themselves; merely inducing Americans to argue about their strategies is likely a vital part of the strategies themselves. Trump has been told all this, but his fascination with himself bleaches out all other concerns in his public remarks.

Attacking America’s institutions is not a Republican Party or conservative hallmark. For Trump, it is something of a commonplace. For example, in a 2017 pre-Super Bowl interview with Fox News’ Bill O’Reilly, Trump said he respected Russia’s Vladimir Putin. O’Reilly responded that Putin was “a killer.” Trump paused for a few seconds — perhaps actually reflecting on what was he wanted to say — before responding, “We’ve got a lot of killers. You think our country is so innocent?”

This Trumpian moral equivalency emerges all too often. Prior to his embarrassing exchange with O’Reilly, Trump said of Putin in 2015, “he’s running his country, and at least he’s a leader, unlike what he have in this country.” The list of comparable examples is depressingly long.

After Nov. 3, Trump’s antics reached fever-pitch. In nearly incoherent remarks during the early hours of Wednesday, Nov. 4, as the vote totals were turning against him, Trump said, “This is a fraud on the American public. This is an embarrassment to our country. We were getting ready to win this election. Frankly, we did win this election.” On Nov. 5, Trump said further, “If you count the legal votes, I easily win. If you count the illegal votes, they can try to steal the election from us.” Even when he seemingly lets the truth slip out, as on Nov. 15, when he admitted a Biden win, he quickly reverses course.

All of this is propaganda, which does constitute “an embarrassment to our country,” coming as it does from the president. Trump’s record over four years, and continuing right until today, is in the sociological expression Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan popularized, “defining deviancy down” in the political world. Our expectations for Trump are so low, we have lost the capacity to be surprised.

Fortunately, however, Trump’s abnormality provides precisely the way to repair the damage his presidency, and especially his post-election performance, have caused us internationally. We must stress that Trump is an aberration, an anomaly, rather than an accurate reflection of the American system or its people. Trump’s war with the election results, sadly but ironically helpfully, is the best proof of his aberrant status.

To repair the damage that his tweets and his actions have caused in recent days, as with repairing the larger damage he has done to our reputation overseas, we need to emphasize that the 2020 election has, hopefully, brought a return to “normalcy.” Biden may not like being this century’s Warren Harding, but that may just be his lot, at least in the rest of the world’s estimate.

We will have significant debates between normal Republicans and Democrats about Biden’s foreign and domestic policies, which we and the world will welcome as normal, and this too will help repair Trump’s damage. The process could actually move quickly. Let’s hope so.

Bolton, Trump’s national security adviser from 2018 to 2019, is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.”

Posted in By John Bolton, News, Uncategorized

The China Nightmare’ Review: Beijing Never Got the Memo

November 17, 2020
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China is not the juggernaut of Wall Street financiers’ imaginations, but that doesn’t make its expansionism any less of a threat.

This article appeared in The Wall Street Journal on November 17, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
November 17, 2020

With Joe Biden’s election now declared by the press, albeit still unacknowledged by Donald Trump, it is appropriate to consider what policies his administration will pursue starting Jan. 20. Any new president’s national-security policy would be more coherent, consistent and sustained than Mr. Trump’s. The risk with Mr. Biden is not that his policy will be chaotic, but that it will be badly misguided.

One thing is certain: China is the most significant international threat that America—and the global West generally—now faces. And that will be true for the rest of this century. Mr. Biden’s real views on dealing with China are obscure, more collateral damage from an election campaign that rarely debated foreign and defense policy in any substantive way.

Much remains to be seen, especially in light of China’s responsibility for worsening the coronavirus pandemic by its concealment and disinformation. Beijing’s disingenuousness has worsened U.S. public opinion about China, a shift echoed world-wide, potentially far more negatively than the adverse reactions to the 1989 Tiananmen Square repression.

Dan Blumenthal of the American Enterprise Institute has stepped into this void with “The China Nightmare: The Grand Ambitions of a Decaying State.” Serious practitioners and students of U.S.-China relations will need to reckon with his analysis.

Mr. Blumenthal’s approach will catch many by surprise. He says plainly that “China has taken advantage of American complacency.” He rejects the conventional thinking that China’s domestic economy is still moving from strength to strength, thereby providing Chinese president Xi Jinping and the Communist Party with the wherewithal to insist on China’s centrality in Asia and to challenge the U.S. globally. Indeed, it is key to Mr. Blumenthal’s “China nightmare” thesis that Mr. Xi’s domestic policies (and those of his immediate predecessor, Hu Jintao) have rolled back many of the dramatic, market-oriented reforms of the Deng Xiaoping era in favor of increased state control. The Xi regime is impairing China’s economic growth (and any prospect for an innovation-based economy) and laying the basis for failure internationally. Mr. Blumenthal writes that the main thesis of his book “is that despite (or perhaps because of) China’s growing internal weaknesses, it is pushing forward grand strategic ambitions.” China is not the juggernaut of Wall Street financiers’ imaginations, but that doesn’t make its expansionism less a threat.

Mr. Blumenthal challenges received wisdom in other ways. Contrary to the prevailing mantra of China’s “peaceful rise,” his analysis stresses that Mao Zedong and his successors repeatedly used military force against their geographical neighbors. They are doing it today, from the East and South China Seas to the “line of actual control” on the disputed frontier with India.

Domestically, the Xi regime is, among other things, engaging in armed repression against ethnic minorities like Tibetans and Uighurs; crushing dissent in Hong Kong (and thereby violating the “handover” agreement with the U.K.); and initiating a “social credit” system so the state can rank all Chinese citizens in every aspect of their lives, from jaywalking to dissent. China faces “insurmountable social problems,” Mr. Blumenthal writes. But “a weaker China . . . does not necessarily mean a risk-averse China.”

While China’s theft of intellectual property is a huge problem for the U.S., Mr. Blumenthal argues further, we cannot ignore the reality that America and Japan purposely transferred considerable scientific and technological knowhow to China. When we assign responsibility for the consequences of this catastrophic error, we need not look far.

Beijing apparently never received the memo that the age of empire is over. The Chinese Communists have focused on fully restoring the Qing empire’s boundaries, and no lacuna in achieving that goal is more painful than Taiwan’s de facto independence. In resolutely Orwellian fashion, China has insisted so fiercely on its distorted interpretation of the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué’s “one China” language that even Americans now unwittingly accept China’s version. That suits Beijing; it doubtless hopes Mr. Biden’s team will find those pesky Taiwanese as much a nuisance as did Jimmy Carter, for thwarting what Mr. Blumenthal calls China’s “main strategic-military priority since the end of the Cold War.”

Taiwan’s example of freedom and openness, Mr. Blumenthal contends, is enormously disruptive on the mainland. The U.S. could put the Communist Party in a vise by using information statecraft and other forms of political warfare. China has for years been waging political warfare against us, so it is well past time to implement a counterstrategy. In cyberspace, America is doing precisely that, forestalling or retaliating against efforts to influence our domestic political discourse, thus building deterrence to prevent such attacks in the future.

While a true grand strategy toward China is urgently needed, Beijing’s obsession with Taipei provides Washington an asymmetric response to objectionable Chinese behavior. We can answer its belligerence and intransigence through diplomatic or political means, wounding the Chinese Communists deeply, and simultaneously bolstering Taiwan.

The most consequential step, one I have urged for over 20 years, is for America to grant Taiwan full diplomatic recognition. By all customary international law criteria (a defined territory and population, a capital city, and a government carrying out normal governmental functions), Taiwan is a sovereign state, and democratic to boot. Relations between the U.S. and China would chill dramatically, but that is what China should fear, not America. There are smaller steps Washington could take. We could, for example, regularly receive Taiwanese officials in U.S. government buildings, which would seriously undermine the legitimacy of China’s campaign to force Taiwan into a morganatic union.

Our relations with Beijing will not get easier over the next four years. Mr. Blumenthal has done the Biden administration a favor with “The China Nightmare.” Let’s hope the president-elect takes advantage of it.

Posted in By John Bolton, News, Uncategorized

Trump will draw up hitlist of ‘traitors’ to blame – I fully expect to be on it JOHN BOLTON

November 15, 2020
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THE 2020 US election is over. Welcome to another uniquely American institution, the “transition” to the Biden Administration.

This article appeared in The Daily Express on November 15, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
November 15, 2020

We have perhaps the longest transition of any democracy, inherited from the Constitution’s first days, because of the geographic reach and limited transport capabilities among the 13 newly united states. Today, with presidential Inaugurations fixed for January 20, the transition is over a month shorter than originally. America’s most important presidential transition followed the 1800 election, when John Adams, the defeated Federalist incumbent, handed over to his Republican challenger, Thomas Jefferson.

In 1797, George Washington left office graciously, succeeded by Adams, his own Vice President. For Adams to accept defeat by the opposition party, however, was a big deal.

Jefferson said memorably in a brief inaugural address “we are all Republicans; we are all Federalists.”

He was sworn in by the new Chief Justice, John Marshall, nominated by Adams after his defeat, and confirmed by the last Federalist Senate majority after their defeat; so much for the supposed “inappropriateness” of nominating Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court before the 2020 election.

Marshall was serving contemporaneously as Adams’ Secretary of State, and also served under Jefferson for approximately a month, a practice now unthinkable.

The 1800-01 transition was not free from rancour. Adams left town before Jefferson’s swearing-in, something we may also see on January 20.

But in their later years, Jefferson and Adams renewed their friendship from the time they crafted the Declaration of Independence.

They both died on July 4, 1826, the Declaration’s fiftieth anniversary. You can’t make it up.

Can anyone imagine Trump playing the roles of the Founding Fathers? Of course not. He will not leave graciously like Washington; so far, he has made Adams look like a man of noblesse oblige; and, unlike Jefferson, he is incapable of saying “we are all Republicans, we are all Democrats.”

So, what is likely in the two months before Joe Biden is sworn in?

At present, Trump has not only not conceded, he continues to insist the election was rigged.

He has unleashed Rudy Giuliani and other surrogates to “litigate” his legal challenges through news conferences and interviews, rather than in State and Federal courts.

Press reports indicate that lawyers previously recruited by the Trump campaign are now making themselves unavailable to join the legal efforts, and new recruits are scarce.

Judicial results for Trump so far are dismal, and little or no probative evidence or new legal arguments seem to be forthcoming.

The likely outcome is that Trump’s badly-faltering legal offensive will continue to collapse, perhaps ending with a whimper within the week. That doesn’t mean Trump will concede, gracefully or otherwise. Instead, he will proclaim “stab in the back” theories about why he lost: list the many “traitors” in his Administration and campaign who undercut him (I expect to be on that list, and in very good company indeed); and attack the always unpopular news media, political pollsters, and left-wing activists now poised to destroy the country.

Make no mistake, unless Republican leaders speak out against this fantasy, Trump will convince many people that the 2020 election was stolen.

Commentators left and right argue that any effort to present the truth to Republican base voters will inevitably fail, so loyal are they to Trump. Ironically, this theory’s most ardent advocates are leftist Democrats, who hope to tie the Trump albatross around Republicans’ necks forever. The stakes are high.

Ultimately, of course, if truth cannot prevail, the future would indeed be dire.

But all that is really required is for Republican leaders other than Trump to do some leading.

If more speak out, the Trump fantasy can be exposed, and his supporters will reconcile themselves with his defeat while remaining loyal to what will hopefully be a revived, Reaganite Republican party.

In the meantime, the current controversy over whether Biden and his team can formally begin the transition process will also be resolved.

Growing numbers of congressional Republicans are pressing for Biden and his senior staff to receive intelligence briefings; others have concluded what should now be obvious, namely that the formal transition itself should get underway.

There need be no admission or concession by Trump that he has lost in order to make the prudent management point that whoever wins needs to be fully prepared on January 20.

Trump obviously doesn’t need a transition, but Biden does, and the sooner it begins, the better.

Forecasting what happens after January 20 remains difficult until the results of two runoff elections for Georgia’s Senate seats are held on January 5.

Peculiarities of Georgia election law require the runoffs, which will be hotly fought. If Republicans prevail in just one, they will retain control of the Senate; if they win both, they will have come through a difficult 2020 campaign losing just one seat net.

Effectively, therefore, anything Biden wants will require dealing with Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell, who will be the second most powerful man in Washington.

Somewhat under-reported is the success story for Republicans in the House of Representatives, where they are already projected to gain six-to-seven seats from their pre-November 3 totals, and probably more.

A majority of the House is 218 members, and Republicans could be just around 212. If House Democrats maintain their unity, they can still work their will, but the possibility of splitting their slender majority present numerous opportunities for Republicans.

Even more troubling for Democrats and Speaker Nancy Pelosi are the upcoming 2022 elections; in US history the incumbent President’s congressional party almost always suffers losses, sometime quite significant, in the midterms.

This shadow alone will diminish the Democrats’ maneuvering room for the next two years.

In short, the 2020 election was a loss for Trump, but a surprising success for Republicans in the House and Senate, and also in the States, where they picked up one additional governership, and several state legislative houses, crucial in the redistricting required by the 2020 census results. Stay tuned!

Posted in By John Bolton, News, Uncategorized

Time is running out for Trump — and Republicans who coddle him

November 11, 2020
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This article appeared in The Washington Post on November 11, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
November 11, 2020

As of this writing, the Republican Party has not suffered permanent damage to its integrity and reputation because of President Trump’s post-election rampaging. This will not be true much longer.

Trump has so far failed to do so, and there is no indication he can. If he can’t, his “right” to contest the election is beside the point. The real issue is the grievous harm he is causing to public trust in America’s constitutional system. Trump’s time is running out, even as his rhetoric continues escalating. And time is running out for Republicans who hope to maintain the party’s credibility, starting with Georgia’s two Senate runoffs in January. Here is the cold political reality: Trump is enhancing his own brand (in his mind) while harming the Republican brand. The party needs a long internal conversation about the post-Trump era, but first it needs to get there honorably.

Consider the competing interests. Donald Trump’s is simple and straightforward: Donald Trump. The near-term Republican interest is winning the Georgia runoffs. The long-term Republican interest emphatically involves winning those Senate seats, but it also involves rejecting Trump’s personalized, erratic, uncivil, unpresidential and ultimately less-than-effective politics and governance.

One approach holds that coddling Trump while he trashes the U.S. electoral system will help him get over the loss, thereby making it easier to reconcile him to leaving the Oval Office. But this coddling strategy is exactly backward. The more Republican leaders kowtow, the more Trump believes he is still in control and the less likely he will do what normal presidents do: make a gracious concession speech; fully cooperate with the president-elect in a smooth transition process; and validate the election process itself by joining his successor at the Jan. 20 inauguration.

Coddling proponents plead that an enraged Trump will jeopardize the chances of victory in the Georgia runoffs. But that is true only if party leaders do not speak up, explaining to voters what the real facts are. Do we in the GOP not trust our own base enough to absorb the truth? They will find out in due course anyway if Trump’s election litigation indeed crashes into reality. Once in court, state or federal, before judges appointed by Republicans and Democrats, actual witnesses will have to raise their right hands and tell the truth, and then face gale-force cross-examination from lawyers for President-elect Joe Biden’s campaign. It’s one thing to tweet; it’s another thing to testify.

Who is going to explain that to Georgia’s voters? Republican leaders should lay that groundwork now and not cede the field to a president whose interests directly contradict the party’s. Otherwise, they will rue the day they stood silent.

In the meantime, the litigation swirls on, risking, if it is ultimately exposed as unfounded, even more destructive consequences to public trust in the electoral process. Trump says he wants the truth. Surely, therefore, his lawyers will not engage in frivolous arguments, obfuscation, pettifoggery or dilatory tactics that would complicate uncovering the truth, right? Sadly, that has never been Trump’s style during a long career of litigation as a lifestyle.

Republican passivity risks additional negative consequences for the country. Trump is engaging in what could well be a systematic purge of his own administration, starting with the utterly unjustified firing of Defense Secretary Mark T. Esper this week and continuing through high- and mid-level civilian offices in the department. Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, head of the National Nuclear Safety Administration, was forced to resign. Washington is filled with rumors that the CIA and FBI directors are next.

This is being done with just 10 weeks left in the administration. All transitions bring uncertainty, but to decapitate substantial parts of the national-security apparatus during such a period for no reason other than personal pique is irresponsible and dangerous. Republicans know this.

Simultaneously, Trump is frustrating Biden’s transition, based on the 2000 precedent, when George W. Bush’s transition was delayed for 37 days by Al Gore’s contesting the Florida results. Two wrongs don’t make a right. It implies no acknowledgment of Biden’s legitimacy as president-elect for Trump to facilitate prudent transition planning, certainly in the national-security field, nor in finalizing distribution plans for a coronavirus vaccine, which will largely occur next year. At least, that’s how a confident, mature, responsible president would see it.

For the good of America, the 2020 election needs to be brought expeditiously to the conclusion that all logic tells us is coming. National security requires that the transition get underway effectively. These are Republican values. We will acknowledge reality sooner or later. For the good of the party as well as the country, let’s make it sooner.

Posted in By John Bolton, News, Uncategorized

Donald Trump’s disgraceful behaviour risks doing lasting damage

November 09, 2020
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This article appeared in The Sunday Telegraph on November 7, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
November 7, 2020

The US presidential race has now widely been called for Joe Biden. The counting has been slower than we’d like, and legal challenges to the process are under way. But if things end as now seems likely, whatever damage the electoral process and the nation’s institutions have suffered in recent days is easily repairable. After the 2000 election, Democratic nominee Al Gore precipitated a contentious recount in Florida – I spent 33 days there on George W Bush’s legal team – and America recovered in due course. We will recover from this, too.

There is, however, one significant caveat: if the Leader of the Free World continues to claim, with essentially no supportive evidence, that the election was stolen through fraud, we will have far more serious problems than merely reconciling disappointed partisans to the reality of defeat.

In the early hours of Wednesday, and again on Thursday evening, Donald Trump asserted unambiguously that he had won the election. He argued that Democrats, in league with corrupt, dishonest or incompetent election officials in six or seven states, were dumping out hundreds of thousands of fake ballots, thereby producing fraudulent majorities affording Biden an Electoral College victory. His surrogates made equally exaggerated claims in multiple state and federal lawsuits, not one of which has brought the Trump campaign any significant vindication, or done the slightest thing to change the results.

This disgraceful performance by the US president is deeply troubling. Any candidate is entitled to express disappointment when he or she loses, complain that life is unfair, and trigger all legitimately available election-law remedies to seek redress for alleged improprieties. Of course, raising claims, however permissible, is not the same as proving them, or showing that even validated claims have had an actual, let alone dispositive, effect on the election itself.
Responsible politicians know that, ultimately, they will pay a price if they go too far, even rhetorically. Apparently, no one ever explained this to Trump, or if they did, he didn’t pay any more attention to it than he usually pays to good advice.

The result is that the Republican Party now faces a character test. The party’s leaders can either reject Trump’s false claims and insist that he provide actual evidence in court, or join in his fantasia and forever tar their own reputations, and that of the party. To date, only a small number of elected Republican officials have commented publicly, evenly divided between these two possibilities. Many more need to speak out, and soon.

There is also a larger question ahead once the election is well and truly behind us, quite possibly once the Electoral College votes, which this year will be on Dec 14. The Republican Party must begin a serious conversation about its new direction going forward, which I hope will return it to a Reaganite approach. It is profoundly wrong to contend, as many commentators already are, that Trump has an iron grip on the party, and will dictate its strategy and determine its candidates from exile at Mar-a-Lago in Palm Beach, Florida, perhaps plotting a 2024 Trump presidential campaign.

In fact, Trump’s influence will drop precipitously once he leaves the Oval Office. He will be, in a word he hates, a loser, and the whole world will know it. Only one defeated incumbent president has ever regained the office, and that was, in 1892, Grover Cleveland (who was both the 22nd and 24th president), hardly a compelling precedent. Dozens of prospective 2024 Republican presidential candidates are already lining up. Trump the man will certainly remain a factor, but there is no “Trumpism”; his administration has had no coherent philosophy, certainly not on national security matters. And after Jan 20, the world will no longer hang on every new Trump tweet.

In Washington, attention will shift rapidly to the new Biden administration and its plans, and how well (or poorly) they will fare in a Congress where Republicans probably still control the Senate and Democrats have a diminished majority in the House. Biden faces an angry Left wing in his own party, and his relations with Mitch McConnell, the Senate majority leader, could well be the big political story ahead.

Not all of Trump’s legacy is bad. Millions of blue-collar voters have rejected the Democratic Party’s radicals. Even more inconveniently for the Left, Hispanic support for Republican candidates has swelled nationwide. Without Trump, we can now seek the return of voters whom his behaviour repulsed, and build a long-term Republican governing majority.

Soon again, we will elect a real conservative Republican president.

Posted in By John Bolton, News, Uncategorized

China Needs to Answer for Its North Korea Policy

October 06, 2020
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Beijing has long avoided paying any kind of price for its acquiescence to the Kim regime’s games.

This article appeared in The Wall Street Journal on September 29, 2020. Click here to view the original article.
By John Bolton
September 29, 2020

For weeks, North Korea observers have speculated that Pyongyang was preparing an election surprise for the U.S., perhaps testing a submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missile. So far there’s been no launch, but the strange shooting death this weekend of a South Korean official who might have been looking to enter the North by boat nonetheless highlights the hair trigger on which the Peninsula still rests.

While Donald Trump has pursued the bright lights and glitter of international “summits” with Kim Jong Un, Pyongyang has relentlessly improved and expanded its nuclear and ballistic-missile capabilities. After almost four years of U.S. showmanship—but insufficient, inconsistent economic and political pressure—it is clear as Nov. 3 approaches that North Korea has again outperformed an American administration. A fourth Trump-Kim encounter might still emerge as an “October surprise” to aid Mr. Trump’s flagging re-election campaign, but participating in such a circus would be an act of self-abasement for the president.

Keeping the world guessing about his intentions has allowed Mr. Kim to divert attention from conditions in the North. “We’re not seeing any sign of regime instability,” said Gen. Robert Abrams, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, on Sept. 10. But little is known about how North Korea has been affected by the coronavirus pandemic. Pyongyang claims to have successfully sealed off its long border with China, but for all anyone knows North Korea’s primitive medical system is on the verge of collapse.

For decades Washington has accepted Beijing’s claim that it opposes Pyongyang’s ambitions because a nuclear North Korea would destabilize the region and impede China’s economic development. Successive American administrations accepted China as a middleman in negotiations. When North Korea repeatedly broke its commitments to renounce nuclear weapons, China helped enforce economic sanctions.

Those days are gone. China should no longer be treated as part of the solution on the Korean Peninsula. Beijing is—and likely always was—part of the problem. Rather than helping to denuclearize North Korea, Beijing has been content to let the U.S. and Japan focus on that threat as a distraction from China’s own growing menace. It’s clear now that Beijing sees a nuclear-capable Pyongyang as a “wild card” useful for keeping the West off balance.

Whether in a second Trump term or a Biden administration, simply pursuing variations on existing policy themes is almost certain to fail. Instead, the U.S. should make China’s continuing acquiescence to Mr. Kim’s nuclear and ballistic-missile programs a priority of the bilateral agenda. Biological and chemical weapons must also be included, since another unfortunate consequence of the Covid-19 pandemic is the proof it offers of the novel coronavirus’s potential as a weapon. Not without reason have these threats long been called “the poor man’s nuke.”

Other countries should take the same approach, as well as deepen their mutual politico-military cooperation. Not that India, Japan or Australia needs much encouragement. Tokyo’s increased willingness to invest in its military stems from its fear of China, not North Korea.

Beijing’s economic lifeline keeps the Kim dynasty in power. China should pay a price for its acquiescence. Additional economic sanctions aren’t enough. It’s time to revive the Cold War concept of linkage and make North Korea an issue for negotiations across the board in Washington’s bilateral relations with Beijing. China has been employing a “whole of government” approach to international affairs, and so should the U.S., raising Pyongyang’s nuclear threats along with existing issues like trade, theft of intellectual property, industrial espionage, forced technology transfer, spying, territorial claims, arms control and military expansion. A linkage policy will require broad international support, and it won’t happen through the United Nations, where China’s Security Council veto would stop the most important measures.

North Korea hasn’t pursued nuclear weapons in a vacuum. China knows it, and it needs to understand that the U.S. knows it too.

Posted in By John Bolton

Back to firm foundations: the UAE-Bahrain-Israeli agreement

September 25, 2020
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The first peace treaty Israel had with an Arab country came in 1979 with Egypt, the next in 1994 with Jordan. The next two, with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain came today. Unlike the previous two, there is a palpable sense of momentum that will lead to more normalizing ties shortly. Missed in all the excitement was that another Muslim state, Kosovo, not only agreed last week to establish relations with Israel, but also to locate its embassy in Jerusalem.

Sadly, of all the European nations who kept lecturing the United States to spend more effort on bringing peace to the Middle East, only Hungary deigned to send a senior representative to this event. Equally significant was that despite all the euphoria in Washington, Abu Dhabi and Manama, in Jerusalem several left-wing politicians and their attending choir of protestors poured cold water on the festivities by lamenting the abandonment of the Palestinian issue. They were joined in their woe in Washington by several news commentators and the Speaker of the House Pelosi who dismissed the treaties as political distractions and complained that the Palestinian issue was unaddressed, as if the headline should be “Peace sets back chances of peace.” Two years ago, these voices all snarked that the move of the US embassy to Jerusalem effectively would end any chances for peace. Finally, Palestinian terror groups in Gaza registered their opinion and launched missiles into the Israeli city of Ashdod to coincide with the White House event.

At the core of the European diplomatic slight, the American establishment’s dismissiveness, and the symbolic but irrelevant launching of missiles was the belief that the Palestinian issue’s resolution is a precondition to advance regional peace. A video recently resurfaced of Secretary of State Kerry in 2016 shutting the door with decisive derision of anyone, especially Israeli leaders, who entertained even the remote possibility that a peace treaty with an Arab country was possible without a resolution of the Palestinian issue first.

And yet, four peace treaties reveal quite a different pattern. Indeed, Secretary Kerry failed not only to predict the future, but the past as well. In 1977, Egypt’s president, Anwar Sadat, was rattled to the core by President Carter’s initiative to convene an international peace conference in Basel Switzerland cosponsored by the Soviet Union – a nation Sadat had just spent years to expel. The Israelis betrayed their anxiety by joking at the time that all Israelis are Swiss since Zionism was born in Basel in 1897 and will die in Basel in 1977. Driven by the US misstep and converging strategic interests, Egypt reached out to make peace. Yes, the Palestinians were mentioned, and an attempt to involve them was included (the Autonomy Plan), but peace and strategic cooperation transcended their veto.

In 1994, the Oslo Accords terrified Jordan’s king. The PLO was an arch-rival and internal threat. Jordan had long coordinated quietly with Israel to manage this threat. The Oslo process threated to devastate this sensitive coordination, so to preempt this, Jordan signed a peace treaty to codify its continued stewardship over the Waqf (Muslim council governing the Temple Mount in Jerusalem) under Israeli control, and reinvigorated Israel’s commitment to coordinate with Jordan. Palestinian aspirations were acknowledged, but again, peace and strategic cooperation transcended their veto.

Since then, Israeli governments offered the Palestinians 98% of the disputed territories, including ceding Judaism’s holiest site, the Temple Mount, and froze settlements, even building in Jerusalem, to encourage the Palestinians back to the table – all for naught. The Palestinians refused to negotiate directly with Israel. Peace stalled because the PLO could not agree to acknowledge the legitimacy of Israel’s existence, yet held a veto over any progress. Periodically escalations followed, each more deadly than the last.

All along, Israel grew in population, wealth and strength. In 1990, Israel hovered at 4.5 million inhabitants, USD 59 billion in GDP, and an industrial era military still reeling from the Yom Kippur and Lebanon wars. It is now twice the size, and nearly ten times the GDP, with one of the most advanced high-tech militaries in the world dwarfing those on its borders combined. In short, the diplomatic reality – that Israel needed peace desperately, was weakened by its absence and that the resolution of the Palestinian issue was the bottom line — diverged starkly from the strategic realities on the ground. Israel was becoming a regional power of great value to those who shared its adversaries, leading to quiet cooperation under the table. In essence, Israel could afford not to have peace; its adversaries, however, could not and are in terminal decline as a result. And indeed, Israel could hardly afford many more attempts to make the sort of peace outlined in Olso in 1993, given the immense cost inflicted on Israel and the Palestinians of trying.

As with Egypt’s Sadat in 1977 and Jordan’s King Hussein in 1994, strategic changes over the last half decade drove a new round of peace. The Obama administration signed the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) and signaled the diminution of American power around which the security architecture of the Gulf, the Levant, the Arabian Peninsula, north Africa and southeast Asia were all built. The distress American moves caused convinced Gulf Arabs that their survival could no longer be held hostage to the Palestinians.

The Trump administration reinvigorated American pressure on Iran, and confidence grew again among allies that the United States once again appreciated the indispensability of its power. But it was inescapable that the United States was entering a period of internal upheaval, turning inward. The proclivity since World War II of Washington elites had been to demand of allies to yield to restraint, subordinate their bilateral relations, or “spokes,” to the hub of American intermediation, and submit to the lead of our diplomats. In return, we would carry the defense burden protection. The Trump administration upended this. We would ask more of our allies so we would need to do less, but also untether them to purse their interests with less deference to the Sisyphean quest of stability, but also in coordination with each other even without its passing through the hub of Washington.

The result was what we witness today: various regional nations realized they have to reach out to Israel and band together to pursue their interests, even survival. They could no longer afford the luxury of being held hostage to Palestinian vagaries. Once again Palestinian aspirations were acknowledged, but again, peace and strategic cooperation transcended their veto.

In short, the ceremonies in the White House today abandoned the attempt of decades to hold the region hostage pending the indulgence of Palestinian rejection and reverted to the strong foundations that had led to the first two peace treaties: namely, to codify already existing fundamental convergence of outlook and national interests, rather than seek to change realities on the ground through a detached utopian vision.

Indeed, it is likely that the Palestinians themselves – not leaders, but those who live in daily contact with Israel – are arriving at the same conclusion.

Posted in By David Wurmser

Abe will be missed, not least because he tethered Trump somewhere close to reality

September 07, 2020
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This article appeared in The Washington Post on August 28, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
August 28, 2020

The resignation of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe — Japan’s most consequential leader since World War II — is a major loss for both Japan and the United States. His unprecedented longevity as prime minister (since 2012, and earlier in 2006-2007) brought the country stability and, therefore, increased Tokyo’s influence in world affairs. Though his successor remains to be chosen, Abe’s main international policy directions are unlikely to shift measurably.

As prime minister, he significantly advanced the proposition, first debated in the 1990s, that Japan was a “normal country,” and thus taking major responsibility for its own defense would be perfectly appropriate. Given Japan’s history of aggression during the first half of the 20th century, that conclusion might not have sat well in much of Asia, but it is now widely understood and accepted. Abe may have failed in amending Japan’s post-World War II constitution to make the change formal, but he likely rendered the need for such amendment far less important.

During the Trump administration, almost alone among U.S. allies and major trading partners, Abe kept economic issues down to a low roar. By preventing trade and investment controversies (inevitable between any two large, interconnected economies) from assuming disproportionate significance in Tokyo and Washington, Abe worked a kind of magic with President Trump. Other U.S. allies were not so successful, repeatedly finding themselves locked in arguments about tariffs, trade barriers and preferential treatment. All important issues to be sure, but not the kind that should distort critical bilateral relationships.

Always armed with charts and graphs about Japanese corporate investment in the United States, and Japan’s purchases of major U.S.-manufactured weapons systems, Abe kept the initiative in meeting after meeting with Trump. Unobtrusively, therefore, he safeguarded the time necessary to discuss with Trump key geostrategic issues of the highest importance to both countries. And he did so with stoic patience, persistent attention to his (and our) ultimate objectives, and endless repetition (so necessary, given his audience).

Abe’s views have been especially important on two key issues: the long-term strategic threats posed by China, and the near-term proliferation threat of North Korea’s efforts to develop deliverable nuclear weapons.

On China, Abe is the real progenitor of the concept underlying Washington’s “free and open Indo-Pacific” mantra, opposing China’s efforts to achieve hegemony in the region and beyond. He has been a major actor trying to foster cooperation among Japan, India, Australia and the United States, a process now underway but with considerably more work to be done. The scope of China’s economic, political and military challenge, and the reality that, for long decades, the United States and others simply ignored what Beijing was up to, means the appropriate answering strategy will not emerge overnight. But Abe has understood plainly that neither can it take forever.

China’s treatment of Hong Kong and Taiwan, and its June clashes with Indian forces along their disputed border in the Ladakh region, are not distant concerns in Japan, as they are to too many Americans. Belligerent Chinese action in the Senkaku Islands, claimed by both Tokyo and Beijing, is even more high-profile for the Japanese, and should be for Washington as well, since it implicates the U.S.-Japan defense alliance. With so much at stake, even as he tends to the chronic health concerns that prompted his resignation, Abe can be an important voice explaining China’s threat across the region.

On North Korea, Abe has unremittingly pursued the elimination of its nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs, along with its ballistic-missile capabilities. Since his early days in politics, he has emphasized Pyongyang’s menace, as well as its barbaric kidnapping of Japanese citizens, holding them for decades without ever providing a satisfactory accounting of their whereabouts or ultimate fate. I first met Abe in August 2002, in Tokyo, when he was deputy chief cabinet secretary, and the “hostage issue” was even then shaping his political career.

He has never been afraid to be clear about the importance of reining in North Korea’s efforts. In September 2017, he wrote in the New York Times that “more dialogue with North Korea would be a dead end.” He added, “I firmly support the United States position that all options are on the table,” meaning that military force was one such option, an extraordinarily forward — but entirely justifiable — position for a Japanese politician.

During the Trump administration, Abe’s disciplined diplomacy was important. He was like a heavy metal chain tethering the president somewhere proximate to reality, rather than getting lost in the Trump-Kim Jong Un rapture. Abe’s successor will have his hands full in either a second Trump term or a Joe Biden presidency, ensuring that we keep our focus on denuclearizing North Korea, and not accepting it as a nuclear power.

Abe’s efforts undeniably strengthened the sometimes-fractious Japan-U.S. alliance. He demonstrated why alliances are not simply disconnected, transactional encounters. Tokyo’s next prime minister needs to remember that as well.

Posted in By John Bolton, Uncategorized

Iran ‘Snapback’ Isn’t Worth the Risk

September 07, 2020
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It would weaken the Security Council veto, which serves U.S. interests at the U.N.

This article appeared in The Wall Street Journal on August 16, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
August 16, 2020

For the U.S., there is one point of high principle worth dying in a ditch for at the United Nations: Never impair the Security Council veto. That’s what President Trump is preparing to do, exacerbating President Obama’s mistakes in negotiating the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.

Mr. Trump rightly withdrew from that agreement in May 2018. The attendant renewal of U.S. sanctions, although imperfectly implemented, brought crushing economic pressure against Tehran. Even so, despite Iran’s continuing violations of the agreement and its widespread belligerent and terrorist-supporting activities, this diplomatic zombie still lurks in the minds of its progenitors, threatening a return next year. Iran Deal 2.0 could come in a Biden administration or even in a second Trump term. The president confidently predicted he could negotiate one in four weeks.

Among the 2015 agreement’s many grievous mistakes was setting a 2020 expiration date on a broad Security Council arms embargo against Iran that specifically enumerates several categories of sophisticated and heavy weapons systems, especially ballistic missiles and their components. There was no reason for Mr. Obama to make this concession except his zeal to make a deal. On Friday the Trump administration tried to extend the council’s embargo, but failed devastatingly; the vote was 2-2 with 11 abstentions; both Russia and China voted no. Approval required nine votes and no vetoes.

The administration had threatened, if the extension failed, to invoke the deal’s “snapback” mechanism and renew all suspended sanctions. Paragraph 11 of Security Council Resolution 2231 provides that a “participant state” in the nuclear deal, asserting “significant non-performance of commitments” thereunder, can force a Security Council vote on snapback within 30 days. That entails a new resolution authorizing the continued suspension of the sanctions, which the U.S. would veto, ensuring that they come back into effect.

The agreement’s backers argue that Washington, having withdrawn from the deal, has no standing to invoke its provisions. They’re right. It’s too cute by half to say we’re in the nuclear deal for purposes we want but not for those we don’t. That alone is sufficient reason not to trigger the snapback process. Why afford any American legitimacy to this misbegotten creature? Further, the U.N. Charter allows no vetoes to decide “procedural” questions, and that is how between nine and 13 members may categorize, and thereby stymie, Mr. Trump’s ploy.

But the real injury is done when a second U.S. administration in five years even attempts, successfully or not, to take actions that undercut America’s veto. The damage here is potentially permanent.

The veto wasn’t widely popular in 1945 when the U.N. Charter was adopted. The idea of eliminating or curtailing it never died. Eleanor Roosevelt and others repeatedly urged against exercising the veto, saying such forbearance demonstrated “moral superiority.” So powerful was this mindset that not until 1970 did Washington first use the power. Thereafter, America has wielded the veto forcefully, largely to protect Israel and other allies.

The U.S. has risked endangering the veto before, notably by introducing the 1950 Uniting for Peace resolution in the General Assembly. Because Moscow had boycotted the Security Council after North Korea invaded the South, Washington was able to obtain the council’s authorization to repel the attack. When the Soviets ended the boycott and threatened vetoes of further Korea measures, America proposed vesting the General Assembly, which had a large pro-U.S. majority, with greater responsibility for international peace and security.

Britain saw the trap immediately. As Dean Acheson wrote, London “wisely forecast the dangers of the idea in the future if the then-majority in the United Nations should give way to one holding contrary views.” He confessed, however, that “present difficulties outweighed possible future ones, and we pressed on.” Sidestepping Russia’s veto seemed attractive, but Uniting for Peace was a potential disaster—averted only because the General Assembly’s own increasing impotence and irrelevance saved the Security Council from political collapse, the fate that befell the assembly.

The snapback concept could be substantially more threatening, enervating the council under the ironic guise of making it more effective. The next time it proves useful to some or all of the permanent members to propose a snap back or similar device to avoid the veto, pressure to acquiesce so as to avoid unnecessary disputes at the U.N. will mushroom. The process may be gradual, but it is nonetheless threatening, either under U.S. administrations that look for temporary deals rather than long-term strategy or ones that overvalue multilateral approbation and tranquility at the U.N. We should skip this experiment.

Posted in By John Bolton, Uncategorized

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